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Abstract
Early literature in the field of transitional justice was dominated by debates over the meaning
of justice, with retributivists arguing for the need for criminal prosecutions following mass
human rights violations and advocates of restorative justice claiming that non-prosecutorial
forms of justice like truth-telling are better suited for post-conflict societies. This debate was
eventually settled, at least in the field, by a belief that post-conflict societies require both
criminal prosecutions and truth-telling. More recently, the debate over justice has centred on
the question of whether the field and practice of transitional justice has prioritized civil and
political rights over economic and social rights. While this is a significant development in
the field, it points to a more fundamental reality. Debates over justice are interminable. To
try to sculpt justice to fit a preconceived definition limits its capacity to respond to the needs
of survivors. This realization serves as the starting point for this project—that justice must
remain open to re-interpretation for it to maintain its relevance in post-conflict societies.
There is, however, a central problem in the field: Transitional justice implies a justice that is
in the service of the transition. What this suggests, then, is that the debates over justice, or,
the justice question, have been substantially circumscribed by the transition question, thereby
limiting the possible definitions of justice. While the justice question has received a great
deal of attention, this project suggests that if debates over justice are to indeed remain
interminable, the more fundamental concern of the field should be the way the transition
question has, in fact, shaped our theorizing about justice.
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Chapter 1

1

Introduction

The research undertaken in this project looks to challenge the dominant theories in
transitional justice. This project is not meant to provide a better form of justice. Rather,
it asks us to think about the way “justice” has been shaped by its attachment to
“transitional.” I argue that theory in the field has been bounded by a fundamental
consensus—that the right kind of justice should help transition a state to a final end-point:
a liberal democracy. This is evident in much of the theorizing in the field, as well as
emerging large-N quantitative studies that look to evaluate transitional justice
mechanisms. This consensus is built on a belief that transitional justice, as the protection
of human rights, was finally able to blossom in the political space opened up by the end
of the Cold War. For the most part, these beliefs have gone unchecked in the field. Part
of the explanation for this is the lack of critical theory in the field. The field was built on
normative, legal-philosophical works and small-N ethnographic case studies by Western
scholars.

1

These scholars were significantly influenced by the third wave of

democratization and the belief that the international community was increasingly moving
towards a more liberal and, as a result, more humane system. More recently, there has
been a call for large-N quantitative studies as a way to evaluate the claims made by these
2

scholars. However, these quantitative studies rely largely on the criteria set by the early

1

For example, see Neil Kritz, ed. Transitional Justice: How Emerging Democracies Reckon with Former
Regimes (Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1995); and Martha Minow, Between
Vengeance and Forgiveness: Facing History after Genocide and Mass Violence (Boston: Beacon Hill
Press, 1998).
2

For example, see Oskar N.T. Thoms, James Ron, and Roland Paris, “Does Transitional Justice Work?
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literature.

Thus, the effectiveness of transitional justice is defined by its ability to

promote human rights and liberal democracy.
Central to the field has been the ongoing debate around what I call the justice
question: What is justice? What are the effects of justice? What form does justice take?
These questions have been the motor propelling transitional justice forward from its focus
on retributive justice through criminal prosecution to its eventual incorporation of
restorative and reparative justice with the recognition of the importance of truth
commissions and reparations. Yet, while the justice question has garnered considerable
attention, very little focus has been placed on the transition question and, in particular,
what is implied by a transition and how justice is impacted by this transition?
Early literature in the field was dominated by debates over the meaning of justice,
with retributivists arguing for the need for criminal prosecutions following mass human
rights violations and restorativists claiming that non-prosecutorial forms of justice like
truth-telling are better suited for such societies. This debate was eventually settled, at
least in the field, by a belief that post-conflict societies require both criminal prosecutions
and truth-telling. More recently, the debate over justice has focused on whether the field
and practice of transitional justice has prioritized civil and political rights over economic
and social rights. While this is a significant development in the field, it points to a more

Perspectives from Empirical Social Science,” 19 October 2008, Social Science Research Network,
http://papers.ssrn.com. See also Colleen Duggan, "Editorial Note," International Journal of Transitional
Justice 4.3 (2010): 315-328.
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fundamental issue: debates over justice are interminable. To try to hold justice to a final
definition limits its capacity to respond to the needs of survivors. This realization serves
as the starting point for this project: justice must remain open to re-interpretation for it to
maintain its relevance in post-conflict societies.

There is, however, a fundamental

problem in the field: Transitional justice implies a justice that is in the service of the
transition.

This transition encircles justice, thereby limiting its possible definitions.

What this suggests, then, is that debates over justice, or, the justice question, are
fundamentally bound by the transition question. While the justice question has received
a great deal of focus, this project suggests that if justice is to remain open and fluid, the
more fundamental concern of the field should be the way the transition question has
shaped our theorizing.
Scholars in the field of transitional justice seem to have coalesced around the
consensus that when a state transitions from conflict, the ideal end-point is the liberal
democratic state. Recent work discussed in chapter two, below, points to the importance
of a series of conferences at the end of the 1980s and 1990s in which the scholars in
attendance set the path for the eventual establishment of transitional justice as a field of
study. Of particular note was the influence of transitology for participants at these
conferences. As a sub-field of Political Science, transitology focused on regime
transformation following authoritarian rule and was unabashedly pro-democracy. As the
study of transitional justice shifts toward more quantitative methods as a way to evaluate
the success of justice mechanisms the impact of democracy has become ever clearer.
Indeed, for many of these studies, the attainment of a liberal democracy and respect of
civil and political rights is held as the main indicator of success.

4

While the influence of transitology tells us something about why the field adopted
a pro-liberal democracy stance early in its development, it does not tell us why the
privileging of these values has remained largely unchallenged. This project suggests that
the dominant historical narrative of the field’s entrance into mainstream international
politics—its normalization as a field—helps shed light on why this is the case. Ruti
Teitel has been a central figure in the field of transitional justice since before its inception
as a coherent field of study. In addition to her impact on the theorization of the field, her
work has provided a widely accepted narrative of how transitional justice emerged from
its origins in the prosecution of Nazi leaders following the Second World War to the
normalization of transitional justice at the international level with the establishment of the
International Criminal Court (ICC) in The Hague. In her most recent work, Humanity’s
Law, Teitel provides an account of an emerging trend in international politics in which
the diverse rights of humanity are increasingly being recognized at the international level.
Teitel traces the growing recognition of humanity’s law, suggesting that the convergence
of International Human Rights law, International Humanitarian Law and International
Criminal Law has created a new subject in the international system, humanity.
According to Teitel, the “telos” of this humanity’s law is a new legal regime and moral
discourse which protects individuals regardless of the state in which they reside—that is,
this new subject is clearly supplanting the primacy of the state in international politics.
Drawing on the work of communitarianism, Teitel argues that humanity’s law does not
have in mind a single, universal law. Rather, she says that the claims increasingly made
on states will reflect the diversity of humanity.

5

In addition to Teitel, Kathryn Sikkink has provided an equally important narrative
of the field’s past and future. Drawing on what she calls agentic constructivism, Sikkink
argues that there is a justice cascade at the international level which is challenging the
old ideas about state sovereignty and sovereign immunity when it comes to the
prosecution of high-ranking state officials for international crimes. Sikkink argues that
the foundation of this justice cascade is the work of the human rights movement. As a
result of this, state leaders are increasingly being held accountable whether through
retributive mechanisms like criminal prosecutions or restorative mechanisms like truth
commissions.
Central to both of these claims is the argument that the traditionally anarchic,
state-centred international system is being domesticated by the right-holding individual or
what Teitel identifies as the humanity’s law subject. Further, both authors argue that the
impetus for this shift in the international system was the end of the Cold War. The
changes in the international system following the collapse of the Soviet Union created the
necessary political space for these actors to assert their demands at the international level.
I refer to this argument as the Cold War Thesis, and it has been widely accepted by
scholars in the field of transitional justice as characterizing the defining moment for the
field. The thesis suggests that, prior to the end of the Cold War, demands for greater
accountability of states were stifled by the conflict between the United States and Soviet
Union and the demands of power politics. The fall of the Soviet Union, therefore,
signified the victory of liberalism in the marketplace of ideas, which meant that chains
could finally be placed on state leaders who violate the basic rights of their citizens. This
consequently led to the decision to adopt the International Criminal Tribunal for the

6

former Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda thereby
unleashing the power of justice onto the international scene.

Teitel refers to this

phenomenon as the normalization of transitional justice.
The early 1990s also saw the growth of the academic theory known as the
Democratic Peace Theory.

This theory is based on a series of historical empirical

analyses, which suggest that democracies do not fight one another.

Influenced by

Immanuel Kant’s perpetual peace argument, these scholars argue that as the world
increasingly democratizes, we will reach greater and greater levels of peace in the
international system. The central normative claim of Democratic Peace Theory is that the
promotion of democracy internationally is good for international peace. This claim is
also supported by its sister thesis, known as the Liberal Peace Thesis. The Liberal Peace
Thesis asserts that for states emerging from conflict the best route to ameliorate the
sources of this conflict is the adoption of liberal democratic institutions. Yet, beyond this
idealistic notion of international peace, the growth of democracies around the world has
particularly strategic value for the United States. Consequently, the Democratic Peace
Theory and the Liberal Peace Thesis were used as justification for merchandizing
democracy and free market capitalism abroad. In contrast to the Cold War Theory, this
project argues that it was this strategic value placed on Democratic Peace Theory and
Liberal Peace Thesis by the United States that was integral in the normalization of
transitional justice at the international level.
The relationship between Democratic Peace Theory and the Liberal Peace Thesis
on the one hand and the Cold War Thesis on the other is central to this argument. For
many scholars, the Democratic Peace Theory and the Liberal Peace Thesis have an air of

7

neo-imperialism or, at the very least, privilege certain western ideals.

3

However, the

field of transitional justice has remained largely insulated from such criticism. This
project suggests that the Cold War Thesis helps explain why this is the case. While
Democratic Peace Theory and, more recently, the Liberal Peace Thesis have been
criticized for the role they play in legitimating American democracy promotion,
transitional justice is often viewed as a project, not of the most powerful states, but,
instead, of the least powerful actors in the international system: vulnerable individuals
(whose claims are supported by human rights activists). Transitional justice theory is
often praised for the work it has done in challenging state sovereignty and lifting human
rights to the international level. Important here is the belief that the end of the Cold War
allowed for an opening of political space for the work of human rights activists to take
hold. What this suggests, then, is that transitional justice stands outside and against
power.
Central to the field of transitional justice is the belief that it has been an effective
tool for the protection of international human rights, and that in doing so, it has
challenged state sovereignty. This project suggests instead that this reading requires a
liberal interpretation of the importance of human rights.

In contrast, more critical

scholars challenge the moral certainty of human rights, suggesting that they have a more
ambiguous character than most would like to admit. They can certainly be understood as
tools for contesting the power of the state, but by taking a more Foucauldian
understanding of power, human rights can also be understood as a disciplinary discourse,

3

For example, see Oliver Richmond, Peace in International Relations (New York: Routledge, 2008).
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which sets specific standards of behaviour. By accepting the Cold War Theory without
reserve, theorists in the field have failed to critically interrogate the way transitional
justice mechanisms are, perhaps, instrumental in perpetuating this disciplinary discourse.
In adopting such a view, this project looks to examine the way the growth of
transitional justice cannot be understood apart from American democracy promotion. Of
utmost importance for this work was Ronald Reagan’s re-interpretation of human rights,
transforming them from international standards to values that are fundamentally
embedded in a state’s political institutions and legal structures.

For Reagan, the

protection of human rights was best served through the promotion of democracy abroad
with the American system serving as the foremost model to follow.

Regan’s re-

interpretation is significant because it took human rights from an obscure concept to
concrete policy recommendations; human rights protection and democratization became
synonymous. From then on, human rights became an important tool in the American
foreign policy arsenal. As a symbol of human rights protection, it is understandable that
the international community, led by the Untied States, turned to transitional justice as a
central tool in democracy building during the 1990s. It was in this era, of course, that the
international community established the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia, followed closely by the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. Much
less a tool of challenging state sovereignty, transitional justice was quickly adopted as a
practice to confirm the importance of democracy.
Ultimately, one can ask why this matters at all. Regardless of its connection to
democracy promotion (American led or not), transitional justice has been important for
bringing attention to the needs of survivors after conflict. However, as recent criticism in

9

the field suggests, justice in this context has been shaped by the assumption of a
transition to liberal democracy. A fundamental component of liberal democracy building
is the construction of free market capitalism, driven by neoliberalism.

While

neoliberalism is generally associated with its economic dictates, its importance must be
understood in terms of a normative theory which suggests that human well-being is best
advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms within a governance structure
that protects private property and promotes free trade. In this view, the state’s role is
limited to guaranteeing the integrity of money and private property through the
establishment of a military, police force, and legal structures. Importantly, neoliberalism
advocates the removal of welfare entitlements, which might act as a disincentive for
individuals to participate in the market. What this means is that attempts to protect
economic and social rights, which in many cases require a strong social safety net, are
severely limited.

Here, we can see that the values important to the transition are

considered prior to justice and, therefore, set the boundaries of what is acceptable as
justice.

What this suggests is that the transition question which privileges liberal

democracy must be subject to further scrutiny if justice is to remain an open concept and
therefore, responsive to the diverse understandings of justice.
In order to destabilize this consensus around liberal democracy, this project
argues that the liberal society is not a moral necessity. Of importance here is the work of
Foucault. In the field of transitional justice, we have failed to consider the operation of
power as anything but a repressive force. Of course, the idea of challenging state power
is supposedly at the centre of the transitional justice discourse. The field is built on the
notion that certain mechanisms, including legal prosecutions and truth commissions, can

10

curtail the power of state leaders (as well as rebel leaders) when they act against
international norms of behaviour. As Bassiouni writes, there is a “growing discontent
with the practice of granting impunity, particularly for the leaders who have ordered the
commission of atrocities and the senior commanders who executed these unlawful
orders… the realpolitik of reaching political settlements without regard to a post-conflict
justice component is no longer acceptable.”4 Here, the literature is very clear on the
relations of power. Transitional justice can provide once powerless victims, with the
necessary tools (i.e. human rights) to challenge the seemingly untouchable power of state
leaders.
In response to this, I draw on the Foucault-inspired work of Ivison, Golder, and
Douzinas to suggest that human rights may be better understood as a conduit for power
rather than checks on power. For Foucault, power must be understood as something that
is diffuse and never in the possession of a single agent.5 In other words, individuals do
not wield power like a stick; rather, they mediate power by regulating behaviour. Such an
understanding recognizes that power is not simply an aspect of the political arena but is
“produced from one moment to the next, at every point, or rather in every relation from
one point to another.”6 Thus, power is indeterminate and omnipresent because it is

4

M. Cherif Bassiouni, “Accountability for violations of International Humanitarian Law and other Serious
Violations of Human Rights,” in Post-Conflict Justice ed. by M. Cherif Bassiouni (Ardsley, NY:
Transnational Publishers, Inc., 2002), 3.
5

Michel Foucault, “Two Lectures,” in Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews & Other Writings 19721977, ed. Colin Gordon (New York: Pantheon Books, 1980), 98.
6

Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality, vol. 1, An Introduction, trans. Robert Hurley (New York:
Vintage Books, 1990), 93.
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“exercised from innumerable points.”7 Accordingly, power is diffused and embodied in
the dominant discursive structure “that sets the standards of accepted or expected
behaviour.”8 As the rite of passage for the transformation of societies from conflict to
peace and authoritarianism to liberal democracy, as advanced by Teitel and others,
transitional justice is fully enmeshed in this manifold of power. Further, it is not simply
the practice of transitional justice that needs to be challenged, but the academic field,
itself. We cannot fully grasp Foucault’s understanding of power in isolation from his
understanding of discourse and knowledge generation:9 “there can be no possible
exercise of power without a certain economy of discourses of truth which operates
through and on the basis of this association. We are subjected to the production of truth
through power and we cannot exercise power except through the production of truth.”10
This is what Foucault means by power/knowledge. Power is articulated in the accepted
forms of knowledge, scientific understandings, and ‘truth’. Indeed, the knowledge that
transitional justice produces further entrenches these practices.
Given that the site of transition in which the language of transitional justice is
used is a place of continued deep contestation, it seems necessary for the field to be
centred on more fluid and flexible concepts in order for theorization to avoid closure
around any single vision of society. To open up transitional justice, then, is to call into
question the ontological certainty around the transition in transitional justice theory.

7

Foucault, The History of Sexuality, 92.

8

Ivan Manokha, “Foucault’s Concept of Power and the Global Discourse of Human Rights,” Global
Society 23, no. 4 (2009): 430.
9

Manokha, “Foucault’s Concept of Power and the Global Discourse of Human Rights,” 430.

10

Foucault, “Two Lectures,” 93.
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Drawing on the work of scholars like Richard Rorty, Jacques Derrida, and Stuart
Hampshire, this project argues that, for justice to remain a responsive concept we must
avoid closure around a single definition—that is, our theories of justice must not be
limited by the transition to liberal democracy.

The work of Rorty is central for

understanding that the language we use to speak about the external world is not neutral.
Words are not merely labels for a material reality but rather give meaning to “our” world.
Central here is that we all carry with us a particular language that we use to rationalize
our beliefs and desires, but that these do not express any truths about the world. They are
not, as Rorty would say, final, but are merely one set of words—or a vocabulary—among
many. Therefore, I argue that we must resist viewing these paradigms as expressing a
universal truth about justice. Rather, they are vocabularies, which express particular
beliefs about the world. In the field of transitional justice, these vocabularies have been
theorized as necessary rules to be followed in the transition to liberal democracy.
In response, I rely on Derrida’s unique perspective on justice to challenge these
boundaries in transitional justice.

For Derrida, the “impossibility” of justice is to

recognize that we must strive for justice, but know that justice will never be conclusively
defined. It will never be something we can touch and hold onto. Instead, justice is
something that we cannot define because to do so is to reduce it to a finite object. To
desire the “impossible,” then, is to “strain against the constraints of the foreseeable and
possible, to open horizons of possibility to what one cannot foresee or foretell.”11 For

11

John D. Caputo, Deconstruction in a Nutshell: A Conversation with Jacques Derrida (New York:
Fordham University Press, 1997), 133-134.
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Derrida, justice requires one to pass through the “ordeal of the undecidable.”12 That is, a
just decision is one that is not guaranteed by a rule. In this light, for transitional justice
theory to impose a definite purpose for transitional justice mechanisms—the attainment
of a liberal democracy—it eliminates the possibility of justice. The only “legitimate”
action, therefore, is that which conforms to the authoritative liberal democratic
framework. This must be challenged.
Hampshire’s approach to conflict and justice can shed light on the necessary task
of transitional justice theory. Hampshire suggests that one cannot approach conflict in a
society with the belief that it can be resolved once and for all. Instead, when it comes to
matters of substantive justice including beliefs about morality and ethics, Hampshire
argues that conflict is interminable. All we can strive for are institutions that allow for all
sides to be heard. In other words, there is no final solution to be had, but the solution is
to hear all sides. Of course, transitional justice theory approaches conflict with a solution
that is fundamentally grounded in the Liberal Peace Thesis. What transitional justice has
failed to recognize is that this fundamentally privileges certain voices at the expense of
others. The central aim of this dissertation is to generate greater discussion in the field
around this decision.
Chapter two of this project reviews the literature and examines the study of the
field of transitional justice. More than a literature review, this chapter provides an
account of the two consensuses in the field: (1) that societies emerging from conflict can
in every case transition to a final end-point—liberal democracy; and (2) that transitional

12

Jacques Derrida, “Forces of Law,” in Acts of Religion ed. Gil Anidjar (New York: Routledge, 2002), 252.
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justice mechanisms, which assist in this transition, emerged as a result of the liberalizing
international system following the end of the Cold War.
Chapter three provides the tools for carrying out an interrogation of the theory of
transitional justice. This chapter draws a fundamental distinction between traditional
theory, which operates within fixed parameters without question, and critical theory,
which looks to challenge these boundaries. Much of transitional justice scholarship
operates within boundaries that it does not question. By adopting a critical stance, this
project looks to transgress these boundaries. The framework for this project is defined by
a deconstructive attitude.

Deconstructing transitional justice theory should not be

interpreted as an attempt to destroy the field altogether. Instead, this analysis is driven by
a desire to loosen the boundaries that circumscribe justice. In doing so, it hopes to show
that the current vocabularies dominant in the field privilege certain perspectives over
others.
Chapter four provides a more in-depth examination of the dominant paradigms of
justice in transitional justice including retributive, restorative and reparative. While each
paradigm draws on a diverse set of ideas regarding justice, this chapter argues that the
field of transitional justice has imposed a definition of justice that supports the
construction of a liberal democracy.

Further, this chapter examines the emerging

quantitative studies in the field of transitional justice which look to evaluate the
effectiveness of theese transitional justice mechanisms. Interestingly, the indicators of
success that are often adopted are those that conform to the values of liberal democracy.
In doing so, these studies produce knowledge about transitional justice that further
entrenches these values in the field.

15

Chapter five argues that the field’s prominence is not a matter of a progressive
unfolding of events, as the Cold War Theory asserts. Instead, I argue that the myth of the
end of the Cold War as an opening for the domestication of the international system is a
nice story that conceals the fact that transitional justice only became useful as a tool in
democracy promotion. This, then, explains why the consensus of finality is so important
to the field. For without the belief that transitional justice is working towards a final endpoint—liberal democracy—its strategic usefulness withers away.
Chapter six draws on the work of Derrida, Hampshire, and Agamben, in order to
transgress the imposed boundaries in transitional justice theory. The dominant theories in
transitional justice rely on a Platonic understanding of justice in which justice is the
attainment of some ideal endpoint. Overwhelmingly, the theorized endpoint is a liberal
democracy. This teleological thinking actually undermines the possibility of justice. In
contrast, if we view the world in Heracleitean terms, we must understand that conflict is
interminable. Justice, therefore, is not the attainment of some ideal endpoint, but must
also be understood as an interminable process.

Such a reading is meant to open

transitional justice theory to allow in those voices that do not conform to the vocabulary
of liberalism dominant in the field.
Finally, in the conclusion, I argue that the impetus for this project was the
recognition that transitional justice has failed to respond to the calls for greater economic
and social justice. Yet, the task was not one of merely imposing another new definition
of justice as this cannot account for the “unforeseeable” demands of justice. Instead, the
challenge is to show that the current theorizing in transitional justice allows for the
privileging or domination of certain voices over others. Therefore, the introduction of

16

postmodern theory into the field of transitional justice is important for guarding against
the closing of justice around any particular conception.
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Chapter 2

2

Literature Review
2.1

Introduction

The definition of transitional justice remains contested, but, in general, refers to the legal
and non-legal mechanisms that societies can adopt in the wake of mass human rights
violations.

These mechanisms primarily include criminal prosecutions, truth

commissions, reparations, lustration, and institutional reform. Conceptually, the range of
crimes covered under this definition can be broad; however, the field has tended to focus
principally on Genocide, Crimes against Humanity, War Crimes, grave breaches of the
Geneva Conventions, and violations of civil and political rights. These crimes reflect the
primary concern of transitional justice: states in transition from repressive authoritarian
rule and/or from armed conflict to peace. Historically, these “transitional” states have
struggled with a set of moral, legal, and political challenges including what to do about
the past and how to move forward. Fueled by fears of never-ending cycles of conflict, the
field of transitional justice emerged to promote specific mechanisms to aid in the
transitions to democracy and peace.

2.2

The Study of Transitional Justice

Transitional justice as a distinct field of study emerged sometime in the late 1990s to
early 2000s.1 Led by legal scholars like Diane Orentlicher and Neil Kritz, the field
quickly gained in popularity and is now fully enmeshed in academia with its own

1

Christine Bell, “Transitional Justice, Interdisciplinarity, and the State of the ‘Field’ or ‘Non-Field’,”
International Journal of Transitional Justice 3, no. 1 (2009): 8.
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journals, centres of research and academic programs. In addition to the academic side,
various non-governmental organizations, including the International Center for
Transitional Justice, support the work of transitional justice practitioners.
Initially dominated by legal scholars, the early focus of the field was on questions
of accountability in democratic transition. According to Ní Aoláin and Campbell, this
“led to the development of ‘transitional justice’ as an identifiable set of discourses in the
first instance.”2

However, as the field expanded across disciplines to include

anthropology, development studies, philosophy, political science, psychology, sociology,
and theology, the focus went beyond legal justice to include non-legal conceptions of
justice, including truth-telling and reparations as well as questions of reconciliation,
healing, forgiveness, and so on. Consequently, as the field progressed, there was a surge
of comparative institutional analyses of the justice mechanisms employed by societies as
they sought justice following mass atrocities.3 Despite the apparent consensus on the
need for justice, there was little agreement on what form justice should take in the field.

2

Fionnuala Ní Aoláin & Colm Campbell, “The Paradox of Transition in Conflicted Democracies,” Human
Rights Quarterly 27. 1 (February 2005): 174. (A classic example is the question posed by Michael Feher,
“How should nascent democracies address the human rights violations that plagued their societies’ recent
past?” See: Michael Feher, “Terms of Reconciliation,” in Human Rights in Political Transitions:
Gettysburg to Bosnia, ed. Carla Hess and Robert Post, 325-338 (Cambridge, Mass.: Zone Books, 1999).
3

See: Alexandra Barahona de Brito, Carmen Gonzalez-Enriquez, and Paloma Aguilar, eds., The Politics of
Memory: Transitional Justice in Democratizing Societies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001); Tristan
Anne Borer, ed., Telling the Truths: Truth-telling and Peace Building in Post- Conflict Societies (Notre
Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2006); Eric Stover and Harvey M. Weinstein, eds., My Neighbor,
My Enemy: Justice and Community in the Aftermath of Mass Atrocity (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2004); Neil Kritz, ed. Transitional Justice: How Emerging Democracies Reckon with Former
Regimes (Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1995); Martha Minow, Between
Vengeance and Forgiveness: Facing History after Genocide and Mass Violence (Boston: Beacon Hill
Press, 1998); Robert I. Rotberg and Dennis Thompson, eds., Truth v. Justice: The Morality of Truth
Commissions, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000); Naomi Roht-Arriaza and Javier Mariezcurrena,
eds., Transitional Justice in the Twenty-First Century: Beyond Truth Versus Justice, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2006); Priscilla Hayner, Unspeakable Truths: Facing the Challenges of Truth
Commissions (London: Routledge, 2002).
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The expansion of transitional justice beyond its legalistic beginnings resulted in a debate
between those who advocated for criminal prosecutions in the wake of mass human rights
violations and those who promoted truth commissions, and the search for truth as vital
4

following intense conflict. Connected to this was the debate between retributive justice
and restorative justice. Taking on a more philosophical tone, this debate centred on the
“underlying philosophy of justice that should inform accountability for past violence.”

5

For scholars who subscribe to justice as within the retributive paradigm, justice
resembles the western-styled understanding by taking the form of criminal prosecutions
followed by some form of punishment for those found guilty.6 These scholars suggest
that there are several positive consequences of punishment including, among others: the
deterrence of future crimes;7 preventing act of vengeance, thus breaking the cycle of

4

For an early argument for criminal prosecutions, see Diane Orentlicher, “Settling Accounts: The Duty to
Prosecute Human Rights Violations of a Prior Regime,” Yale Law Journal 100, no. 8 (1991): 2537-2615;
Similarly, for an early argument for truth commissions, see Priscilla B. Hayner, Unspeakable Truths:
Transitional Justice and the Challenge of Truth Commissions (New York: Routledge, 2002); and Miriam J.
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Harvard Human Rights Journal 15 (2002): 29-98.
5
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Societies (New York: Routledge, 2013), 24.
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Roht-Arriaza, “State Responsibility to Investigate and Prosecute Grave Human Rights Violations in
International Law,” California Law Review 78. 2 (1990): 449-513; Declan Roche, “Retribution and
restorative justice,” in The Handbook of Restorative Justice, ed. Gerry Johnstone and Daniel W. Van Ness
(Portland, OR: Willan Publishing, 2007).
7
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violence;8 and building the status of a new state (by rejecting the old state) and increasing
the respect for law.9
On the other hand, restorative justice emerged from a much different view of
wrongdoing.10 In recognizing the communal aspect of life, such a perspective views
crime as both a consequence of, and contributor to, damaged relationships within a
community.

A criminal act, therefore, signals an existing brokenness within the

community. In contrast to the retributive paradigm, restorative justice emphasizes the
“transformation of subjective factors that impair community, such as anger, resentment,
and desire for vengeance.”11 Any response to such collective brokenness must seek to
restore the basic fabric of society by including the victim and the offender, as well as
other community members.12 Restorative justice draws inspiration from philosophies and
beliefs from around the world, including Christianity,
justice,

14

15

and African cultural concepts like Ubuntu.

13

Aboriginal approaches to

Such restorative justice principles

8

Graham T. Blewitt, “The Importance of a Retributive Approach to Justice,” in The Legacy of Nuremberg:
Civilizing Influence or Institutionalized Vengeance? ed. David A. Blumenthal and Timothy L.H.
McCormack (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2008), 39.
9

Mark Drumbl, Atrocity, Punishment, and International Law (New York: Cambridge University Press,
2007), 173.
10

Howard Zehr, The Little Book of Restorative Justice (Intercourse, PA: Good Books, 2002), 22.

11

Mark R. Amstutz, “Restorative Justice, Political Forgiveness and the Possibility of Political
Reconciliation,” in The Politics of Past Evils: Religion, Reconciliation, and the Dilemmas of Transitional
Justice, ed. Daniel Philpott (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2006), 166-167.

12

Zehr, The Little Book of Restorative Justice, 21.

13

Zehr, The Little Book of Restorative Justice; Daniel Philpott, “Peace after Genocide,” First Things
(Jun/Jul 2012): 39-46.
14

Rupert Ross, Returning to the Teachings: Exploring Aboriginal Justice (Toronto: Penguin Canada,
1996).
15

Elizabeth Kiss, “Moral ambitions within and beyond political constraints,” in Truth v. justice: The
Morality of Truth Commissions, ed. Robert I. Rotberg and Dennis Thompson, 68-98 (Princeton: Princeton
University Press), 81.

21

have become the guiding moral force behind the development of truth and reconciliation
commissions following mass atrocities.

The purported benefits of truth and

reconciliation commissions include, among others: eliminating a regime’s ability to deny
truth;16 restoring the dignity of victims;17 promoting forgiveness;18 and fostering
reconciliation.19
Finally, scholars of transitional justice have identified reparative justice as a third
paradigm. The starting ground for the reparative paradigm is the notion that humans and
the relationships they build need to be repaired from time to time.20 Such brokenness is
certainly evident following episodes of mass violence. For Weitekamp, the generally
accepted rationale behind the concept of reparations is the "act of restoring; restoring to
its rightful owner; the act of making good or giving equivalent for any loss, damage or
injury; and indemnification.”21 Such a response to crime was historically much more
common than relatively more recent conceptions of justice like retribution.22

16

Priscilla B. Hayner, Unspeakable Truths: Transitional Justice and the Challenge of Truth Commissions
2nd ed. (New York: Routledge, 2011), 22.
17

Kiss, “Moral ambitions within and beyond political constraints,” 71-72.

18

Minow, Between Vengeance and Forgiveness.

19

Kader Asmal, Louise Asmal, and Ronald Suresh Roberts, Reconciliation through truth: a reckoning of
apartheid’s criminal governance (Cape Town: David Philip Publishers, 1997), 6.
20

Elizabeth V. Spelman, “Coexistence and Repair,” in Imagine Coexistence, ed. Antonia Chayes and
Martha Minow (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2003), 236. For more information on the purported power of
truth commissions see: David Mendeloff, “Truth-Seeking, Truth-Telling, and Post-conflict Peacebuilding:
Curb the Enthusiasm?” International Studies Review 6, no. 3 (2004): 363-375.
21

Elmar Weitekamp, “Reparative Justice: Towards a victim oriented system,” European Journal on
Criminal Policy and Research 1. 1 (1993): 70. Current terminology for reparative justice includes:
restitution, reparative schemes, victim-offender reconciliation, redress, mediation programmes, community
service, atonement, indemnification, and compensation. According to the author, such terms are generally
used interchangeably, but share this same conceptual basis.
22

Weitekamp, Reparative Justice, 70-73.

22

In post-conflict societies, the concept of reparations is frequently broadened from
its historically narrow focus on monetary compensation.

In the transitional justice

literature, the term refers to several legal and social measures including material
reparations like cash payments or provisions for education, health and housing,
restitution, and symbolic measures like commemorations, memorials, and apologies.23
Reparative mechanisms have largely been overshadowed by the attention given to
retributive and restorative justice; however, as for some victims the latter are the most
concrete response to human rights abuses.24

2.3

Emerging Criticism of Justice

Transitional justice has not been without its critics, from both within the field and outside
of it.

First, various critics have sought to challenge the assumptions of legalism

embedded in the field. This, of course, goes back to the debate between retributive and
restorative justice that dominated the early transitional justice literature.

For some

restorative advocates, the dominance of retributive justice has very much been about the
power of the international community to impose its will on weaker, conflict-ridden states.
These critics envision power as the international community’s ability to get smaller states
to prosecute their leaders, where they, in all likelihood, might not otherwise have done so.
Such a conception of power relies on an unequal relationship between those who
employ power—the international community—and those who are subject to it—states
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and state leaders emerging from conflict. The creation of the International Criminal
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and, following this, the establishment of the
International Criminal Court (ICC), are examples of the external imposition of justice in
cases where impunity for crimes might have otherwise occurred. As Llewellyn and
Howse suggest, the “criminal prosecution of perpetrators… has seemed the most obvious
avenue, especially to Western human rights activists or international lawyers.”25 As the
field developed, restorative and retributive models were eventually viewed as legitimate
approaches to justice after mass atrocities. In the UN Secretary-General’s Report of
2004, The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies,
truth commissions were cited as an “important mechanism for addressing past human
rights abuses.”

26

Further, under the section, “Articulating a Common Language of

Justice for the UN,” the report states that,
The notion of transitional justice discussed in the present report comprises the full
range of processes and mechanisms associated with a society’s attempts to come
to terms with a legacy of large-scale past abuses, in order to ensure accountability,
serve justice and achieve reconciliation. These may include both judicial and nonjudicial mechanisms, with differing levels of international involvement (or none at
all) and individual prosecutions, reparations, truth-seeking, institutional reform,
vetting and dismissals, or a combination thereof.”27
The report made it clear that both truth commissions, as mechanisms of restorative
justice, and criminal prosecutions, as mechanisms of retributive justice, as well as
reparations, are viewed on equal footing by the UN.
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More recently, there has been a focus on the neglect of socio-economic rights in
states transitioning from conflict.

28

This work draws considerable inspiration from

human rights activist Paul Farmer, who argues that “human rights violations are not
accidents; they are not random in distribution or effect. Rights violations are, rather,
symptoms of deeper pathologies of power and are linked intimately to the social
conditions that so often determine who will suffer abuse and who will be shielded from
harm.”29 In terms of transitional justice, a focus on trials and reparations, which ignores
economic and social inequalities, is “like treating the symptoms while leaving the
underlying illness to fester” and the “diagnosis of human rights violations abstracted from
the dynamics of social power and conflict” overlooks the fundamental pathologies of a

28
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society.30

Other critics in the field are slowly noting the limited exposure socio-

economic, structural factors receive within transitional justice. Miller argues that “the
reduction of economic questions to the need for reparations and, in turn, a focus on the
pressure on reparations as an issue of limited resources in a nascent economy curb the redistributional possibilities of the project of transitional justice.”31 By ignoring economic
questions, the transitional justice literature does not focus on the economic causes of
conflict, or on their potential to undermine peace. Further, Miller suggests that there is
often a complete disregard for the role that international actors, including external states
and multinational corporations, play in conflict. Such oversight, according to Miller,
makes “transnational structural imbalances seem irrelevant with regard to internal
violence or repression.”32
Mani concludes that this failure to address questions of equality in post-conflict
society is the result of a mix of factors including risking a negative response from elite
groups and institutions that, for some reason, reject ideas of redistribution; a desire to
maintain an economically-friendly environment for business communities and
international investors; and/or a lack of resources to carry out any significant policy of
redistribution.33 Mani suggests that peacebuilding, including transitional justice, has
failed to adequately address the real concerns of survivors of conflict. Peacebuilding
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agents have often focused on reconstructing state institutions while overlooking questions
of distributive justice, which often underlie conflict in many countries.34 While general
poverty as a result of resource scarcity is considered a probable cause of conflict, in
reality, a more likely explanation of civil strife is injustice—that is, the prevailing social,
economic, and political structures that favour an elite few at the expense of the rest of
society.
Similarly, Laplante suggests that the international community must broaden its
understanding of justice to include structural violence, referring to the embedded
socioeconomic conditions that have combined to produce such poverty and inequality in
a society.35 For example, she believes that there needs to be an explicit recognition of
economic, social, and cultural rights, in order to legitimate and protect social justice.
While some mechanisms, like truth commissions, highlight the impact of socioeconomic
factors in a historical context, they do not present them as a rights violation, per se.
Without situating them in a language of rights, there are no explicit duties to be fulfilled.
Instead, Laplante suggests that it is left to political leaders to decide whether or not to
address such structural concerns.36 The lack of focus on socio-economic injustices is a
failure of justice in the field and is, perhaps, a result of the prioritization of civil and
political rights over economic and social rights.
These concerns are borne out in the work of Simon Robins. Robin’s fieldwork in
Nepal suggests that “a liberal discourse, combining ideas of democracy, rights, and
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development has become hegemonic as a result of the priorities and resources of
international agencies and the willing co-optation of national elites who have benefited
from an association with it, through access to funds and careers.”37 Robin’s interviews,
however, reveal a fundamental disconnect between the priorities put forward by this
liberal discourse and the needs of victims. In particular, he suggests that, while the civil
society in Nepal generally advocates a judicial agenda, the victims themselves place a
higher priority on social and economic needs.38
Robins suggests that while, theoretically, the international community recognizes
the importance of both civil and political, and economic and social rights, “in both the
global rights discourse and in praxis (in Nepal and elsewhere), social, economic, and
cultural rights are far less emphasized… potential compensation and economic support
for victims is always framed in terms of a legally based ‘right to reparation’, essentially
reframing the issue as a civil/political right.”39 Robins concludes that, “while human
rights remains a tool of strategy and mobilization for oppressed groups seeking justice
after conflict… locally grown, ‘non-human rights’ efforts to both address the issues
arising from conflict and fight for political and social change in the system that led to
conflict can provide unique input to create a transitional justice process that can give
space to the agendas of victims.”40
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These criticisms serve as an important starting point for this project. That the
socio-economic plight of victims in post-conflict societies has only, until recently,
resonated very little within the field of transitional justice is problematic.

The

prioritization of civil and political rights over economic and social rights was a common
feature of early literature on human rights.

As Shue points out, the fulfillment of

economic and social rights was believed to place an unreasonable burden on the dutybearer and, therefore, the aspiration to honour such rights was viewed as having
“dangerously utopian overtones.”

41

This treatment of economic and social rights was

carried over into the field of transitional justice. Consequently, these criticisms are an
important reminder that justice in response to human rights violations must be an open
concept. Shue seeks to put economic and social rights on par with civil and political
rights. For Shue, “one of the chief purposes of morality in general, and certainly of
conceptions of rights, and of basic rights, above all, is indeed to provide some minimal
protection against utter helplessness to those too weak to protect themselves. Basic rights
are a shield for the defenseless against at least some of the more devastating and more
42

common of life’s threats, which include… loss of security and loss of subsistence.”
The question, then, is how to translate these beliefs into the field of transitional justice.

In highlighting the prioritization of retributive over distributive justice, and civil
and political over economic and social violations, these critiques suggest that transitional
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justice, in many ways, represents the interests of the West and, particularly, of global
capitalism. They challenge the conception of justice in transitional justice, pushing for a
more inclusive definition of justice in post-conflict societies. Returning to Laplante’s
analogy of “treating the symptoms while leaving the underlying illness to fester” these
critiques suggest that the current cure for the illness in these post-conflict societies is
lacking. 43 In highlighting this, they hope to find a more accurate diagnosis in order to
heal these societies.44
These critiques, while pertinent within the field of transitional justice, highlight a
significant assumption in the field: that with the right kind of justice, we can progress to
a state of existence that no longer requires such justice. Transitional justice implies
finality. In other words, the rights kind of justice will lead us out of transition. Such a
teleological view maintains the assumption that all societies are transitioning, or
progressing, towards a final end-point.
The idea that transitional justice, and the societies in which it operates, is
advancing towards a final end-point is problematic for four reasons: First, it
fundamentally structures our actions—that is, once we have set our sights on an ideal
end-point, we tend to close ourselves off to all options except those that will contribute to
this final point. Second, setting a final end-point, of course, closes the door on alternative
end-points. Third, setting a final end-point, especially if it relate to justice, suggests a
certain level of permanency that over-simplifies the complexity of life. In societies
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emerging from conflict, such an assumption suggests that the quantity of justice needed
for societies emerging from conflict can be measured in doses. A dose of retributive and
a dose of restorative, therefore, are viewed as sufficient to heal society. Finally, to assert
that we are advancing towards a final end-point opens the door for the most powerful to
decide what that end-point is going to look like. It does not maintain the flexibility that is
arguably necessary in states emerging from conflict. Indeed, the site of transition is
bombarded by a multitude of actors and ideas. To close this site to all but a select few
ideas is to open up the country to further eruptions of violence when those ideas become
a point of contention. In other words, to do so is to deny the ineradicable conflict in any
free society.

2.4

Transitions in Transitional Justice

The debates over justice have been the motor driving transitional justice forward beyond
its origins in international justice to a field that now views retributive, restorative, and
reparative justice as integral to a societies emerging from conflict. However, when it
comes to the “transitional” component of transitional justice, there has been very little
debate. Indeed, literature in the field regarding transitions is scant. Quinn provides a
useful typology of transition:
(1) Post-conflict transitional societies, meaning societies that are “recover[ing] after
mass atrocity, civil conflict, genocide, authoritarian regimes, and so on.”45
According to Quinn, these societies are “clearly in the process of seeking to move
forward from the past, by dealing with questions of justice.”46 “Forward,” here, is
defined as “transitioning toward peace and democracy.”47
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(2) Pre-transitional states are defined as “those in which there has not been a definite
transition from one regime to the next, nor a clear move from conflict to peace.
Fighting often continues, and the population continues to live in a state of
48
‘suspended animation’.” According to Quinn, Uganda is a good example of a
pre-transitional state. She writes, “The election of President Museveni might once
have signaled a kind of opening for the possibility of democracy and peace, but
more than 25 years after he first seized power, this seems increasingly less likely.
His actions belie any semblance of democratic intention.”49
(3) Non-transitional states are defined as “countries that may well be regarded by the
rest of the world as solidly democratic, peaceful states. And yet under their ‘good
guy’ veneer often lurks a violent past.”50 Most of the former British colonies
including the United States, Canada, and Australia would fall into this category in
view of their past and, in many cases, current treatment of the Indigenous peoples.
While extremely useful for generating discussion around transition, Quinn’s typology is
important more for understanding the kinds of states we are transitioning from rather than
the kinds of states we are transitioning to. In fact, her typology points to the reason for
this: there is, in fact, a general consensus in the field that “transition” refers to liberal
democratization.

When we think of countries in “transition,” we assume they are

transitioning from X (i.e. Iraq, Bosnia, Afghanistan, etc.) to a liberal democracy.
According to this model, the history, culture, economics, and so on of X does not matter.
But, the question remains, how did we get from theorizing about questions of justice after
mass atrocities, as we did at Nuremberg, to justice for democracy promotion as we do
today? In other words, when did justice after mass atrocities become transitional justice?

2.4.1

Getting from Justice to Transitional Justice

If the start of the twentieth century was defined by conflicts between states, the end of the
century was marked by a surge of largely internal conflicts. These various conflicts were
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characterized by systematic human right violations and extreme repression, which “tore
apart the social fabric of a number of countries, leaving a toll of deaths, injuries, broken
lives, trauma, and deepened antagonism.”51 As a result of these conflicts, many of the
countries were left with intense political and social divisions.52 As political change swept
over many of these countries, subsequent governments, as well as the international
community, struggled with a set of moral, legal, and political challenges. As Hayner
points out, “the basic question, that of how to reckon with massive past crimes and
abuses, raises a wide range of difficult issues.”53

In response, the international

community, led by the United Nations (UN), has accepted that, after such mass atrocities,
the concept of “justice” needs to be promoted.54 This impulse for justice is generally
regarded as the driving rationale for the field of transitional justice.
Transitional justice is defined by Teitel as “the conception of justice associated
with periods of political change, characterized by legal responses to confront the
wrongdoings of repressive predecessor regimes.”55 More specifically, Kerr and Mobekk
write that transitional justice has been employed to “denote the range of judicial and nonjudicial mechanisms aimed at dealing with a legacy of large-scale abuses of human rights
and/or violations of international humanitarian law.”56 For Kerr and Mobekk, “these
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mechanisms are designed, to a greater or lesser extent, to address the need for
accountability, to provide justice and to foster reconciliation in societies in transition
from authoritarian to democratic rule or from war to peace.”57
Central to these definitions is the belief that transitional justice is a language of
change.

We adopt the language of transitional justice to address the past, but we

inevitably instill in it a vision of the future. As Mendez asserts,
redressing the wrongs committed through human rights violations is not only a
legal obligation and a moral imperative imposed on governments. It also makes
good political sense in the transition from dictatorship to democracy. In fact, the
pursuit of retrospective [transitional] justice is an urgent task of democratization,
as it highlights the fundamental character of the new order to be established, an
order based on the rule of law and on respect for the dignity and worth of each
human person.58
Similarly, Teitel argues that “for there to be meaningful change in societies driven by
racial, ethnic, and religious conflict, ‘identity politics’ should be exposed for what it is—a
political construction. Ethnicity politics has no place in the liberal state. What needs
construction is the liberal response to injustice.”59 And, while Teitel recognizes the
limitations of such liberal responses as the International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia,

60

she concludes that, “in such transitional circumstances, perhaps the best

that can be brought into view is the image, rather than the reality, of the liberal state.”61
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Both Mendez and Teitel suggest that this change implies democratization. Yet,
this still fails to answer the question of why. What these authors are suggesting is that,
when injustices occur, the only viable response to ensure that they do not occur again is
to create a liberal democracy—that is, that liberal democracy is the best model for
organizing society to ensure violence does not erupt again.

Paige Arthur sheds

considerable light on how the field came to this consensus or, perhaps more accurately,
how this consensus was embedded in the field from the start.
In her article, “How ‘Transitions’ Reshaped Human Rights: A Conceptual History
of Transitional Justice,” Arthur provides insight into the founding ideas behind the
concept of transitional justice. Arthur’s analysis is centered on a series of conferences
including the 1988 Aspen Institute conference, “State Crimes: Punishment or Pardon,”
the 1992 Charter 77 Foundation conference, “Justice in Times of Transition,” and the
1994 Institute for Democracy in south Africa conference, “Dealing with the Past,” which
established the “intellectual framework” within which we now examine how societies
should deal with their outgoing, rights-abusing regimes.62 According to Arthur, many of
the individuals involved in these conferences helped to establish the foundations of the
field, including Juan Mendez, Ruti Teitel, Aryeh Neier, and Diane Orentlicher, among
others.63 It was at these conferences as well as in the first major book on transitional
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justice, Neil Kritz’s Transitional Justice: How Emerging Democracies Reckon with
Former Regimes, that the two normative aims of transitional justice were cemented:
accountability and building democracy. Participants at the conference expressed a desire
to see “some measure of justice [for] those who suffered under repressive state
regimes.”

64

Following this, participants were concerned with “facilitating an exit from

authoritarianism and shoring up a fragile democracy.”

65

These priorities have both

structured the conceptual boundaries of the field and provided the accepted mechanisms
we now associate with transitional justice. As Arthur writes,
It was not by chance that the structure of conversations at this conference— and
similar conversations at the 1992 Charter 77 Foundation conference and the 1994
IDASA-sponsored conference on dealing with the past in South Africa, as well as
Kritz’s work—consistently reflected an interest in a particular set of measures as
objects of debate: prosecutions, truth-telling, transformation of an abusive state
security apparatus, and rehabilitation or compensation for harms. Nor is it by
chance that this structure implied that a comprehensive approach, including
elements of all of these measures, should at least be considered by transitional
regimes. These measures fit closely with [the] two normative aims that many of
66
the participants expressed.”
That these ideas were dominant does not explain their origins. According to Arthur, the
participants at these conferences including Kritz were particularly influenced by the work
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of transitology and in particular, the writings of Guillermo O’Donnell and Philippe
67

Schmitter.

Transitology was the study of regime transformation which gained prominence in
the late 1970s and 1980s. Transitologists suggested that a stable transition away from
authoritarian rule must be accompanied by mutual guarantees of protection between elites
and important interest groups including the military, business leaders, political leaders,
etc.68 O’Donnell and Schmitter focus on the importance of elite decision making and
legal-institutional reform in establishing the importance of the rule of law and, of great
importance for transitional justice, the need to address the past. The authors assert that
while prosecution poses significant risks, “by refusing to confront and to purge itself of
its worst fears and resentments, such a society would be burying not just its past but the
very ethical values it needs to make its future livable.”69
The literature on transitology filled an important vacuum in the study of
democratization. Whereas prior paradigms dominant in the development and
democratization fields had focused on structural factors like socio-economic conditions
for understanding the transition from traditional to modern societies, their work suggested
that a transition to democracy is best achieved through elite negotiation.

Thus, by

rejecting these structural paradigms, transitology opened the door for more direct forms
of democratization, as well as the introduction of top-down models to assist in this

67

Arthur, How Transitions Reshaped Human Rights, 343.

68

Guillermo O’Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter, “Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative
Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies,” in Transitional Justice: How Emerging Democracies Reckon
with Former Regimes, ed. Neil J. Kritz (Washington: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1995), 64.

69

O’Donnell and Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule, 59.

37

transition. According to Arthur, the work done by transitologists was influential in
structuring the conceptual boundaries for transitional justice, as it was carried out within
an overtly pro-democracy normative framework. That this literature was included in the
first major books on the topic, including Neil Kritz’s edited volume, Transitional Justice:
How Emerging Democracies Reckon with Former Regimes is rather telling. Arthur’s
analysis focuses on the way the field has been bounded by this “transition to democracy”
lens.
Arthur provides considerable insight into the intellectual beginnings of the field of
transitional justice as well as providing a brief introduction to the general consensus that
has framed the field. However, her work suggests that the field of transitional justice is
solely an individual actor-driven endeavour. This is typical of the field of transitional
justice, given that it comprises mainly scholars/activists who view themselves as central
to the functioning of the field. Such a view is predicated on a second major consensus in
the field: that the end of the Cold War provided the necessary political room for
transitional justice to flourish outside of academia. Scholars tend to believe that the
growth of transitional justice is a result of the liberalization of the international
community following the end of the Cold War.
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Accordingly, in the marketplace of

ideas, once state socialism proved untenable, liberal democracy was finally able to take
its place as the only legitimate form of government in the eyes of the international
community, thus creating a space for transitional justice to flourish.
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interrogate this assumption further, the following section will examine two dominant
narratives of the field’s current trajectory.

2.5
Hypotheses on the Trajectory of Transitional
Justice
Recently, there has been a surge of books and journal articles that attempt to better
contextualize and evaluate what we know about transitional justice. Some of these
71

studies focus on the field’s past,

72

on the present,

and its future.

73

Of particular

concern for this study is the question of from where transitional justice emerged. From
these texts, there seem to be two dominant perspectives on the trajectory of transitional
justice—that is, where it came from and where it is going. First, Kathryn Sikkink, along
with a variety of co-authors, has shaped what has become known as the justice cascade.
These writings culminated in her book, The Justice Cascade, which provides an account
of the emerging justice trend in international relations. Second, Ruti Teitel has written
extensively on this matter. Her 2000 book, Transitional Justice, provided some of the
first insights into the path that transitional justice has taken and where this might be
leading. Since then, she has elaborated further on this through her article, “Transitional
Justice Genealogy,” and most recently, in her 2011 book, Humanity’s Law. The two
authors attempt to capture both the historical antecedents of the field and the impact
transitional justice is having on international relations.
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2.5.1

The Justice Cascade

The justice cascade argument is built on what Sikkink calls an agentic constructivist
framework.

According to Sikkink, “agentic constructivism is concerned with how

agents—that is, real people and organizations—promote new ideas and practices. If
successful, such new ideas may catch on and over time… will create new understandings
of the ways in which states ought to behave [i.e. structural constructivism’s logic of
appropriateness], and new understandings of the national interest of states [i.e. realism’s
logic of consequences].”74 To explain the justice cascade in the international system,
then, we need to focus on the way new ideas emerge, proliferate, and, eventually,
displace old ideas.
At the centre of the justice cascade is the ascendancy of the individual in the
international system and the way this has challenged traditional notions of sovereignty in
the state system. The importance of the individual, recognized by the emergence of the
human rights regime, fundamentally challenges “the old ideas about sovereignty and
sovereign immunity [which] maintained that high-ranking state officials should not and
could not be prosecuted.”75 Over time, these ideas were replaced by “new ideas about
individual criminal accountability for human rights violations [which] stress that state
officials should and could be held accountable.”76

Admittedly, Sikkink attributes

tremendous explanatory power to human consciousness, arguing that,

74

Kathryn Sikkink, The Justice Cascade: How Human Rights Prosecutions are Changing World Politics
(W.W. Norton and Company, 2011), 236-237.
75

Sikkink, The Justice Cascade, 234.

76

Sikkink, The Justice Cascade, 234.

40

The early adopters and innovators of trials were largely unaware of one another,
and they were not drawing on international models. They chose to use
prosecutions because of domestic pressures, not because they were told or obliged
to do so by other powerful countries or institutions in the North…In both Greece
and all the early adopters in Latin America, regional human rights commissions
wrote crucial country reports on human rights violations during the authoritarian
regimes that provided evidence and encouragement for such prosecutions, while
not in any sense determining the outcomes. Early adopters of transitional policies
then acted as laboratories of justice, which innovated and experimented with new
and different transitional justice practices. Eventually, some of these practices
served as models that could be used in other countries.77
For Sikkink, then, the justice cascade “was not spontaneous, nor was it the result of the
natural evolution of law or global culture in the countries where the prosecution
occurred.”78 Instead, “these changes in ideas were fueled by the human rights movement.
The cascade started as a result of the concerted efforts of small groups of public interest
lawyers, jurists, and activists, who pioneered strategies, developed legal arguments,
recruited plaintiffs and witnesses, marshaled evidence, and persevered throughout years
of legal challenges.”79

Whereas the tendency is to view the implementation of

international justice as a result of top-down pressure,80 Sikkink wants to draw attention to
the way ideas flow both outwards and upwards. The cascade originated in the domestic
politics of countries in what she identifies as the semi-periphery (Greece, and eventually
Latin America) where it then diffused horizontally to other countries, as well us
vertically, up to international institutions.81
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While Sikkink focuses predominantly on the use of criminal prosecutions, she
does allow that truth commissions are just as important in the story of the justice cascade.
She asserts that, “one of the most interesting characteristics about the justice cascade is
the confrontation and convergence of two new and powerful international norms:
criminal accountability and restorative justice.”82

While the advocates of restorative

justice have often denied the continued importance of criminal prosecutions, Sikkink
argues that restorative justice mechanisms like truth commissions can work “very
effectively together with retributive justice, such as domestic and foreign prosecutions.”83
Thus, while “some advocates like to stress the differences between them, it is perfectly
legitimate both theoretically and practically to see these as complementary ideas that
form part of the broader movement for accountability for past human rights violations.”84
And, just as criminal prosecutions spread via human rights activists, so, too, did
truth commissions. While we associate the truth commission with South Africa, the first
prominent commission took place in Argentina followed by Chile. Experts from
Argentina and Chile, including Patricia Valdex, Cataline Smulovitz, and Jose Zalaquett
subsequently shared their experiences with South Africa as that country set out to create
its own commission.

Alex Boraine and Paul van Zyl, deputy chair and executive

secretary of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission respectively, have
further contributed to the spread of these ideas with the establishment of the prominent
transitional justice non-governmental organization, International Center for Transitional
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Justice (IJTJ).85 ICTJ has since helped guide the establishment of truth commissions
across the globe.86
While these new norms can have a powerful influence, Sikkink does recognize
the importance of the wider context. She argues that “the interests of actors don’t exist in
the abstract, but change over time in relation to the changing institutional and ideational
context in which they are operating. Unless victims can imagine prosecutions, they can’t
calculate that it would be in their interests to pursue them.”87 According to Sikkink, two
major structural changes precede the justice cascade: First, the increase in the number of
transitional states during the third wave of democracy provided the sites at which
prosecutions can occur;88 and, second, the end of the Cold War and the eventual break-up
of the Soviet Union, took “attention away from a polarized struggle between communism
and anti-communism… [which] created a more permissive atmosphere for holding
former repressive leaders of whatever ideological stripe accountable for past human
rights violations.”89 For Sikkink, activists exploited this opening in the international
system in order to advance their human rights agenda.
The first half of Sikkink’s book tells a story about the building of an international
norm regarding the accountability of leaders for human rights abuses. However, the book
takes a more rationalist turn when she attempts to measure the impact of such
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mechanisms on human rights and democracy. Her tests look at both the individual
impact these mechanisms have, and the impact they have in concert. In the end, her
analysis suggests that human rights and truth commissions have an independent effect on
human rights practices in a country.90 When considered together—that is, if a country
has both human rights prosecutions and a truth commission—the impact on human rights
practices is even greater.91 Further, she finds evidence to support the claim that these
mechanisms are having a deterrent effect on other countries, as well.
This consequently poses the question: what is the causal logic at work? She
writes, “human rights prosecutions are not only instances of punishment or enforcement
but also high-profile symbolic events that communicate and dramatize norms.”92 Yet,
“because trials involve simultaneous punishment and communication, it is hard to know
which is doing the work in bringing about improvements in human rights. Are future
perpetrators deterred by the fear of punishment, or have they been socialized by the
normative process of observing the trials?”93 This is why the positive impact of truth
commissions is important. If the only causal factor for deterrence was punishment, and
given that truth commissions don’t result in such punishment, then one could reasonably
expect that truth commissions should not have an effect. Yet, according to her research,
“the fact that both truth commissions and prosecutions are associated with improvements
suggests that transitional justice works through a normative mechanism like socialization
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as well as through deterrence.”94 Sikkink uses this evidence to confirm her initial sketch
of this emerging norm. She argues that the justice cascade is not just a rhetorical
phenomenon, nor is it merely limited to effects on adopting countries. Its impact must be
understood as a form of socialization that can potentially impact the behaviour of state
leaders throughout the international system.95 Such a perspective views the trajectory of
transitional justice in an upward and outward fashion from its origins in the work of
human rights to its installation at the international level following the end of the Cold
War to its universalization around the world.

2.5.2

Humanity’s Law

In her most recent book, Teitel postulates an emerging normative framework taking
shape in the international community, which she calls ‘Humanity’s law’. Humanity’s law
is the construction of a structure of protection built on the notion of the human race and
not based on “membership in a particular political community.”96 Philosophically, it is
based on the work of “Hobbes, but also other pivotal philosophers such as Montesquieu,
who wrote that liberty is the opinion each citizen has of their own security, and of Locke,
or of Spinoza, who opined that ‘the virtue of the state is security’.”97 What stands out for
Teitel is the focus these authors place on the “capacity of the state to protect as central to
its legitimacy–rather than on democracy, or the state, as an expression of collective will.”
For Teitel, such an
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understanding of the state… points to the possibility of a global perspective –
since, of course, the threats or vulnerabilities to which citizens or civilians are
exposed are, in many cases, not limited by national boundaries. In this sense,
what emerges is that the liberal idea of the human has a global telos. This
notion—which possibly legitimates contemporary institutionalization—may go
some way toward supporting a notion of global society.98
In terms of historical events, Teitel locates the origins of this framework in the postwar
period following the defeat of Nazi Germany.

Specifically, she argues that the

establishment of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg marked a watershed
moment: the convergence of three areas of international law: International Human Rights
Law, International Humanitarian Law, and International Criminal Law.
While the relationship between these three bodies of international law is certainly
not coterminous, it is clear that the three areas are connected. Human Rights Law refers
to law which attempt to regulate relations between individuals and their state.99
International Humanitarian Law (IHL), also known as the Laws of War refers to the body
of international law that attempts to civilize conflict by outlining the protection of
vulnerable individuals including civilians and prisoners of war as well outlawing
inhumane killings through legal provisions like the ban on Cluster Munitions.100 Finally,
whereas International Human Rights Law refers to the relationship between citizen and
state and IHL is built largely on the international treaties signed between states,
International Criminal Law holds accountable individual persons “who commit
extraordinary international crimes such as genocide, Crimes against Humanity, or
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widespread War Crimes.101 As Drumbl points out, the Nuremberg tribunal held that,
“crimes against international law are committed by men, not by abstract entities, and only
by punishing individuals who commit such crimes can the provisions of international law
be enforced.”102 Prior to this convergence, international law, for the most part, governed
only the relations between states. How individuals were treated by their state was a
matter of domestic jurisdiction and not international law.103 There were, however, only a
few examples where “concern for individual human welfare seeped into the international
system.”104
Acting together, these three areas of law, Teitel suggests, created a distinctively
new subject in the international system: humanity. She quotes the Nuremberg Tribunal
which declared that “humanity need not supplicate for a Tribunal in which to proclaim its
rights… Humanity can assert itself by law. It has taken on the robe of authority.”105 The
“telos” of this new legal regime and moral discourse is the protection of individuals,
regardless of the state in which they reside.106 She writes,
The increasing recognition of Crimes against Humanity goes to the heart of the
emerging global rule of law. It expresses the change in the rule of law by sending
a message that ‘humanity rights’ are inviolable, and by expressing the value of
protection – that is, of freedom from persecution by the state or other state-like
entities –on a global basis. Indeed, this offense encapsulates the paradigm shift in

101

Mark Drumbl, “International Criminal Law: Taking Stock of a Busy Decade,” Melbourne Journal of
International Law 10, no. 1 (2009): 38-39.
102

Drumbl, “International Criminal Law,” 39.

103

There were a few exceptions including the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907, as well as the first
three Geneva Conventions of 1864, 1906, and 1929.
104

Philip Alston and Ryan Goodman, International Human Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2013), 136.
105

Teitel, Humanity’s Law, 9.

106

Teitel, Humanity’s Law,19.

47

normativity, as it expresses the status of the new subject and defines the place of
the individual—in terms of and connected up on the basis of the collective, as
well as other transnational affiliations. 107
Central to Teitel’s argument is a shifting, or progressively liberal, notion of state
sovereignty in the international system.
Traditionally, state sovereignty provided for the protection of state leaders who
“were largely unconstrained in terms of what they did within their own borders (except
for the minimal standards relating to the treatment of aliens – the law of diplomatic
protection).”108 Outside those borders, “apart from jus cogens [principles in international
law from which no derogation is allowed], states were constrained only by norms to
which they had consented, either by explicit agreement (as in the case of conventional
law), or by state practice (as in the case of customary law).”109 In other words, the state
was the primary actor with no supreme authority. Not only were states unconstrained,
but also the international law that they constructed merely reinforced this system, mainly
through the protection given to state sovereignty that was at the heart of international law.
As Brownlie states, “sovereignty and equality of states represent the basic constitutional
doctrine of the law of nations, which governs a community consisting primarily of states
having a uniform legal personality.”
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However, according to Teitel, the humanity’s law

framework and its subject, the individual, has supplanted the traditional subject of
international law since the Peace of Westphalia, the state. And, as the framework extends
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to more and more populations, she suggests that the contemporary rule of law at the
international level will increasingly be “equated with the assurance of humanitarian
norms regulating violence within a coercive scheme.”

111

This shift is, perhaps, most

vivid in the increasing focus on human security. She writes that
one can see how the protection of human rights poses a direct challenge to the
preeminence of state security and, indeed, how the shift to a humanity-based
regime reflects a change in the very meaning of international security. As the
humanity law framework in important respects, modifies (without wholly
replacing) older norms based on territoriality and the protection of state borders, it
produces a transformed understanding, whereby international security becomes
112
part and parcel of human security, the security of persons and peoples.
This progress is already evident in the establishment of the International Criminal
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and Rwanda (ICTR) and, of course, the
establishment of the International Criminal Court (ICC). For Teitel, the establishment of
these courts reflects a “greater reliance generally on legal processes and norms in the
ordering of international society, the regulation of conflict, and the protection of human
security.”113 Building on the legal work of Nuremberg, these tribunals set in motion a
“jurisdictional revolution,” in which the convergence of humanitarian law, human rights,
and international criminal law provides for a more comprehensive framework. This
framework asserts that War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity are indictable offenses
regardless of the nature of the conflict (international or domestic).

This increased

protection was initially established at the ICTY, which “found the normative protection
against War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity applicable in both international and
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internal conflicts—relying on the postwar Geneva Conventions extending rights beyond
interstate conflict.”114 The ramifications of this shift are monumental. To drive this point
home, Teitel quotes an ICTY ruling which asserted that, “a state-sovereignty-oriented
approach have [sic] been gradually supplanted by a human-being-oriented approach…
Why protect civilians from belligerent violence or ban rape, torture or the wanton
destruction of hospitals, churches… as well as proscribe weapons causing unnecessary
suffering when two sovereign states are engaged in war, and yet refrain from enacting the
same bans or providing the same protection when armed violence has erupted ‘only’
within the territory of a sovereign state.”

115

While the ICTY blazed the initial path, it was the ICTR and, eventually, the ICC that
really marked the jurisdictional revolution. Teitel writes, “despite that the offenses at
issue were being committed within that country’s ethnic conflict, the ICTR’s statute
explicitly contemplates international enforcement of prohibitions on Crimes against
Humanity. Here, we see that institutionalization of the most serious offenses is being
directed at protecting core individual and group humanity rights affinities beyond their
nexus to the state.”116

Thus, whereas prohibitions on Crimes against Humanity

historically required a nexus with armed conflict, the ICTR’s statute provided for a more
inclusive jurisdiction. Importantly, this jurisdictional revolution also provides protection
from atrocities committed by non-state actors. According to Teitel, “from the very first
case before the Balkans tribunal, the ICTY declared that ‘the law in relation to Crimes
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against Humanity has developed to take into account of forces which, although not those
of the legitimate government, have de facto control.”117 This development is especially
important for weak or failed states.
Ultimately, she is claiming that the emergence of humanity’s law provides the
basis for new forms of action for people at the international level that are not mediated by
their political attachments (i.e. as subjects/citizens of the state).

Perhaps more

importantly, what this suggests is that there will in the future be greater action to protect
endangered persons regardless of the particular state in which they find themselves
located. Teitel supports this claim with various examples of institutional contexts where
the language of humanity is being utilized including NATO’s bombing of Serbia, the
establishment of the ICTY and subsequently the ICTR, which, according to Teitel, all
have an explicit agenda of both protecting and, thus, reconfirming humanity’s law.
However, she draws a distinction between her argument and the work of cosmopolitans
and constructivists like Kathryn Sikkink, who interpret the “growing universalization of
the humanitarian norms… [as] a sign of an ever-expanding legal system—one that has
the potential of attaining universal scope, and thus caries the allure of the promise that we
may someday see a ‘one-law’ world.”118
Teitel recognizes that the notion of a global rule of law “implies a measure of
universalizability across situations and regimes.”119 However, drawing, in part, on the
work of communitarianism, she argues that different cultures and traditions will produce
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a variety of interests and norms.120

Therefore, she suggests that we eschew the

“individualist, or hyperliberal conceptions of rights as derivatives from the claim of the
unsituated self,”121 in favour of an interpretivist framework that allows for evolving
practices that respect the dynamism of humanity with all its “multiple actors, persons,
peoples, and states.”122 By this term “interpretivism,” she is referring to an approach that
can rule in cases of injustice but does not close justice to future re-interpretations. She
refers to judicial interpretation as an example: “judicial interpretation is well suited to
making sense of diverse normative sources, under conditions of political conflict and
moral disagreement. Courts are inherently in dialogue with other courts and institutions
that also play interpretive roles, and their decisions in individual cases can give meaning
to law without purporting to give ‘closure’ to normative controversies in politics and
morals.”123 Thus, the “dynamic character of the status of the human,” implies that
international law needs to recognize that “the status of the human is a basis for new and
diverse claims”—that is, a necessary subject of international law.124

In doing so,

“persons and peoples” will have the “opportunity to shape the law to which they are
subject, and to shape the relevant values that are at issue.”125
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In such a framework, our duties and rights are not grounded in an a priori view of
norms that humans share by virtue of being rational individuals, but, rather, the “shared
experiences of the memory of inhumanity, and the claims to rights of situated, affected
agents.”126 However, she does argue that humanity’s law recognizes that the diversity of
persons and people does function within a “context of a common humanity—a humanity
that transcends the particular persons who are organizing as peoples; goes beyond fixed
or ‘essentialist’ racial, ethnic, or religious categories; and possesses a strong subjective
element, a matter of a will to live collectively that may we be inherent in what it is to be
human.”127
Thus, by allowing for the evolution of our definitions while being rooted in a
common bond of humanity, Teitel’s interpretivist framework seeks to “navigate the
narrow strait between the Scylla of difference and the Charybdis of universalism.”128
Such a framework will allow for the evolution of our definitions while being rooted in the
common bond of humanity. Here, Teitel has shifted from an explanation of events to
normative theory, but she is clear that her interpretivist framework is rooted in the
already existing legal and political conditions.129 She writes, “Humanity’s law—as a
basis for a universal, global rule of law—depends on a discourse and structure of claims-
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making that has become the world’s lingua franca, surpassing while also encompassing
human rights law and norms.”130
According to Teitel, the genesis of Humanity’s Law is the Nuremberg Tribunal
following the Second World War. However, these forces did not gain traction until after
the end of the Cold War. While the end of the Cold War initially gave rise to “hopes of a
new peace,” the outbreak of intra-state wars suggested otherwise.131 Yet, in the face of
these tragedies, there were a “range of interventions and engagements undertaken in the
name of ‘humanity’.”132 Thus, “born at a moment of great uncertainty and flux in global
affairs, humanity’s law supplie[d] a new discourse for politics.”133 For Teitel, “this
discourse goes hand in hand with judicialization and greater reliance generally on legal
processes and norms in the ordering of international society, the regulation of conflict,
and the protection of human security.”134 She continues, “the pivotal role of law in the
discourse of diplomacy has become clear since the end of the Cold war; humanitycentred claims permeate much foreign affairs discourse.”135

For Teitel, then, the

trajectory of transitional justice is not all that different than Sikkink’s. While Teitel’s
understanding of the potential substantive content of transitional justice is more diverse,
the trajectory she sketches in Humanity’s Law takes transitional justice from its origins in
the Nuremberg trials following the Second World War to its establishment at the
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international level following the end of the Cold War, to its proliferation around the
world.

2.5.3

Interrogating the Claims

Both the justice cascade and humanity’s law posit an emerging framework for the
protection of human rights in the international system. While Teitel’s work attempts to
account for a more diverse subject in international law, they both take as their starting
point the importance of human rights as a moral force in international relations. These
two accounts are illustrative of a larger blind spot in transitional justice: an
oversimplification of power.

136

On its face, Sikkink’s argument is rather persuasive. By closely documenting the
flow of ideas from the ground up and across space, she provides a clear account of the
emergence of the justice cascade. Questions of power, including both coercive and
structural forms, do figure prominently in Sikkink’s framework but are better at
“explaining why accountability was kept off the agenda for so many years, and why even
people harmed by human rights violations rarely considered the possibility of prosecuting
repressive state officials” and not why it emerged in the first place.137 In the end, her
analysis of power and, specifically, her failure to account for more diffused
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understandings of power leads her quickly down the path of moral certainty, where
caution should be exercised.
Sikkink’s framework consequently rejects claims that the justice cascade was a
product of powerful states or structural power. According to Sikkink, “except in a
handful of cases, like the former Yugoslavia” powerful states have not led the trend
towards accountability.138 In fact, powerful states like the United States have stood in
direct opposition to the development of this norm.139 As for structural power, Sikkink
recognizes that “a Western liberal legal and philosophical tradition [is] hegemonic in the
world today and at the time most human rights law was drafted” and, therefore, “the
move to individual criminal accountability could be seen as the result of the structural
power of the hegemonic Western worldview.”140 However, she argues that such an
agenda which empowers “an individual vis-à-vis his or her state runs deeply counter to
the structural power of states in the state system.”141 And, as the data confirms, the
justice cascade is not a myth: “the idea of the individual sometimes wins over the ability
of state officials to protect themselves from prosecution.”142 Finally, Sikkink addresses
Marxist-inspired claims, which attempt to connect the power of the individual and the
consequent human rights trials with the ascendance of the capitalist worldview.143
Similar claims about the power of capitalism were made by dependency theory to explain
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the increase in military coups and repressive governments. She rejects these arguments
on the grounds that capitalism cannot be used to explain both the rise of authoritarian
regimes and liberal democracies. Instead, she writes, “the capitalist economic system and
ideology have co-existed with both labor repression and human rights prosecutions.”144
The explanation of the justice cascade is predicated on the “intrinsic power of a
new norm,”145 a norm that was eventually “put forward by a coalition of like-minded
states and NGOs who are in favor of change, embedded in law and institutions.”146 To
suggest that the power of the norm is intrinsic suggests that it somehow appeals to a
universal sense of humanity. As Sikkink writes, “this norm is powerful and persuasive in
itself—not just because of the power of the states that advocated it, or the financial power
of the foundations that supported the human rights NGOs, but because the idea is
inherently appealing to a broad range of individuals.”147 For Sikkink, power does factor
into the equation, but is better understood as an explanation of why the justice cascade
took so long to gain momentum, and not for its eventual dominance at the international
level. Therefore, this is not a story of a top-down imposition of ideas. Much to the
contrary, “the justice cascade started in domestic politics in the semi-periphery and
diffused outwards and upwards through horizontal diffusion from one country to another,
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and then via bottom-up vertical diffusion from individual countries to international
organizations and international NGOs.”148
In the case of humanity’s law, Teitel is overtly trying to make a case against
constructivists like Sikkink and cosmopolitans like Jürgen Habermas. For example,
while Teitel recognizes that cosmopolitans “effectively capture the spirit that animates
the proliferation of law,” she argues that they “tend to essentialize this spirit as a timeless
moral truth” and, in doing so, “it somehow elides the range of historically contingent
factors that explain the law’s normative direction in the present era.”149 In contrast,
Teitel’s interpretivist turn hopes to account for this shift towards international rule of law
(the proliferation of law) without prescribing the universalization of a Western ideal. She
writes, “humanity’s law is universalizing enough to offer a new legal and political
subjectivity,” but “the subjectivity is defined and shaped by the humanity concept itself,
and is articulated and achieved through the multiplication of claims in diverse actor’s
struggles over access to courts and other institutions of global law.”150 Yet, Teitel,
herself, does not escape criticism. According to the critical international legal scholar,
Martti Koskenniemi, Teitel “provides us with a Whig history of international
legalism.”151 Koskenniemi suggests that, throughout her book, Teitel finds “glimmerings
of the human law framework,” whether in the League of Nations, the Nuremberg trails or
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the writings of Hugo Grotius.152 Indeed, “the story she tells is one of a long struggle
against statehood, waged predominantly by European and American activists using
international law and institutions to bind states to their ethical principles.”153

For

Koskenniemi, then, “rather than history, this reads like ideology.”154 In other words,
Teitel’s account is ignorant to the workings of power. He writes, “instead of examining
that discourse in terms of its implications in the world of power and policy, she has
chosen to survey and map the many instances where we met it in today’s politics and law.
It is used by human rights organizations and international courts, by political
philosophers and military interveners.”155

How this language of humanity is used,

however, is of little concern to Teitel: “questions as to whom it empowers, or whose
preferences are implicit within it, are broached hardly at all. The humanity vocabulary is
taken at face value to represent the good post-sovereignty world that she wants to
celebrate.”156 While Teitel has expressed concern over the use and abuse of this language
by state leaders,157 she fails to see the way power is already functioning through the
words themselves.
What these historical accounts of the rise of transitional justice suggest is that the
field has uncritically inherited concepts into its discourse in a way that ignores the
functioning of power. While Teitel draws on authors like Derrida and Foucault, she does
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so with disregard to the argument that language, itself, is imbued with power. For
Sikkink, the question of power is ignored, given the central role played by human rights
activists in the rise of transitional justice. Similarly, she fails to see the way power is
always already functioning through our languages. Instead, the authors rely on a causal
story, which views the end of the Cold War as the catalyst for the progression of these
ideas at the international level. Such progress can be understood through a simplified
causal story:

An International

And International

System Closed to

End of the

System Open to the

the Ideas of Human

Cold War

Ideas of Human

Rights

Rights

The end of the Cold War plays a central role in the mythology of the field of
transitional justice. It is in this period that we not only see the expansion of the practice
of transitional justice, what Teitel calls the normalization of transitional justice, but its
emergence as a distinct field of study. Yet, this founding myth hides a much more
complex story: a series of events that must be hidden from view if we are to maintain the
shiny façade.
The argument put forward here is that transitional justice must be understood as
an integral component of the pro-democracy movement that started in the Reagan era, but
was expedited by the end of the Cold War. In other words, to understand the emergence
of transitional justice, it is vital to understand the democracy promotion paradigm that
came to dominate first the normative projects of the United States, and, subsequently,
those of the international community.

60

For many, the end of the Cold War signaled a major triumph for the United States.
Practically overnight, the United States assumed the role of the lone superpower in the
world as the dissolution of the Soviet Union brought a crashing halt to the Cold War
paradigm that had shaped much of inter-state relations during the second half of the
twentieth century. The break-up of the Soviet Union was not just a major victory for the
United States, but marked a significant victory for liberal democracy, in general. Just
over 20 years after U.S. President Ronald Reagan set out to re-engage his country in a
battle of ideas against the Soviet Union, scholars resolutely claimed the superiority of
liberal democracy over communism.
In the field of international relations, the dissolution of the Soviet Union
transformed the international system.

For many observers, this victory for liberal

democracy “was the realization of the final goal of the history of humankind, the
successful outcome of a long developmental process.”158 This is, perhaps, best captured
by the oft-cited title of Francis Fukayama’s book, The End of History and the Last Man,
in which Western liberal democracy is the end point of humanity's ideological evolution.
Based on a Hegelian reading of history, Fukuyama posits that liberal democracy and free
market capitalism best meet the needs of human nature. According to Fukuyama, then,
this same logic can be applied to relations among states. Just as individuals’ needs were
best satisfied within liberal democracies, Fukuyama suggests that, in an international
society full of liberal democracies, the need to engage in war will be replaced by the
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rational recognition of each other’s legitimacy.159

Fukuyama’s assessment of the

capacity for states to achieve peace is echoed in the work of other contemporary liberal
scholars like Michael Doyle, Bruce Russet, and James Lee Ray. These contemporary
liberals share with their earlier counterparts a belief that progress can be made in the
human condition. And, in terms of international relations, it is “through their faith in the
power of human reason and the capacity of human beings to realize their inner potential,
[that] they remain confident that the stain of war can be removed from human
experience.”160 Liberals across generations see the ailment of war as a curable disease in
the international system. Accordingly, “the treatment which liberals began prescribing in
the eighteenth century [has] not changed” and includes “the twin medicines of democracy
and free trade. Democratic processes and institutions would break the power of the
ruling elites and curb their propensity for violence. Free trade and commerce would
overcome the artificial barriers between individuals and unite them everywhere into one
community.”161

The liberal prescription of more democracy has gained increasing

legitimacy as an actual pathway for securing peace in the international community. This
increased legitimacy is, in large part, due to empirical work in international relations
scholarship based on the Democratic Peace Theory.
The Democratic Peace Theory is a general label for a large body of literature,
which revolves around the observed phenomenon that democratic states do not engage in
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large-scale wars.162

In opposition to neo-realist theories, the democratic peace is

premised on the liberal belief that the internal make-up of a state impacts its behaviour
and that it will find perpetual peace with other states that share their liberal democratic
structures.

Such findings, according to democratic peace theorists, suggest that the

growth of democracies will lead to a growth in overall inter-state peace, thus
transforming international politics.163 Russett articulates this vision for a new world
suggesting that, “[t]he new century presents more than just the passing of a particular
adversarial relationship; it offers a chance for fundamentally-changed relations among
nations.”164 The work of democratic peace theorists is largely rooted in the writings of
the German idealist, Immanuel Kant.
Of most influence were Kant’s writings on perpetual peace, a state of affairs that
exists where there is a consolidation of peace among nations. Kant stipulated three
definitive articles of perpetual peace. First, he believed that a republican constitution
established on the principles of freedom and equality imposes on the state an obligation
to obtain approval from its citizens to wage war. According to Kant, this presents the
citizens with an opportunity to “consider very carefully whether to enter into such a
terrible game, since they would have to resolve to bring the hardships of war upon
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themselves.”165 This was in contrast to a non-republican state, in which the decision to
wage war is taken without due consideration of the interests of the citizens.
Second, Kant discussed the existence of “cosmopolitan law,” which, according to
contemporary scholars, embodies ties of international commerce and free trade.166
Finally, Kant proposed the establishment of a “pacific union” between sovereign states.
He asserted that each nation, “for the sake of [its] own security, can and ought to demand
of others that they enter with [it] into a constitution, similar to that of a civil one, under
which each is guaranteed [its] rights.”167 Kant argued that, “peace can be neither brought
about nor secured without a treaty among peoples, and for this reason a special sort of
federation must be created, which one might call a pacific federation or union. This
union would be distinct from a peace treaty in that it seeks to end, not merely one war, as
does the latter, but all wars, forever.”168 According to this, he believed that the idea of a
“pacific union” could progressively include all states, thereby leading to perpetual peace.
The various authors working within the democratic peace tradition have debated
over the causal logics that explain the possibility of democratic peace. In general, the
observed pacification of relations between liberal states is a product of their shared
democratic norms and institutions. In terms of democratic institutions, the representative
aspect of a modern liberal democratic state tends to create a transparent and accountable
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relationship between the state and its citizens.

Thus, according to Michael Doyle,

“democratic representation introduces republican caution and precludes autocratic
caprice.”169 Because political elites in democracies are dependent on the willingness of
the public to bear the brunt of any conflict, they must seek broad support for any risky
state actions in international politics. Consequently, adventurism in international affairs
without sufficient public support opens politicians up to punishment through elections.170
According to this rationale, the threat of being thrown out of office tames the behaviour
of politicians.
In addition to the intimidation of electoral punishment, liberal theorists argue that
international action in a democratic political system necessitates the mobilization of a
range of institutions within the system of government. These may include the legislature,
the political bureaucracy, and key interest groups.

Given this significant hurdle,

movement towards aggressive state action is both “difficult and cumbersome.”171
Moreover, engaging in conflict defined as war must be seen as either a necessity for
survival or justified by liberal goals like human rights.172 Generally, democratic peace
theorists contend that this further restricts the behaviour of politicians.
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In addition to democratic institutions, some scholars point to the influence of
democratic norms on the relationship between two liberal states. The resolution of
political competition through peaceful means, backed by a commitment to individual
rights and the rule of law, suggests that liberals are more likely to resort to negotiations
than the use of force to resolve their conflicts. William Dixon refers to this practice as
“bounded competition,” and suggests that, “political actors [in a democratic state]
whether inside or outside of government agree not to employ physically coercive or
violent means to secure a winning position on contentious public issues.”173 Indeed,
disputes can be resolved through a democratic process that, generally, “ensure[s] both
majority rule and minority rights.”174 Such an expectation limits the fear that relations
between two democracies will break down into violence. For example, if state officials in
Democracy A see in Democracy B the same structures and behaviours that limit their
own aggression, they will be less fearful that Democracy B will resort to violence.
In this respect, it appears that both norms and institutions contribute to the
emergence of peace between democracies, as the two concepts generally, complement
each other and, indeed, overlap to produce a democratic peace.175 However, this pacifist
preference only translates into peaceful relations with other democracies. In conflicts
with non-democracies, scholars suggest that democracies can be just as violent as non-
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democracies.176 This has given rise to two distinct research streams in the democratic
peace scholarship: The dyadic version, a dominant approach among liberal international
relations (IR) theorists, suggests that democracies do not fight each other. The more
extreme stream of research, known as the monadic version, suggests that, in general,
democracies are more peaceful than other regimes. This concept, of course, is highly
contested, especially given the propensity of liberal democracies like the United States to
engage in wars with authoritarian regimes and to support them.
The democratic peace is a dominant theory and has had a powerful impact on IR
scholarship. Its influence, however, has not been limited to the realm of scholarship and,
increasingly, policymakers have adopted the language of democratic peace in their own
rhetoric. In particular, these ideas were popular among Western powers, specifically the
United States. For example, in 1994 then-U.S. President, Bill Clinton, asserted that,
“Ultimately, the best strategy to ensure our security and to build a durable peace is to
support the advance of democracy elsewhere. Democracies don’t attack each other.”177
For liberal proponents, the goal of building liberal democracies is not just
desirable for inter-state relations, but for intra-state relations, as well. Such beliefs
spawned the Liberal Peace Thesis: a theory of conflict resolution, which asserts that
liberal democratic institutions are inherently good for societies emerging from conflict.178
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The Liberal Peace is, of course, connected to its counterpart in international relations, the
Democratic Peace Theory. As such, “both theories place importance on the role of
representative institutions and shared values in constraining liberal/democratic societies
from visiting aggressive violence upon one another.”
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The Liberal Peace Thesis,

however, emphasizes a “broader set of specifications than simply democracy, most
notably the adoption of liberal capitalist economics, and also a more specifically liberal
interpretation of how democracy should be defined.”180
Specifically, the Liberal Peace Thesis offers several recommendations for states
emerging from conflict.

Politically, the Liberal Peace Thesis advocates for the

establishment of a liberal democracy (or representative multi-party democracy), which
includes periodic elections, limitations on the exercise of governmental power guaranteed
through the establishment of a written constitution, and respect for civil and political
rights, such as the right to free speech and a free press, as well as freedom of association
and movement.181 In the economic realm, the Liberal Peace Thesis advocates for the
“movement toward a market-oriented economic model, including measures aimed at
minimizing government intrusion in the economy, and maximizing the freedom for
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private investors, producers, and consumers to pursue their respective economic
interests.”182 The Liberal Peace Thesis was an exercise in social engineering. Although,
its true effects remained unknown, it quickly gained prominence among politicians and
the peacebuilding community. For example, U.S. President Bill Clinton’s foreign policy
circle “saw free-market democracy as the antidote to the poverty, tyranny, and ethnic
hatred that generated political instability in Third World countries.”183 The underlying
hope in its design was that “democratization would shift societal conflicts away from the
battlefield and into the peaceful arena of electoral politics, thereby replacing the breaking
of heads with the counting of heads; and that marketization would promote sustainable
economic growth, which would also help to reduce tensions.”184
Throughout the 1990s, the Liberal Peace Thesis became the central doctrine for
agents of peacebuilding. As Paris points out, “given the multiplicity of peacebuilding
agencies and the absence of a centralized peacebuilding authority, perhaps the most
remarkable feature of the peacebuilding operations in the 1990s was that they all pursued
the same general strategy for promoting stable and lasting peace in war-shattered states:
democratization and marketization.”185 From the United Nations Development Program
to the Bretton Woods institutions (the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank)
to the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and international
nongovernmental organizations like the Open Society Institute, the Liberal Peace became
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the “de facto central organizing framework for peace interventions and reconstruction
efforts in the aftermath of contemporary civil wars.”186
The liberal state model is not a radical departure from the general vision
embodied in most western countries’ constitutions.

Indeed, the ideas behind this

particular model of the state date back to the works of John Locke and Adam Smith, and
were popularized by U.S. president, Woodrow Wilson, as a universal concept for all
states to eventually adopt. Yet, this increase in liberal democracy’s appeal following the
end of the Cold War seemed to translate into a renewed belief in an ever-expanding
sphere of liberalism across the world and democracy quickly became the gold standard
for international legitimacy. Diamond summarizes this position:
The experience of this century offers important lessons. Countries that govern
themselves in a truly democratic fashion do not go to war with one another. They
do not aggress against their neighbor to aggrandize themselves or glorify their
leaders.
Democratic governments do not ethnically ‘cleanse’ their own
populations, and they are much less likely to face ethnic insurgency.
Democracies do not sponsor terrorism against one another. They do not build
weapons of mass destruction to use on or to threaten one another. Democratic
countries form more reliable, open, and enduring trading partnerships. In the long
run they offer better and more stable climates for investment. They are more
environmentally responsible because they must answer to their own citizens, who
organize to protest the destruction of their environments. They are better bets to
honor international treaties since they value legal obligations and because their
openness makes it much more difficult to breach agreements in secret. Precisely
because, within their own borders, they respect competition, civil liberties,
property rights, and the rule of law, democracies are the only reliable foundation
on which a new world order of international security and prosperity can be
built.187
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For Magen and McFaul, this renewed fervor for democracy has meant that states outside
of the liberal fold have increasingly needed to qualify their positions, suggesting that,
“even where authoritarians still prevail, they mostly no longer champion an alternative
form of government, but either claim that their regimes are democratic or that they are
gradually moving their countries towards democracy.”188

According to Magen and

McFaul, such bold claims are supported by the actual growth of democracies around the
world with the total number of democratic regimes increasing from 40, in 1974, to 121, in
2006.189

2.6

Reflecting on the Project

Transitional justice as a field of inquiry has grown significantly over the last two decades.
In this short time frame, transitional justice has garnered considerable attention not just
among academics but also from the wider international community. Indeed, it is clear
that there is a genuine consensus that, following periods of mass atrocities (however
those atrocities are defined), some form of justice must be promoted. Yet, despite this
consensus, there has been a great deal of debate over what justice looks like. The justice
question occupied a central role in the early debates in the field of transitional justice.
Initially, justice in transitional justice took on mainly a retributive form and was
embodied in the criminal prosecution. In time, alternative forms of justice including
mechanisms derived from restorative and reparative conceptions of justice like truth
commissions were accepted as legitimate, thus expanding the field’s overall reach.
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course, this expansion of the field was hard fought; the retributive/restorative debate
occupied much of the discussion throughout the 1990s and early 2000s. Even today,
questions over what constitutes justice remain a vital area of scholarship in the field, with
the field continuing to expand to include traditional mechanisms of justice like the mato
oput ceremonies of Northern Uganda.
The justice question has been, and continues to be, a point of contention for
scholars in the field. But this has, perhaps, come at the expense of a general acceptance
of the transitional question. Arthur’s article provides us with considerable insight into
the conceptual boundaries of the field. Within these boundaries, it is clear that there is an
accepted consensus regarding, first, the idea that justice is working towards a final goal,
otherwise known as the transition to democracy; and two, that human rights
activists/scholars have been central to the field’s growth following the end of the Cold
War and the opening up of the international community. It is these two consensuses that
this project looks to further interrogate and, in the end, to challenge.
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Chapter 3

3

Theoretical Tools of Analysis

This chapter outlines the theoretical tools of analysis that will be used in this project. The
analytical framework draws largely on the work of postmodern writers including Michel
Foucault, Jacques Derrida, and Richard Rorty.

In International Relations (IR),

postmodern theory came to prominence in the 1980s in what is generally referred to as
the third great debate between positivists (neorealists and neoliberals) and postpositivist
theory.1

This “critical impulse” in IR emerged in response to the “widespread

dissatisfaction with both realism (particularly Popperian rationalism in IR), Kantianderived liberalism as a more normative response, and structurally determinist approaches
derived from Marxism.”2 The two fronts (modern critical theory and Postmodern critical
theory) of the attack on mainstream IR theory drew on critical social theory including the
works of Max Horkheimer, Theodore Adorno and other writers of the Frankfurt School;
Italian Marxist Antonio Gramsci; and postmodern writers including Foucault and
Derrida, among others. While these authors have diverse opinions across ontological,
epistemological and methodological grounds, these groups do exhibit a commonality in
what they oppose, namely the positivist school of thought.

1
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While it might seem counter-intuitive to begin with an approach that will not be
used in this project, it is necessary in order to situate critical theory.

Given the

dominance of positivism in political science, a project which uses critical theory tools
must address both what it is and what it is not trying to achieve with its analysis.
Following this general overview of positivism I examine the work of modern critical
theory and, specifically, the work of Horkheimer. Horkheimer’s work is important for
drawing a substantive distinction between positivist scholarship—what he would have
identified as traditional theory—and the critical theoretical tools used in this project.
From there, I introduce the postmodern lenses that are used in the analysis of this project.
These lenses are informed primary by the work of Rorty, Derrida, and Foucault.

3.1 Positivism and its Critics
Positivism is a philosophy of science which seeks “objective, value-free, timeless, and
neutral knowledge about human society.”3 Accordingly, “the role of research is to test
theories and to provide material for the development of laws.”4 Positivism is based on
the belief that the world of the social sciences consists of the same kinds of regularities
that one might find in the natural world of the physical sciences, regardless of time and
place.5

Therefore, the pursuit of knowledge of society can only be achieved by

emulating the methodological approaches of the natural sciences—“that is, by
experience, observation, and experiment.6 Positivism drew heavily on the work of David
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Hume, an eighteenth century British philosopher who asserted that “there is nothing we
can directly observe in any single observed sequence of events, independent of our past
experiences, that makes the first cause the second; there is no detectable glue attaching
the cause to its effects that enable one to distinguish between causal and accidental
sequences.”7 As a result, the only way to distinguish between causation and correlation is
to “identify well-confirmed regularities that stand behind causes and that are absent in
cases of correlation.”8 According to Hume, “in the absence of strict exceptionless laws,
in everyday life we make do with rough-and-ready empirical regularities to underwrite
particular causal claims.”9
Today, positivists subscribe to a deductive logic whereby theory is used to
generate hypotheses about the world. These hypotheses are subsequently “exposed to
rigorous empirical scrutiny” and “the hypotheses [are] either confirmed or rejected.”10
Indeed, the domain of science encompasses only phenomena that can be observed and
measured. 11 Sentences derived from theory that cannot be verified or, following Popper,
falsified, are of little use.12 Thus, positivists draw a sharp distinction between facts
(scientific statements) and values (normative statements). In other words, much like the
natural sciences, positivist researchers believe in the possibility of objective (unbiased)
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research in the social realm. Ultimately, by uncovering regularities in social phenomena
in the past, the hope is to make predictions about social phenomena in the future.
The value of this type of theory lies in its ability to “fix limits or parameters to the
problem area and to reduce the statements of a particular problem to a limited number of
variables which are amenable to relatively close and precise examination.”13 Yet, since
the days of the Vienna Circle of the logical positivists, their approach has been subject to
much scrutiny.14 In his 1937 article, “Traditional and Critical Theory,” Max Horkheimer
drew a fundamental distinction between critical theory and the traditional theory of
positivism. In IR theory, Horkheimer, and the subsequent work of the Frankfurt School,
were rather influential for postpositivists of both modern and postmodern stripes.15 For
Horkheimer, traditional theory consisted of a linked set of primary propositions (the
fewer the better) about a subject on which derivatives were built. Hypotheses about a
subject are fashioned along the lines of a set of causal connections: “if circumstances a,
b, c, and d are given, then event q must be expected; if d is lacking, event r; if g is added,
event s, and so on.”16 According to Horkheimer, for positivists the relationship between
scientific theory and reality is distinct: “There is always, on the one hand, the
conceptually formulated knowledge and, on the other, the facts to be subsumed under it.
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Such a subsumption or establishing of a relation between the simple perception or
verification of a fact and the conceptual structure of our knowing is called its theoretical
explanation.”17 The validity of theory is judged according to how well it approximates
reality. From this perspective, good theory is the construction of parsimonious
generalizations best corresponding to experience. When the derived propositions do not
fit reality, either the scientist’s observations are inaccurate or the theory’s principles are
incorrect.18 According to Honneth, “as more and more segments of reality are caught in
the net of hypothetical statements, natural and social processes as a whole can finally be
theoretically predicted and controlled.”19
This understanding of theory is based on the notion of ‘truth as correspondence’,
which asserts that there is an objective and knowable world. And by studying this world,
we can acquire, for certain, an understanding of the “things” out there.
Epistemologically, authoritative knowledge is judged by its ability to accurately capture
reality as it is presented to us. Such sentiment is based on the Cartesian duality: a
fundamental distinction between the subject (investigator) and the object (that being
investigated). The Cartesian mind views the world as a thing-in-itself with an intrinsic
order waiting to be discovered by the disinterested scientists.20 Knowledge of society can
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and should be value-free—if obtained using academically rigorous methods and research
designs, knowledge remains impervious to the values of the researcher.21
Developed in Descartes’ Meditations on First Philosophy, published in 1641, the
Cartesian duality is derived from his particular ‘method’, which sought to “ground all
knowledge in basic truths and principles accessible to a rational mind.”22 His method
started with a thought process: What if the world contained an “evil genie” who
entertained himself by deceiving our very senses. The existence of such a genie would
force us to call into question absolutely every idea about the world. Even our most
settled truths could be the result of the genie’s desire to deceive us. Pressed to absolute
skepticism, Descartes argued that we could still be certain of one thing: the thinking
subject. Our existence as the thinking subject is secured by the mere fact that we have
the ability to think of these things: “I think therefore I am.”23 As Ferry observes,
according to Descartes, our ideas may be false or we may be vulnerable to deception,
“but in order for [us] to be deceived, or to deceive [ourselves], [we] must at the very least
be something that exists!”24 Such a method, according to Ferry, leads “to a definition of
truth as that which resists doubt, as that of which the individual subject can have absolute
certainty. Thus a state of subjective consciousness—certainty—becomes nothing less
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than the new criterion of truth.”25 For Descartes, truth is dependent on our ability to call
into questions all inherited ‘knowledge’. If we seek absolute certainty in our minds, we
must “subject to the most rigorous process of doubt all those opinions, beliefs and
preconceptions which have not undergone minute examination.”26

Proceeding from

Descartes’ method of absolute skepticism, what he called tabula rasa, is “a new version
of nature, founded on individual conscience rather than tradition, of a unique certitude
which compels recognition before all other kinds: that of the individual subject in his
relation to himself,”27 a relation characterized by the mind’s “absolute distinction from
the (mortal) body”—the immateriality of the mind.28 For Descartes, then, “it is no longer
belief or faith which enables us to reach an ultimate truth, but awareness of self.”29
By freeing reason from traditional authorities and locating it the mind of the
individual, Descartes’ work had an extraordinary impact on the age of enlightenment in
Europe–a movement in Western philosophy, which promised mankind a new kind of
freedom through rationality and the scientific method.30 Descartes’ belief in the ability of
the subject to shed all beliefs in order to represent the “world as it is” laid the foundation
for “increasingly impersonal forms of inquiry.”31

Certainly, his work continues to

resonate in the social sciences, especially within the positivist school of thought currently
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dominant within North American social sciences. Positivist research has primarily been
associated with quantitative studies; however, in their seminal work, Designing Social
Inquiry, King, Keohane, and Verba have called for its use in qualitative studies as well,
asserting that, “non-statistical research will produce more reliable results if researchers
pay attention to the rules of scientific inference.”32
Theory that is critical (both modern and postmodern) calls into question this
objective Cartesian subject central to traditional theory. By viewing the subject as a
blank slate (tabula rasa), traditional theory “occupies itself with received principles and
methods whose fundamental purpose is to organize and clarify experience and to
eliminate contradictions among our inherited ideas. It works within an apparatus of
judgments and concepts that it does not question, or not fundamentally and not
critically.”33 In doing so, it treats objective facts as “permanent, unchanging aspects of
our knowledge of the world.”34 Thus, the scholar who seeks truth as correspondence to
some apparent reality cannot see the boundaries of his/her thinking and fails to consider
the structures in which their theorizing takes place.

In doing so, traditional theory

“operates in favour of prevailing ideological priorities.”35
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In contrast, critical theory recognizes that the “reality” addressed in social theory
is a social reality and, therefore, “no single perspective can claim to be exclusively
correct.”36 As Cox similarly notes, “all theories have a perspective. Perspectives derive
from a position in time and space, specifically social and political time and space.”37 In
recognizing this, theory that is critical has to be self-referential and “account for [its] own
distortion.”38 In other words, critical theorists do not view knowledge as merely “a
reflection of an inert world ‘out there’,” as an epistemology committed to truth as
correspondence would suggest, but as “an active construction by scientists and theorists
who necessarily make certain assumptions about the worlds they study and thus are not
strictly value free.”39 Therefore, our accounts of reality—our thoughts—and the objects
of this reality must be seen as historically shaped.40 As Giddens notes, “we cannot treat
human activities as though they were determined by causes in the same way as natural
events are. We have to grasp what I would call the double involvement of individuals
and institutions: we create society as the same time as we are created by it… Social
systems are like buildings that are at every moment constantly being reconstructed by the
very bricks that compose them.”41 Such an understanding of the relationship between
subject and object exposes the limits of the objective knowledge sought by the positivists.
These conditions suggest that any knowledge of society is not analogous to knowledge of
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physics or chemistry. For Linklater, this “observation that there are no disembodied
cognitive subjects who can acquire objective knowledge of external reality is a crucial
theme running through all critical standpoints.”42
For Horkheimer, by ignoring perspectivism, the approach taken by traditional
theory “absolutized the conception of theory as though it were grounded in the inner
nature of knowledge as such, or justified in some other ahistorical way, and thus it
became a reified, ideological category.”43 To oppose this, critical theory must take a selfreferential position.

The situated knowledge that Horkheimer sought started “from

specific social problems and work[ed] toward an explanation of how they came about.”44
According to Devetak, in doing so, it attempts to uncover the “unexamined assumptions
that guide traditional modes of thought,” and show how these traditional modes of
thought participate in the making of the “prevailing political and social conditions.”45
This “criticism of the present,” closely allies Horkheimer’s work with that of Foucault
and his “history of the present.”46
Horkheimer’s modernist critical theory and the critical theory of postmodern
writers like Foucualt exhibit a similar attitude towards the past by challenging traditional
theory’s premise that “how we acquired our beliefs and knowledge is irrelevant to the
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validity of those beliefs.”47 Further, as Hoy points out, “both [Horkheimer’s] critical
theory and [Foucault’s] genealogy are asking precisely how we came to forget the
contingency of the historical beginnings of our practices and why we persuaded ourselves
that these practices were necessary and universal rather than arbitrary and contingent.”48
Thus, both authors are oriented towards challenging these positions as a means to open
up a future of possibilities: critical theory and genealogy both try to unmask power and
show it for what it is. Insofar as this unmasking works, it does not necessarily bring
about social change, although it does make social transformation more likely.”49
Where modernist and postmodern theorists diverge, however, is in the idea of
progress and the repression of real interests. Horkheimer saw the ailment of “his current
society as the result of either oppression or the blind outcome of competing forces,”50 but
not, as Horkheimer wrote, the “result of conscious spontaneity on the part of free
individuals.”51 By reproducing the bourgeois society and maintaining inequality in the
system, traditional theory as an objective science was an illusion—a product of the “false
consciousness of the bourgeois savant.”52 Thus, Horkheimer believed that critical theory
should be geared towards emancipation by promoting the historical progress of human
freedom.53 In contrast, the notion of progress for Foucault and other postmodern writers

47

Hoy, “Genealogy, Phenomenology, Critical Theory,” 282.

48

Hoy, “Genealogy, Phenomenology, Critical Theory,” 282.

49

Hoy, “Genealogy, Phenomenology, Critical Theory,” 282.

50

Hoy, “Genealogy, Phenomenology, Critical Theory,” 282.

51

Horkheimer, “Traditional and Critical Theory,” 283

52

Horkheimer, “traditional and Critical Theory,” 198.

53

Hoy, “Genealogy, Phenomenology, Critical Theory,” 283.

83

presupposes that we can find ground to stand on “outside or above history from which to
make the judgment that history is progressing and universal freedom is increasing.”54
Second, the modernist critical theory of Horkheimer and the postmodern approach
generally disagree over whether or not there are “real interests” that are being repressed
by power.55

Drawing on the Marxian-Lukacsian notion of false consciousness,

Horkheimer’s work argues that ideology “permeates every social stratum,” and explains
why “people act contrary to what is obviously in their real interests.”56

Again,

postmodern approaches point out that, in order to uncover real interests, there must be an
Archimedean point—a view outside society—to make such a judgement. Second, post
modern approaches deny the existence of a natural essence of humanity: the unmasking
of power (or false consciousness) will not uncover “real interests” but, rather, the
fragments of previous masks.

3.2

Language and Final Vocabulary

Rorty, like the Frankfurt School, challenges the Cartesian duality and its insinuation of
transcendence.

This perspective has falsely propagated a ‘truth as correspondence’

epistemology and the search for eternal truths or essences. And such a search, according
to Rorty, will lead only to human constructs. Truth, for Rorty, then, is a “property of
sentences,” and “since sentences are dependent for their existence upon vocabularies,
since vocabularies are made by human beings, so are truths.”57 When we attempt to
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provide a theory as a “best fit” as ‘truth as correspondence’, we are actually privileging
“one among the many languages in which we habitually describe the world or
ourselves.”58
Rorty’s critique builds on the work of Ludwig Wittgenstein.

For Rorty,

Wittgenstein’s importance lies in his “wrenching” us from the desire to ask “which pieces
of our language lock on to reality, and which do not?”59 In his book, Philosophical
Investigations, Wittgenstein challenges the truth as correspondence epistemology. Such a
view, according to Wittgenstein, depends on the assumption that the relationship between
reality and the language we use to describe it is neutral. His primary target is, in many
respects, his own earlier ideas about the relationship between language and the world
found in his first book, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (hereafter, Tractatus). 60
In the Tractatus, Wittgenstein oversimplified this relationship by viewing the
linkage between language and the world in a rather simple manner, in which words
(names) are merely labels of objects that together formed propositions. “A proposition,”
wrote Wittgenstein, is “a model of reality as we imagine it.”61 Thus, propositions, if
logical, “express a portion of reality by picturing a true state of affairs.”62 Further,
Wittgenstein did not just believe that language could represent the “world as it really is,”
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but he argued that all inquiry that did not take this form was merely senseless.63 Thus, he
concluded the Tractatus with the statement: “What we cannot speak about we must pass
over in silence.”64 Such claims about the neutral relationship between language and the
world made the Tractatus a central text for logical positivists, who, themselves, were
committed to a science of society driven by the objective forms of inquiry dominant in
the natural sciences. 65
In Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein’s views on language made an about
face, giving up on the idea that language has a direct connection to reality. Instead of
viewing language in terms of true and untrue propositions, he saw language as bound up
in human life and human practices, and wholly intertwined in the world. For that reason,
“language cannot usefully be understood as a tool for describing an objective reality.”66
Instead, language use needs to be understood as a type of action that can take a variety of
forms. While philosophy has been overly concerned with discovering some essence of
language, according to Wittgenstein, it needs to pay more attention to the way we use our
language. Thus, he views language use as he views games: we see games of all sorts,
including those that are competitive and those that are not, those that use balls and those
that use wooden pieces.67 What gives meaning to language is not its connection to
reality, but rather the use we give them. As Wittgenstein wrote, “the fundamental fact
here is that we lay down rules, a technique, for a game, and that then when we follow
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rules, things do not turn out as we had assumed. That we are therefore as it were
entangled in our own rules. This entanglement in our rules is what we want to
understand (i.e. get a clear view of).”68 Therefore, words do not have an absolute
essence, but vary in meaning according to the context in which they are used.
Wittgenstein’s chess analogy illustrates this point: outside of its brute fact of
being a piece of wood, a chess piece is rendered meaningless unless we know the rules of
the game. Its nature is determined, instead, by the rules of the game; there is no intrinsic
nature, no essence, outside of the rules of chess. Rorty adopts Wittgenstein’s position
that there are no essences out there, waiting to be discovered.

Truths about the world

are, instead, “a property of linguistic entities, of sentences.”69
According to Rorty, we need to clarify the distinction between the existence of an
independent world, which, of course, exists outside of any “human mental state” and
truth claims about that world that depend on the utterances of human language.70
Through language, “we create representations of reality that are never mere reflections of
a pre-existing reality but contribute to constructing reality.”71 Reality exists; physical
objects like houses, cars, and a lake exist, regardless of my representations of them. But
they only gain meaning through our language. To illustrate this point, Jorgenson and
Phillips use the example of a flood:
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The rise in the water level that leads to the flood is an event that takes place
independently of people’s thoughts and talk. Everybody drowns if they are in the
wrong place, irrespective of what they think or say. The rise in the water level is
a material fact. But as soon as people try to ascribe meaning to it, it is no longer
outside discourse. Most would pace it in the category of ‘natural phenomena’, but
they would not necessarily describe it in the same way. Some would draw on a
meteorological discourse, attributing the rise in the water level to an unusually
heavy downpour. Others might account for it in terms of the El Nino
phenomenon, or see it as one of the many global consequences of the ‘greenhouse
effect’. Still others would see it as the result of ‘political mismanagement’, such
as the national government’s failure to commission and fund the building of
dykes. Finally, some might see it as a manifestation of God’s will, attributing it to
God’s anger over a people’s sinful way of life or seeing it as a sign of the arrival
of Armageddon. The rise in the water level, as an event taking place at a
particular point in time, can, then, be ascribed meaning in terms of many different
perspectives or discourses.72
What this suggests, is that language is a “‘machine’ that generates, and, as a result,
constitutes the social world.”73 For Rorty, it is not that a reality does not exist, but,
rather, truths about that reality are made and not found. This is what Wittgenstein meant
when he wrote that we become “entangled in our own rules.”74
As humans, we carry with us a “set of words”—a final vocabulary—which we
adopt to rationalize our “actions, beliefs, and lives.”75 Rorty writes, “these are the words
in which we formulate praise of our friends and contempt for our enemies, our long-term
projects, our deepest self-doubts and our highest hopes.”76 They are final in that,
if doubt is cast on the worth of these words, their user has no noncircular
argumentative recourse. Those words are as far as he can go with language;
beyond them there is only helpless passivity or a resort to force. A small part of a
final vocabulary is made up of thin, flexible, and ubiquitous terms such as ‘true’,
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‘good’, ‘right’, and ‘beautiful’. The larger part contains thicker, more rigid, and
more parochial terms, for example, ‘Christ’, ‘England’, ‘professional standards’,
‘decency’, ‘kindness’, ‘the Revolution’, ‘the Church’, ‘progressive’, ‘rigourous’,
‘creative’. The more parochial terms do most of the work.”77
The key, here, is that we need to recognize and embrace the contingency and fragility of
these most central beliefs. 78 Language is not a means to discover truths about the world–
we are not getting ever closer to a language that best represents reality and expresses the
self. Therefore, our most central beliefs do not refer to “something beyond the reach of
time and chance,” they are merely one set of words among many.79 The problem is that
we theorize as if our vocabulary is final, thus freezing it into place. Thus, we must treat
alternative vocabularies—those that are not part of our final vocabulary—not as “bits of a
jigsaw puzzle” but as “alternative tools.”80 In other words, there is no grand vocabulary
that unites these final vocabularies. There is no meta-vocabulary which can distinguish
the correctness of one final vocabulary over another.81 Instead, they are often mutually
exclusive and incapable of being reduced to or united with other vocabularies. This does
not deny the usefulness of these vocabularies, but their value is fundamentally confined
to a specific frame and we cannot mistake this for Reality. They are, as Friedrich
Nietzsche would argue, metaphors and not literal. That is, truth must be understood as a
movable host of metaphors, metonymies, and anthropomorphisms: in short, a sum
of human relations which have been poetically and rhetorically intensified,
transferred, and embellished, and which, after long usage, seem to a people to be
fixed, canonical, and binding. Truths are illusions which we have forgotten are
illusions; they are metaphors that have become worn out and have been drained of
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sensuous force, coins that have lost their embossing and are not considered as
metal and no longer as coins.82
Nietzsche, too, rejected the dogmatic search for truth that has driven the philosophical
discipline since the Greeks. Truth is not something out there to be discovered, but is
wholly attached to this world and the humans who inhabit it; truth is “linked to the
context of its production.”83 Therefore, the subject, for Nietzsche, is always situated in
the world. As such,
Judgments, value judgments on life, whether for or against, can in the last resort
never be true: they possess value only as symptoms, they come into consideration
only as symptoms–in themselves such judgments are stupidities. One must reach
out and try to grasp this astonishing finesse, that the value of life cannot be
estimated [assessed]. Not by a living man, because he is a party to the dispute,
indeed its object, and not the judge of it; not by a dead one, for another reason –
For a philosopher to see a problem in the value of life thus even constitutes an
objection to him, a question-mark as to his wisdom, a piece of unwisdom.84
Nietzsche’s work is important for challenging the transcendent set of standards, the
absolute Truth, in which morality is couched.85 However, if, as Nietzsche argues, there is
no Truth in this world to judge humanity, what are we left with? For Rorty, all we can do
is critically appraise the languages we do use to describe the world around us. The
fundamental question for Rorty, then, is “Does our use of these words get in the way of
our use of those words?” To do so, is to prevent the walls of our final vocabularies from
closing in on us and to remain open to other, perhaps more useful, alternative
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vocabularies. Rorty’s work here is heavily influenced by the writings of the French
philosopher, Jacques Derrida.

3.3

Deconstruction

If Wittgenstein is important for helping us see the way language gives meaning to our
world, Derrida’s work is significant in showing us that we are fundamentally constrained
by the structure of our language.86 As May observes in his study of postmodern thought,
we are oppressed by “our very words. Each time we speak, we rely on constraints that
haunt our language.”87 Yet, Derrida does not believe that we can look behind text to
capture an essence—an ahistorical thing-in-itself—that has been lost. 88 Such a task is
impossible given that we are “always and already… embedded in various networks—
social, historical, linguistic, political, sexual networks.”89 Instead, Derrida is interested in
breaking down the categories of experience that we use to make sense of this world. To
start, he argues that the project of philosophy, which “consists largely in attempting to
build foundations for thought,” is significantly constrained by our language use and,
specifically, the way we privilege certain concepts over others.90 At the centre of this is
the problematization of the logic of identity. As Dooley and Kavanagh note, “identity
has traditionally implied purity and wholeness.”91 That is, “[t]o identify with someone or
something means to have full knowledge of that person or object. As such, knowledge
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admits of no black spots or inaccessible dimensions.

What we identify with is

completely present to consciousness.”92 Ontologically, this views “Being as presence.”93
As Derrida writes, “It could be shown that all the names related to fundamentals, to
principles, or to the centre have always designated an invariable presence–eidos, arche,
telos, energeia, ousia (essence, existence, substance, subject) aletheia, transcendentality,
consciousness, God, man, and so forth.”94 Yet, for Derrida, such a perspective fails to
capture the way presence is never whole. Presence is not pure (i.e. there is no essence),
but is always dependent on the absence of the other. For example, what we consider
masculinity and femininity, which have traditionally been viewed as quite distinct, are, in
fact, interwoven in a hierarchical relationship that privileges masculinity at the expense
of femininity.95 Such privileging has had ghastly consequences for women, but Derrida
does not stop there. For, it is not merely the privileging of masculinity over femininity
that constrains us, but the realization that femininity is fundamentally internal to
masculinity’s understanding; it is not merely its other (or opposite), but is constituted by
it.

Masculinity cannot be understood except by the femininity that is excluded.96

Masculinity and femininity, therefore, “operate in a dynamic relation of distinctness and
mutual envelopment where the line between them can be neither clearly drawn nor
completely erased.”97 If we cannot fix borders around concepts like masculinity and
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femininity, then our language fails to capture reality in the way positivists have assumed.
Instead, the truth our language articulates is better understood as metaphor than factual
representation.
Given that philosophy depends on thought, as noted above, if we cannot fix
meanings to terms, then our foundation for philosophy will eventually give way. As
Norris points out, though “philosophy strives to efface its textual character, the signs of
that struggle are there to be read in its blind-spots of metaphor and other rhetorical
strategies.”98 Philosophers have been able to “impose their various systems of thought
only by ignoring or suppressing the disruptive effects of language.”99 Yet, this is not
merely an academic debate. The privileging of masculinity over femininity is an injustice
that must be rectified: concepts like these play a central role in our day-to-day lives and,
in so doing, they shape the way we see both others and ourselves in this world.100 In
response, Derrida’s concept of deconstruction works to “draw out these effects by a
critical reading which fastens on, and skillfully unpicks, the elements of metaphor and
other figural devices at work in the texts of philosophy.”101 In this light, deconstruction
is rectification. By acting “as a constant reminder of the ways in which language deflects
or complicates the philosopher’s project,” deconstruction disrupts this notion “that reason
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can somehow dispense with language and achieve knowledge ideally unaffected by such
mere linguistic foibles.”102
It is not a matter of inverting the privileged relationship; instead, we must
recognize the fluidity of these concepts. To do so, is to be mindful of our language so as
to allow for expression and not suppression.103

As May suggests, “when we see that

these categories bleed into each other, then we are no longer worried about the ‘essence’
of the masculine and the feminine. We become free to borrow from realms that once
seemed barred from us.”104 And, in doing so, “we are no longer bound to make those
borrowings conform to a pre-given model of what our lives and our world should look
like, since the categories within which we would conceive our lives and our world are
themselves fluid.”105 Thus, Derrida’s deconstruction urges us to abandon our desire for
definite end-points and moral truths (or moral certainties).

While some equate

deconstruction with destruction or demolition, it must, instead, be understood as a way of
responding to those who seek closure: for those who, according to Rorty, see their
vocabulary as final.

Hence, deconstruction is fundamentally about “affirming the

irreducible alterity of the world we are trying to construe.”106
The overall framework of this analysis is driven by a deconstructive approach.
Deconstruction of a text proceeds with a two-step reading: a dominant-reproductive
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reading followed by a transgressive-productive reading.

The dominant-reproductive

reading provides the foundation of the text and would be considered closest to the text’s
traditional understanding. As Caputo suggests, this reading would remain on all the
major expressways by outlining the dominant tendencies of a text. Such a reading would
be followed up by the transgressive-productive reading, which, instead of taking the
expressways, dares to embark on a journey though the secondary roads; to the places that
are not visible when driving along the expressway. It is only by taking these secondary
roads that the deconstructivist can “explore the tensions, the loose threads, the little
openings in the text which the classical reading tends to close over or put off as a
problem for another day, which is really just a way to forget them.”107 Deconstruction is
not about destroying. In fact, it is quite the opposite: by disturbing the well-travelled
paths—exploring the “dead-ends and aporias”—deconstruction hopes to maintain the
livability or fluidity of a text.108
By transgressive-productive, deconstructionists do not mean that anyone has
complete liberty to say whatever she wants about a text. Rather, “a deconstructive
reading is exceedingly close, fine-grained, meticulous, scholarly, serious, and, above all,
responsible, both in the sense of being able to give an account of itself in scholarly terms
and in the sense of responding to something in the text that tends to drop out of view.”109
It is not, as some observers suggest, about destroying or wreaking havoc. Deconstruction
is responsible. It is loyal to a tradition. As Caputo notes, “the only way to conserve a
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tradition is not to be a conservative. That is why the possibility must be kept alive of
reading otherwise, which means always passing through the classical discipline, and
never having abandoned or jettisoned it, to explore what it omits, forgets, excludes,
expels, marginalizes, dismisses, ignores, scorns, slights, takes too lightly, waves off, is
just not serious enough about!”110 The deconstructor wants to return to these dead-ends,
these aporias, like “an inspector who is gravely concerned with a little crack he observes
in an airplane’s fuselage, while everyone else on the inspection team is eager to break for
lunch.”111 The purpose of this method is to see that the “orthodox, received, dominant
interpretation has been produced by a wave of the hand that brushes aside the deviations
and transgressive moments.”112
To deconstruct is to create the necessary space for the possibility of “the other.”
“The other” is a term Derrida borrows from Emmanuel Levinas, which captures the idea
of the unforeseeable and unidentifiable other which is ‘to come.’113 In other words, ‘the
other’ does not refer to a stable identity, but is, instead, a radical ‘other.’ What Derrida is
trying to suggest is that we must expose today for what it is: a contingent possibility.
And, as a contingent possibility, the present is not necessary and, therefore, could be
something different.114 The question then becomes how do we think about today in a
way that is open to this unforeseeable and unidentifiable other to come rushing in.
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3.4

Foucault, Power, and the Uncertainty of Liberalism

Of central importance for this project is Foucault’s understanding of power. Foucault’s
later work looks to challenge traditional political theory’s one-dimensional understanding
of power relations. For scholars like Robert Dahl, their understanding of power focused
solely on its observable usage in the political realm.115

This conception of power

highlighted only the negative aspects of power: power was conceived of as the ability of
actor A to make actor B do things that actor B would not otherwise have done.116
Accordingly, “the closest equivalent to the power relation [was] the causal relation. For
the assertion ‘C has power over R’, one can substitute the assertion, ‘C’s behaviour
causes R’s behaviour’. If one can define the causal relation, one can define influence,
power, or authority, and vise versa.”117 Here, understanding the relations of power is
possible “only in cases of overt conflict—since those who prevail in such cases are able
to do so precisely because they do, in fact, have more power than their opponents.”118
This one-dimensional view of power was rejected by Peter Bachrach and Morton S.
Baratz, and, later, Steven Lukes.
In their article, “Two Faces of Power,” Bachrach and Baratz introduced a second
dimension of power. Where Dahl’s understanding focused solely on the public face of
power, Bachrach and Baratz added a second, or private, face of power. Here, power “can
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be seen in the covert exclusion of the interests of particular individuals or groups from
consideration in legislative assemblies, council chambers and other arenas in which
decisions affecting the life of the community are taken.”119 According to this conception,
“power is exercised when A participates in the making of decisions that affect B. But
power is also exercised when A devotes his energies to creating or reinforcing social and
political values and institutional practices that limit the scope of the political process to
public consideration of only those issues which are comparatively innocuous to A.”120 In
this instance, power is effective. “To the extent that A succeeds in doing this, B is
prevented, for all practical purposes, from bringing to the fore any issues that might in
their resolution be seriously detrimental to A’s set of preferences.”121 Yet, according to
Lukes, Bachrach and Baratz’s analysis fails to consider a more insidious, third face of
power.
Centrally, Lukes criticizes Bachrach and Baratz’s conception of power as it
remains within the realm of behaviouralism. In doing so, it is unable to account for the
unobservable ways power is exercised.122 A radical conception of power, according to
Lukes, must take into account the way A exercises power over B by “influencing, shaping
or determining his very wants.”123 Thus, “men’s wants may themselves be a product of a
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system which works against their interests.”124 Such a view is significantly influenced by
Antonio Gramsci’s discussion of bourgeois hegemony in which “the consent of the
popular classes to bourgeois rule is possible… only because they are not aware of their
interest in the overthrow of capitalist domination.”125 While Lukes certainly improves
upon previous attempts at conceptualizing power in society, he maintains a negative and
rather reductionist understanding of power.
One of Foucault’s major contributions has been to move the debate beyond this
reductionist view in which power is the possession of a single agent (or group/class of
agents). However, it is important to note that Foucault’s approach to power should not be
understood as a “context-free, ahistorical, and objective” theory like those discussed in
the “faces of power” debate.126 Instead, he is proposing an analytics of power—that is,
“instead of attempting to say what power is, we must attempt to show how it operates in
concrete and historical frameworks.”127 For Foucault, “power is never localized here or
there, never in anybody’s hands, never appropriated as a commodity or piece of
wealth.”128

We must resist viewing power, for example, as merely a “group of

institutions and mechanisms that ensure the subservience of the citizens of a given
state.”129 What this suggests is that power is not a “general system of domination exerted
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by one group (e.g. class) over another, a system whose effects, through successive
derivations, pervade the entire social body.”130

Such reductionist understandings, for

Foucault, are merely the “terminal forms power takes.”131 Thus, “if power is not a thing,
or the control of a set of institutions, or the hidden rationality to history, then the task for
the analyst is to identify how it operates.”132
Power is “the name that one attributes to a complex strategical situation in a
particular society.”133 It is “employed and exercised through a net-like organization.”134
Such an understanding, therefore, recognizes that power is not simply an aspect of the
political arena but is “produced from one moment to the next, at every point, or rather in
every relation from one point to another.”135

Thus, power is indeterminate and

omnipresent because it is “exercised from innumerable points.”136 To suggest that power
is everywhere could easily eliminate the analytical strength of power, but Foucault
connects this non-reductive definition to his understanding of discourses.137 We must
understand that power can be everywhere not because it engulfs us like the sheer force of
a tsunami, but because individuals are not simply the targets of power, “they are always
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also the elements of its articulation.”138 In this respect, power is not simply a negative or
repressive force, but a productive one:
The individual is not to be conceived as a sort of elementary nucleus, a primitive
atom, a multiple and inert material on which power comes to fasten or against
which it happens to strike, and in so doing subdues or crushes individuals. In fact,
it is already one of the prime effects of power that certain bodies, certain gestures,
certain discourses, certain desires, come to be identified and constituted as
individuals. The individual, that is, is not the vis-à-vis of power; it is, I believe,
one of its prime effects, or precisely to the extent to which it is that effect, it is the
element of is articulation. The individual which power has constituted is at the
same time its vehicle.139
Individuals do not merely wield power like a stick. Instead, the individual is the gobetween for power. The body mediates power by regulating behaviour according to the
dominant views of normality. Accordingly, power is diffused and embodied in the
dominant discursive structure “that sets the standards of accepted or expected
behaviour.”140

Therefore, we cannot fully grasp Foucault’s conception of power in

isolation from his understanding of discourse and knowledge generation. 141 According
to Foucault, “there can be no possible exercise of power without a certain economy of
discourses of truth which operates through and on the basis of this association.”142 We
are “subjected to the production of truth through power and we cannot exercise power
except through the production of truth.”143
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This is what Foucault means by power/knowledge.

Power is fixed (at least

temporarily) in the accepted forms of knowledge, scientific understandings, and ‘truth’.
According to Foucault, “in a society such as ours, but basically in any society, there are
manifold relations of power which permeate, characterize and constitute the social body,
and these relations of power cannot themselves be established, consolidated nor
implemented without the production, accumulation, circulation and functioning of a
discourse.”144 For each society, then, there is a unique regime of truth, understood as the
specific discourses which function as barometers of truth.145 Foucault writes that
power never ceases its interrogation, its inquisition, its registration of truth: it
institutionalizes, professionalises and rewards its pursuit. In the last analysis, we
must produce truth as we must produce wealth, indeed we must produce truth in
order to produce wealth in the first place. In another way, we are also subjected
to truth in the sense in which it is truth that makes the laws, that produces the true
discourse which, at least partially, decides, transmits and itself extends upon the
effects of power. In the end, we are judged, condemned, classified, determined in
our undertaking, destined to a certain mode of living or dying, as a function of the
true discourses which are the bearers of the specific effects of power.146
For example, in Western societies,
‘truth’ is centered in scientific discourse and institutions; it is central to economic
production and political power; it is widely circulated; it is produced and
disseminated by great economic and political apparatuses like the university, the
media, or the army. In this system of truth there are many forms of excluded and
subjected knowledge. Those who occupy the lowest status in various institutions
or conditions of life—the patient, inmate, prisoner, welfare mother, laborer,
student- all find their knowledge dis- counted. They are part of a system of power
which invalidates their discourse, occasionally by blatant denial, but continuously
by a set of implicit rules concerning what sorts of concepts and vocabulary are
acceptable and what credentials and status are requisite for one's discourse to
count as knowledge.147
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It is clear, then, that what power produces is precisely the subject. This is Foucault’s
message in his books, Discipline and Punish, and History of Sexuality. In Discipline and
Punish, while Foucault’s apparent focus is on the constant observation, assessment and
control that is employed in the modern penitentiary, its more general theme is the
production of the “contemporary norm-governed social individual”—the docile
subject.148 The modern self is not a tabula rasa, as it is for Descartes, but, rather, is a
historical product—a construct. As Foucault writes, “the individual is not a pre-given
entity which is seized on by the exercise of power [e.g. Descartes’ evil genie]. The
individual, with his identity and characteristics, is the product of a relation of power,
exercised over bodies, multiplicities, movements, desires, forces.”149 The modern self is
an “irreducible node” that takes on the right sort of beliefs and psychological states—the
self is forged by what society defines as normal.150
This is what is ultimately meant when Foucault argues that power is productive:
the modern self—the subject—is a product of power.151 That power is productive hides
the insidious nature of its effects. As Foucault writes, power “does not only weigh on us
as a force that says no, but it traverses and produces things, it induces pleasure, forms
knowledge, produces discourse.”152 In this manner, the effect of power is more pleasure
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than pain. Thus, we do not resist its effects as we would if it was a purely repressive
force. 153
Foucault’s understanding of power is quite complex. While power’s insidious
nature produces a particular subject, Foucault refuses to see this as fulfilling any sort of
coherent master plan of a singular group (i.e. a conspiracy of the bourgeois class).
Instead, Foucault “sees all psychological motivation not as the source but as the result of
strategies without strategists.”154

For Foucault “people know what they do; they

frequently know why they do what they do; but what they don’t know is what they do
does.”155

In this way, Foucault’s work attempts to de-psychologize power by

investigating “how both scientific objectivity and subjective intentions emerge together in
a space set up not by individuals but by social practices.”156
To illustrate this argument, Foucault draws on two examples, the internment of
the insane throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and the repression of
infantile sexuality during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. In the case of the
internment of the insane, one could easily show that this was a plan of the bourgeoisie, as
“lunatics are precisely those persons who are useless to industrial production.”157
Similarly, the repression of infantile sexuality could just as easily be seen as a
consequence of bourgeois class domination “given that the human body had become
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essentially a force of production from the time of the seventeenth and eighteenth century,
all the forms of its expenditure which did not lend themselves to the constitution of the
productive forces—and were therefore exposed as redundant—were banned, excluded
and repressed.”158 For Foucault, “these kinds of deductions are always possible,” but
they are “simultaneously correct and false.”159 But such lines of thinking are “too glib”
for Foucault because “it is equally plausible to suggest that what was needed was sexual
training, the encouragement of a sexual precociousness, given that… the greater the
labour force, the better able would the system of capitalist production have been to fulfill
and improve its functions.”160 In other words, he suggests that, if we take this kind of
conspiratorial view of power, we could arrive at any number of logical conclusions from
the very general observation of the bourgeois classes’ obvious domination.161
Instead of locating these types of causal relationships, Foucault is more interested
in how these techniques for dealing with the insane or with sexuality were maintained
from the lowest level up. This requires a focus on the level of the family and the
immediate environment of the subject. Therefore, instead of grouping these techniques
“under the formula of a generalized bourgeoisie” such an examination would focus on the
real agents responsible for these techniques including the parents, family, doctors, and so
on.162 For Foucault, it is at this most basic level of society where we find the logic of
these techniques of repression or confinement and the certain needs they were meant to
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address. Indeed, “at the local level there is often a high degree of conscious decision
making, planning, plotting and coordination of political activity,” but it is critical to see
that this does not imply a grand strategy.163 Foucault recognizes that actors at the lowest
level, “more or less know what they are doing when they do it and can often be quite
clear in articulating it. But it does not follow that the broader consequences of these local
actions are coordinated. The fact that individuals make decisions about specific policies
or particular groups jockey for their own advantage does not mean that the overall
activation and directionality of power relations in a society implies a subject.”164 It is in
this way, then, that power relations are “intentional and non-subjective.

Their

intelligibility derives from their intentionality. ‘They are imbued, through and through,
with calculation: there is no power that is exercised without a series of aims and
objectives’.”165
To be clear, Foucault does not deny that the confinement of the insane or the
repression of sexuality helped the bourgeoisie, but he wants to avoid any conspiratorial
explanations. In other words, Foucault rejects any claims which suggest the bourgeoisie
elaborately devised these techniques in order to meet their specific needs. Rather, these
techniques and procedures were a response to certain needs at the basic societal level, and
only after they were established did they come “to represent the interests of the
bourgeoisie.” 166 The bourgeoisie did not invent these micro-mechanisms of power but,
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once their political or economic usefulness was revealed, they were, no doubt, “colonized
and maintained by global mechanism and the entire state system.167 The conclusion
which must be drawn from this analysis is that we need to abandon our search “for the
headquarters that presides over [power’s] rationality; neither the cast which governs, nor
the groups which control the state apparatus, nor those who make the most important
economic decisions direct the entire network of power that functions in a society.” 168 In
other words, the dynamics of an omnipresent power mean that the isolation of definite
cause and effect relationships and underlying laws will always come up short. Thus,
where some observers see fixed essences of the subject and metaphysical finalities,
Foucault sees the play of power and a series of unforeseen events that brought us to
today.

3.4.1

Power and the Political

The idea that human rights function as a vehicle for power, as opposed to against power,
does not fit nicely into the traditional liberal conception of human rights. Here, the work
of Foucault can provide a useful lens. As mentioned above, Foucault’s work looks to
challenge traditional political theory’s focus on power’s observable usage in the political
realm in which power is equated with coercion and repression. In terms of the political,
this understanding of power—the ability to get others to do things that they would not
otherwise have done—locates the source of power with the sovereign. The sovereign has
the “right” to create and enforce laws because she has the “consent of those subject to it;
the right to exercise power is directly related to the individual rights of those subjects to
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its exercise.”169 Foucault refers to this as juridical power and cautions against limiting
our understanding of power to this rather reductionist perspective. Thus, “consent might
provide one answer as to the question of the legitimacy of the exercise of power, but it
provides only a very limited answer to questions about the exercise of power more
generally.”170 In other words, Foucault wants to move beyond the association of power
with the “institutions most explicitly associated with rule-giving and enforcement—such
as the state and other important social and political actors.”171 For Foucault, viewing
power as merely a “group of institutions and mechanisms that ensure the subservience of
the citizens of a given state” is to reduce power to only its most overt form.172
Like his concept of power, Foucault conceives of government in broader terms
than traditional political theory and views it as the regulation of the conduct of others.
This can be achieved in direct terms, for example, through the use of the military or the
police, but it can also be achieved in indirect ways “when it acts on the ways in which
people regulate their own behaviour.”173 Emerging from this concept of discipline is the
notion of governmentality. Combining government and rationality, Foucault argues that
governmentality is a form of power “that is addressed to regulating and governing the
populations of states, animated by a particular rationality [the accepted regimes of truth
of a society].”174 Whereas the state typically imposed its power through direct forms of
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intervention, governmentality directed attention towards the promotion of particular types
of conduct—in this way, government was better understood as “the conduct of
conduct.”175 For Dean, conduct could mean “to lead, to direct or to guide, and perhaps
implies some sort of calculation as to how this is to be done.”

176

This rather benign

understanding starts to take on an ethnical or moral tone when “we consider the reflexive
verb ‘to conduct oneself’. Here one is concerned with attention to the form of selfdirection appropriate to certain situations, e.g. at work and at home, in business dealings,
in relation to clients or friends.”

177

Further, if we consider conduct as a noun, it

generally refers to an “articulated set of behaviours,” for example in the case of
professional conduct.178 In these cases, there is a distinct notion of “self-guidance or selfregulation” which must conform to “set of standards or norms.”179 What this suggests,
then, is that conduct is something that prescribes a certain set of behaviours—it is
normative—which can be consequently judged by agents responsible for maintaining
regulation—it is evaluative.180 In this light, Government as “Conduct of conduct,” is
“any more or less calculated and rational activity, undertaken by a multiplicity of
authorities and agencies, employing a variety of techniques and forms of knowledge, that
seeks to shape conduct by working through the desires, aspirations, interests and beliefs
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of various actors, for definite but shifting ends and with a diverse set of relatively
unpredictable consequences, effects and outcomes.”181
Some key aspects emerge from this definition: First, according to Dean, “from the
perspective of those who seek to govern, human conduct is conceived as something that
can be regulated, controlled, shaped and turned to specific ends.”182 Second, governing is
a rational activity. Here, Dean notes that “rationality is simply any form of thinking
which strives to be relatively clear, systematic, and explicitly about aspects of ‘external’
or ‘internal’ existence, about how things are or how they ought to be.”183 This links
government up with a more normative focus on morality. Dean writes, “if morality is
understood as the attempt to make oneself accountable for one’s own actions, or as a
practice in which human beings take their own conduct to be subject to self-regulation,
then government is an intensely moral activity.”184 Government is moral in a number of
ways: first, “it is moral because policies and practices of government… presume to know,
with varying degrees of explicitness and using specific forms of knowledge, what
constitutes good, virtuous, appropriate, responsible conduct of individuals and
collectivities.”185 We see this everyday, from tickets for driving without a seatbelt to
time spent in jail for the use of illicit drugs. Second, we can think of government as a
moral activity if we consider the morality of governors: this refers to our demands that
individuals representing the government have “integrity, honesty and impartiality” which
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can be regulated by codes of conducts, audits, etc. Finally, government as a moral
activity can refer to the ways it “seeks to engage with how both the ‘governed’ and
‘governors’ regulate themselves, e.g. a taxpayer can be constituted as an individual
capable of honest self-assessment or a judge as someone with a duty to exercise fair,
impartial and reasonable judgement and wisdom.”186 This brings us back to Foucault’s
notion of power. To govern is to set and enforce the standards of accepted behaviour, but
it is, perhaps more importantly, a process which attempts to engender practices of selfregulation. As Dean notes, “the government of the prison, of the economy and of the
unemployed as much as the government of our own bodies, personalities and inclinations,
entails an attempt to affect and shape in some way who and what individuals and
collectives are and should be.” Therefore,
government is crucially concerned to modify a certain space marked out by
entities such as the individual, its selfhood or personage, or the personality,
character, capacities, levels of self-esteem and motivation the individual
possesses. Government concerns not only practices of government but also
practices of the self. To analyze government is to analyze those practices that try
to shape, sculpt, mobilize and work through the choices, desires, aspirations,
187
needs, wants and lifestyles of individuals and groups.
The state and its agencies are merely one among various “instruments and rationalities of
government (understood in its broad terms) that attempts to regulate our behaviour.”188
This is nowhere clearer than in our own daily working lives, which are governed not
simply by the obligations we have to our employers, the universities, and our students,
but also by general sets of health and safety regulations, school codes of conduct, and so

186
187
188

Dean, Governmentality, 19.
Dean, Governmentality, 20.
Ivison, Rights, 190.

111

on.

This radical decentering of the state fundamentally challenges our traditional

understanding of the sovereign power. As Ivison notes, “once we see how the business
of managing populations extends beyond the formal instruments of the state and is
dispersed across a wide array of instruments, processes and techniques, it becomes
increasingly difficult to see how the discourse of sovereignty can capture either what is
occurring or provide a justification for these diverse ‘arts of government’.”189
Foucault was particularly interested in liberalism and, more specifically, neoliberalism, as a rationality of government. Traditional political theorists view liberalism
as a “set of arguments and practices that are aimed at criticizing and containing state
power” which “obviously include[s] the language of subjective rights.”190 In this light,
the rights associated with liberalism are viewed as a tool against power.

Such a

conception of rights relies on a particular understanding of humans: as “stable,
intentional, effective subject[s] who stand instrumentally before rights, who ontologically
pre-exist them, and whose knowable interests or freedom [are] thus protected by
them.”191
However, if viewed through a Foucauldian lens, liberalism “offers a particular
rationality of government, one in which liberty itself becomes a technique of government,
along with law.”192 By viewing humans fundamentally as rational maximizers, the neo-
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liberal rationality asserts that our well-being is best advanced by “liberating individual
entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional framework characterized by
strong private property rights, free markets, and free trade.”193 The state, in such a view,
exists to guarantee the integrity of money and private property through the establishment
of a military, police force and, legal structures.194 However, this reduction of the state
does not actually reduce government (understood now as “the conduct of conduct”).
Those who do not conform—deviants like welfare recipients, prisoners and other
‘unemployables’—are subjected to alternative forms of government.195 In contrast to our
traditional, liberal understanding of rights, rights for Foucault, by producing the liberal
subject, become a conduit for power.196 What this suggests is that, far from moral
certainty, rights have an ambiguous character. As Golder notes,
Rights are both political tools for the contestation and alteration of mechanisms of
power and simultaneously mechanism of capture and inscription; both
disciplinary and governmental apparatuses, that is, which conduct the behaviour
and go to constitute the very identities of those who deploy them. Far from being
unproblematic tools for the protection of a subject’s freedom [as traditionally
understood in transitional justice], rights emerge in this account as conflicted and
ambivalent mechanisms which subjectify and regulate the would-be subject of
rights even as they claim to protect that subject or to enlarge the domain within
197
which the subject moves.
By viewing rights through a Foucauldian lens, we can see that rights, like power,
in general, can “form part of disciplinary and governmental networks which affect, even
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constitute, that subject.”198 Douzinas makes a similar claim, arguing that “recently, rights
have mutated from a relative defense against power to a modality of its operations.”199
Again, to understand the functioning of rights, we must see the individual as not prior to
power, nor, in this case, rights. As Foucault claimed, “the individual is not, in other
words, power’s opposite number; the individual is one of power’s first effects. The
individual is, in fact, a power-effect, and at the same time, and to the extent that he is a
power-effect, the individual is a relay: power passes through the individuals it has
constituted.”200 The individual is not a subject of rights, but is, instead, the “subjecteffect of rights.”201 What this suggests is that “a right… is not simply a mechanism that
converges with disciplinary power but is itself, ‘from the beginning a potentially
disciplinary practice’.”202 Here, the rights regime must be understood as producing a
particular kind of subject—the liberal subject.203
In order to deal with his particular approach to power (that is, power as productive
but not according to any master plan) Foucault develops the instrument or tool of
genealogy.

To start, genealogy must be distinguished from traditional history.

As

Dreyfus and Rabinow suggest, genealogy is not meant as a tool to capture the “meaning
or significance of a past epoch.”204 Foucault is not interested in getting “the whole
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picture of a past age, or person, or institution,” nor is he “trying to find the underlying
laws of history.”205 Perhaps most importantly, Foucault eschews what Dreyfus and
Rabinow call finalism: a “history which finds the kernel of the present at some distant
point in the past and then shows the finalized necessity of the development from that
point to the present.”206 Such an Hegelian approach views “everything that happened in
between [the kernel and the present as] taken up by this march forward, or else left in the
backwash as the world historical spirit differentiates and individuates what is central from
what is peripheral.”207 In this type of history, we search the details of our past behind a
lens of progress thereby viewing noteworthy events as merely signposts directing us to
the present.

According to this perspective, “everything has a meaning, a place;

everything is situated by the final goal history will attain.”208
Central to genealogy is a rejection that the outcome of history is anything
necessary. The genealogist “recognizes that the deep hidden meanings, the unreachable
heights of truth, the murky interiors of consciousness are all shams.”209 Instead, it was
“one possible result of a whole series of complex relations between other events” where
no outcome was inevitable.210 To see humanity as a contingent possibility is to argue that
history is not an unfolding of events in some teleological manner, but is, rather, a series
of accidents. Indeed, the “story of history” for the genealogist is not the progressive
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“development of Truth or the concrete embodiment of Freedom, but “is one of accidents,
dispersion, chance events, lies.211 Such a perspective does not suggest that just about
anything could have occurred as there are often very defined forces at work that produce
one particular outcome rather than another. Instead, we must recognize how our history
structures for us a “narrow range of possibilities.”212 According to this perspective, our
search for origins must be abandoned. As Foucault points out, for Nietzsche, the search
for origins is a futile “attempt to capture the exact essence of things,” as it “assumes the
existence of immobile forms that precede the external world of accident and
succession.”213

The task of historical analysis for the genealogists is driven by an

altogether different logic. As Dreyfus and Rabinow suggest, “Genealogy’s coat of arms
might read: oppose depth, finality, and interiority. Its banner: Mistrust identities in
history; they are only masks, appeals to unity.”214 It is contingency that matters, not
progress and continuity.
To argue that history is not an unfolding of events, but is, in fact, the result of a
series of accidents, is to challenge the belief in human progress. For Foucault, progress
implies that we are traveling towards some final end-point like the absolute attainment of
freedom. However, such a view requires that humans have an eternal essence that has
been denied as a result of some external power. Such a view posits that the individual is
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“ontologically prior to the exercise of power.” 215

This, for Foucault, is not the case.

There is no eternal human essence like freedom that must be re-captured in order to
advance humanity.

For Foucault, if the historian refuses to buy into the ruse of

metaphysics, she will find that the only thing behind the thing is not some “primordial
truth” or “timeless and essential secret” but, rather, a story of “accidents that accompany
every beginning.”216

This is reason enough as to why the genealogist must poke

metaphorical holes in the story of lofty origins and progress by showing what had to be
repressed for this veneer of history to maintain its gloss.
Therefore, we must see that the process ahead is not one of writing a whig history,
that is, a “a ‘true’ history of the past in the sense of one that is fully adequate to the past,
which represents it correctly, which gets the whole picture.”217 Such an endeavor, for the
genealogist, is based on the “false claim of the correspondence theory of reality.”218 In
contrast, the genealogist “accepts the fact that we are nothing but our history, and that
therefore we will never get a total and detached picture either of who we are of or our
history.”219 Instead, Foucault calls for a writing of a history of our present: “we must
inevitably read our history in terms of our current practices.”220 In “writing the history of
the present,” Foucault’s “approach explicitly and self-reflectively begins with a diagnosis
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of the current situation.” 221 We must first “locate the acute manifestations of a particular
‘meticulous ritual of power’… to see where it arose, took shape, gained importance, and
so on.”222 In excavating this “meticulous ritual of power,” one can show that it was not
necessary, but rather, very much contingent on practices that preceded it. Thus, instead
of attempting to piece together a causal account of history bit by bit, the genealogists
looks for contingencies. What had to occur for the outcome that we see today?
The purpose of this chapter is to suggest the need for a rupture in the dominant
theorizing of transitional justice. The suggestions made here are not merely for the sake
of critique alone. They are meant to inspire, to motivate, to re-shape that which may
appear as justice in the dominant reading, but which continues to commit violence on
those it seeks to help. If we are to see the world as contingent and open, we must be
diligent to avoiding closure; to avoid building guardrails that unnecessarily constrain our
path. Foucault and Derrida are both interested in the “constraints [that] arise primarily in
the categories by means of which we conceptualize ourselves in our world.”223

In

suggesting that the subject is “molded by historical and political forces,” Foucault
recognizes that there are “aspects of our world that seem to be immune from change. We
must conform to the limits they place before us and order our world with those limits in
mind.”224 Yet, as we have seen, such limits for Foucault “are not merely placed upon us
from the outside like barriers but are instead woven into the very fabric of human
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existence.”225 Foucault’s genealogy shows us that “many of these internal limits arise not
from the constitution of our being but from the politics of our relationships.”226
Together, these authors challenge the idea that we can approach knowledge of the
social world in the same manner as we do the natural world. The message from Foucault
is that the social world is better characterized by flux than by eternal essences. History is
not the unfolding of events according to some underlying law but is a series of accidents:
contingency not causality. For Derrida, we must see that the language we use to make
sense of this world builds impenetrable walls around us in a way that always excludes the
other (whoever they may be). Thus, we must remain vigilant in opening this world up to
those we cannot anticipate. Finally, Rorty encourages us to see that our vocabularies are
never final. To believe so is to ignore the fact that our language cannot capture the
world-as-it-is. To accept the fragility of our language is to remain open to the use of
alternative vocabularies.

3.5

Conclusion

The previous section examined the theoretical tools that are used in this project. The
theories of Richard Rorty, Jacques Derrida, and Michel Foucault provide answers to three
questions: First, what is this project about? It is about identifying and challenging the
final vocabulary we use in transitional justice to speak about justice. As Rorty asks us,
“Does our use of these words get in the way of our use of those words?” The answer to
this, as evidenced by the emerging critique in transitional justice, is, of course, yes: our
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justice vocabulary is limited and exclusive. This leads to the second question: Why is
this a problem? While all authors point to why this is a problem for Foucault, we must
recognize the way power functions in society. Of central importance in Foucault’s work
is the notion of governmentality. In transitional justice, we seem to have accepted
uncritically that human rights are always opposed to power, and, therefore, immune from
its effect.

In contrast, human rights and, more broadly, liberalism as a form of

governmentality can be viewed as a disciplinary discourse that constructs the liberal
subject. The field of transitional justice has, of course, adopted liberalism as its savior.
In doing so, we have closed off justice: in the dominant view, justice is always in service
of this transition to liberalism.
This leads to the final question: How are we to achieve this? Here, both Foucault
and Derrida provide us with ways of approaching this question. The overall framework
for this analysis is informed by deconstruction. Deconstruction is not meant to destroy or
annihilate the field; quite the opposite. Rather, to deconstruct is to loosen it up, to open it
to the other. To do so is to maintain its relevance for those societies emerging from
conflict where the site of transition is very much a contested place. Deconstruction
proceeds by way of a double reading of a text: the first reading is closes to the traditional
reading of a text. It remains on the main highway of the text. The second reading, in
contrast, veers of the highway in search of tensions in the text that are ignored by the
traditional reading. For his part, Foucault urges us to see that our present condition is not
by any means necessary. History is not the unfolding of events according to some master
plan but is, instead, a series of accidents. Historical events are contingent—that is, they
were one possible outcome of a series of complex preceding events. The importance of
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Foucault’s argument is that we must reconsider the historical events leading up to the
normalization of transitional justice at the international level. The field tends to see
transitional justice as the result of legal and human rights activists challenging the
sovereignty of states, often drawing a line from Nuremberg to the end of the Cold War, to
its normalization with the establishment of the ICC. Such a view, I argue, ignores the
functioning of power in the emergence of the field. This analysis, therefore, seeks to
show the way other interests were integral in the growth of transitional justice. In doing
so, I seek to challenge some of the field’s central assumptions, including the belief that
transitional justice always stands in opposition to power. The purpose of this, of course,
relates back to the need to open up and loosen the walls we have drawn around “justice”
in transitional justice.
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Chapter 4

4

Examining the Paradigms of Transitional Justice

The following chapter explores the dominant paradigms of justice in transitional justice.
While the field initially coalesced around a single understanding of justice as criminal
prosecution, it has expanded to include restorative justice and, to a lesser degree,
reparative justice. Ultimately, while these paradigms of justice emerge from unique
philosophical, religion, or cultural traditions, in transitional justice theory, they have been
viewed as instruments to assist in the establishment of liberal democracy.

While

transitional justice mechanisms have always been associated with democratization,
Teitel’s theory of transitional justice specifically theorized these mechanisms as rituals in
societies transitioning from a state of conflict to a state of peace. In this way, the field
has approached conflict as a problem or puzzle that can be solved with the right solution:
liberal democracy.
To understand the problems this poses, we must recognize that transitional justice
mechanisms operate always in societies with deep divisions. It is believed, then, that the
introduction of transitional justice mechanisms can assist in finding a path out of this
divisiveness. As Teitel suggests, transitional justice should be understood as a bridge
connecting the old, rights-abusing regime with the new, rights-respecting one. Its very
essence (at least, how it has been theorized) is that it is a fleeting moment.

This

relationship between transitional justice and time is what I hope to interrogate when I
speak of the need to examine the “transition question.” How is our theorizing about
justice shaped by the transition? First, this periodization between old and new suggests
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that each period exhibits relatively stable characteristics. Society in the old regime is
defined by divisiveness whereas, in the new regime, it is defined by non-conflict. This
leads to the second observation that, as it has been theorized, transitional justice must
necessarily entail a teleological account of justice. Justice is working towards some
definite end-point—the other side of the bridge. In transitional justice theory, this endpoint consistently entails the construction of a liberal democracy. Here, we can see the
influence of the Liberal Peace Thesis on transitional justice theories. To begin this
analysis, the following section examines the three paradigms of justice in transitional
justice.

4.1

Retributive Justice

The retributive justice paradigm has been the central approach for dealing with
perpetrators of mass atrocities at the international level. Starting with the International
Military Tribunal at Nuremberg (1945) and the International Military Tribunal for the Far
East (1946) following the Second World War, retributive justice has been the cornerstone
of the international community’s approach to mass atrocities, as evidenced by the
establishment of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (1993),
the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (1994), and the permanent International
Criminal Court (2002). In addition to these international courts, hybrid courts, which
consist of both international and domestic justice actors, have also been established
including the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (1997) and the Special
Court for Sierra Leone (2002).
While some argue that criminal prosecutions following mass atrocities is an
imposition of Western justice, the international community, led by the United Nations,
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has generally prioritized this response over all other mechanisms. Yet, while there is a
general consensus regarding the importance of criminal prosecutions, there is little
agreement over the actual value of such proceedings. The following section examines the
dominant justifications for using criminal justice.
There are several justifications for using criminal prosecutions. Legal theorists
and philosophers have generally distinguished between two categories: consequentialism
and retributivism. Consequentialist arguments focus on the way criminal prosecutions
can the change behavior of both the individual perpetrator who is on trial as well, as other
would-be wrongdoers.1

In contrast retributivist justifications focus purely on the

restoration of justice. Retributivist theorists suggest that an offender has “taken an unfair
advantage in committing a crime, which can only be corrected by the administering of a
punishment.”2
A retributivist justification is ‘backward-looking’ because its raison d'être is
rooted in the past, in the commission of the act.3 This argument for criminal prosecution
seems to tap into a raw emotion of vengeance. Mani captures this sentiment, suggesting
that “the basic retributive urge is that wrongdoing must be punished simply because the
wrongful act merits condemnation and punishment. But a retributivist justification is
more than an urge for vengeance. A retributivist insists that there is a moral obligation to

1

Michael Wenzel, Tyler G. Okimoto, Norman T. Feather, Michael J. Platow, “Retributive and Restorative
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inflict suffering on a wrongdoer. Some of the early literature in transitional justice
focused on the writings of Jean Hampton.4 According to Hampton, punishment is “a
commitment to asserting moral truth in the face of its denial.”5 The perpetration of a
crime results in the elevation of a perpetrator over a victim, putting the two in a
hierarchical relationship in which the perpetrator asserts his/her superiority.

For

Hampton, this produces a “false moral claim,” and, as a result, “moral reality has been
denied.”6 By denying the perpetrator’s superiority, the act of retribution is an attempt to
correct this false moral status.7 In doing so, the state, and, where that is not possible, the
international community, “reaffirm a victim’s equal worth in the face of a challenge to
it.”8 Similarly, Drumbl argues that “the infliction of punishment rectifies the moral
balance insofar as punishment is what the perpetrator deserves. Punishment, therefore, is
to be proportionate to the nature and extent of the crime.”9

According to Elster,

retribution as a theory of punishment likely has the most appeal among victims of mass
atrocities. He writes, “the idea that wrongdoers deserve to be punished for their acts,
irrespective of the consequences of punishing them, is one that probably has a wider
appeal in the population at large than among criminal law scholars.”10
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In addition to retribution, Drumbl identifies two consequentialist justifications for
criminal prosecutions: general deterrence and expressivism.

In terms of general

deterrence, by institutionalizing justice the state removes the need for personal
vengeance. Blewitt captures this view when he writes that
[a]ll victims expect, and in my view are entitled to see, that the persons most
responsible for the crimes against them, their families and loved ones, are brought
to justice. If justice is not achieved on their behalf, then their feelings of
grievance and their desire for revenge could lead to them taking the law into their
own hands to achieve justice, or what they perceive in their eyes as justice – an
eye for an eye!”11
In terms of mass human rights violations committed by one ethnic group against another,
Meernik, Nichols and King suggest that “by pointing the finger of blame squarely at
those who conceived, organized, and ordered the commission of War Crimes, Crimes
against Humanity, and genocide, criminal prosecution is theorized to contribute to
deterrence by lessening the perceived need for one ethnic group to take revenge against
another.”12 This justification is premised on the belief that the threat of punishment will
create a hostile world for those who commit human rights violations and, as a result,
potential violators will give weight to the threat of judicial accountability when deciding
their course of action. Of course, advocates of this theory recognize that enforceable
international law will likely not deter all potential violators,13 but suggest that their
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existence in the international community is still better than the alternative—that is to say,
complete anarchy.14
In support of this argument, Blewitt suggests that the Prosecutor of the ICTY was
able to effectively prevent any atrocities from occurring during a build-up of tension
between ethnic Albanian rebels and the Macedonian government following the conflict in
Kosovo (1998). According to Blewitt, the Prosecutor of the ICTY made it explicitly
clear to the Macedonian authorities that the jurisdiction of the ICTY remained in
existence and encompassed the entire territory of the former Yugoslavia; a tract of land
that included Macedonia. Consequently, Macedonian authorities were made aware of the
judicial consequences that would occur if such violations took place. Such a message was
also delivered to the ethnic Albanian rebels.15 This threat was not lost on the military
chief in Macedonia:
[F]ollowing a particular incident, where ethnic Albanian rebels were holding a
village hostage, the Government ordered the chief of the military to enter the
village and to restore law and order. [The Prosecutor] was informed that the
military chief responded by saying that if he made a mistake whilst carrying out
these order then we would most likely end up in The Hague. He was then
informed that he should not make any mistakes and to act within the law.16
For Blewitt, this suggests that the laws, at the very minimum, were being factored into
the military’s overall approach and, therefore, had the potential to alter potentially deadly
strategies.
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Elster, too, points to a particular example of deterrence. He cites the case of a man
in Norway who, after finding out the consequences for collaborating with the Nazi party,
rejected a request to serve on a Nazi special court.17 In this story, the man risked
punishment from his Nazi superiors, believing that “it would be better for his posthumous
reputation if he were sentenced by the Nazi Party than by the resistance.”18 For Elster,
much like in Blewitt’s example, there must be an outside actor, like an exiled government
or international agent, can publicize credible threats in order to deter potential human
rights violators. Today, this task is carried out by the International Criminal Court which
provides a permanent mechanism to stand up against human rights violations.
There is, however, a great deal of skepticism surrounding the actual effectiveness
of an international court in deterring would-be human rights violators. Drumbl suggests
that there is no systematized evidence that definitively demonstrates the effectiveness of
criminal trials in deterring international crimes.19 Furthermore, Drumbl points out that
some of the worst human rights violations including the Srebrenica massacre (1995) and
the Kosovo ethnic cleansing (1998) took place while the ICTY still had jurisdiction.20 He
suggests that the failure to deter crimes comes, in part, because “deterrence’s assumption
of a certain degree of perpetrator rationality, which is grounded in liberalism’s treatment
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of the ordinary common criminal seems particularly ill fitting for those who perpetuate
atrocity.”21
For Drumbl, the effectiveness of an international court to deter crimes is muted,
especially against the backdrop of “massive violence, incendiary propaganda, and
upended social order that contours atrocity.”22 The cost-benefit analysis undertaken by
an individual carrying out such atrocities is, perhaps, an overly optimistic view of a
potential perpetrator’s particular mindset within such circumstances. Drumbl argues that
participants in such atrocities are often caught up in the emotional fervor of the moment.
Accordingly, “[f]or many participants, violence has meaning and is compelling… many
individuals organized as foot soldiers of evil share an affective motivation for
discriminatory killing. They are captured by angry social norms or, at least, are captivated
by them.”23 For these participants, their actions, while not legal, are morally justifiable
given the particular circumstances. This moral defense is often re-confirmed through the
use of propaganda that de-humanizes the “other” and elicits fears of their reprisal.24 This
type of propaganda was used throughout the Rwandan genocide.25 Megret, too, rejects
the view that a would-be human rights violator such as a “crazed nationalist purifier”
would be deterred by the existence of some distant court. He suggests that this belief is
“a typical case of liberalism’s hegemonious tendency of constructing the other in its own
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self-image, preferably along the lines of some reductionist form of economic rational
choice theory.”26 In contrast, Elster suggests that rather than conceiving of deterrence as
the prevention of crimes via “signals from the outside to the inside,” it is, perhaps, more
fruitful to think of deterrence as being effective when the signals are from the “present to
the future.”27

Such was the position taken by Justice Robert Jackson during the

Nuremberg trials, who felt that the trials were necessary to “make war less attractive.”28
Expressivism

is

the

second

consequentialist

justification

for

criminal

prosecutions. This justification asserts that punishment provides a necessary signal of
change for a newly emerging regime. One of the early human rights activists in the field,
Juan Mendez, captures this sentiment when he writes:
[R]edressing the wrongs committed through human rights violations is not only a
legal obligation and a moral imperative imposed on governments. It also makes
good political sense in the transition from dictatorship to democracy. In fact, the
pursuit of retrospective justice is an urgent task of democratization, as it
highlights the fundamental character of the new order to be established, an order
based on the rule of law and on respect for the dignity and worth of each human
person.29
Similarly, Teitel, a central theorist in the field, is also a proponent of this perspective.
Her transitional jurisprudence argument suggests that by subjecting the old regime to the
rigours of criminal law, transitional legal processes “convey publicly and authoritatively”
the real differences between illiberal and liberal regimes.30 For McAdams, “the decision
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to act upon past abuses will amount to more than simply finalizing the break with
authoritarianism.

Assuming they [trials] are properly conducted, these proceedings

should provide tangible evidence of the guiding principles—equality, fairness, and the
rule of law—that are meant to define the new order of things.”31 McAdams touches on
one of the key pieces of expressivism.

He writes, “legal prosecution equates to

embracing the rule of law—that is, holding violators accountable for their misdeeds
demonstrates to all members of society that the law’s authority is superior to that of
individuals.”32

“By bringing the impartiality of the courtroom to adjudicate these

crimes,” trials, convictions and punishment can build the status of a new state and
increase the respect for law.33 Similarly, Orentlicher asserts that, “by condemning past
crimes through the strongest sanction used by the institutions of government to condemn,
exemplary trials could send a message to the future: This will not be tolerated again.”34
For Osiel, criminal prosecutions can positively contribute to post-conflict societybuilding through the growth in social solidarity that emerges when parties can rely on
institutions to peacefully resolve disputes. In this case, the institution’s effectiveness
reaffirms its importance in society.35
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In addition to rebuilding the status of the rule of law, many of the transitional
justice scholars argue that criminal prosecutions can play a vital role in the promotion of
reconciliation. While previous trials like the ad hoc tribunals for the former Yugoslavia
and Rwanda were largely considered ineffective in this respect,36 scholars like Kerr and
Mobekk suggest that with the right approach (for example, locating the trials in the
country in which the crimes occurred as well as ensuring community buy-in) judicial
courts can “make a contribution to peace and reconciliation.”37 For example, Akhavan
argues that trials like the “ICTY will contribute to interethnic reconciliation by telling the
truth about the underlying causes and consequences of the Yugoslav tragedy.

The

ascertainment and public recognition of indisputable facts before an impartial tribunal
will help counter the distortions of demonization and ethnic hatred fomented by certain
political élites in the former Yugoslavia.”38 The purpose of truth here is to “demonstrate
that there was nothing inevitable or irreversible about the eruption of ethnic violence and
that interethnic harmony is both possible and desirable.”39
Yet, Akhavan is clear that an exhaustive truth based on “recital of objective facts”
will not lead to reconciliation.40 Rather, the type of truth necessary for reconciliation is a
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“shared truth—a moral or interpretive account.”41

Of course, this is where criminal

prosecutions are more constructive than other truth-getting procedures. He writes that
through the exercise of prosecutorial discretion, the limited resources at the
disposal of the ICTY can be used to construct an optimal shared truth that
demonstrates that individuals—primarily leaders—bear liability for crimes, and
that there is no justification for the collective attribution of guilt to entire ethnic
groups. But such truth-telling is necessarily restrained by the limits of the judicial
process, the focus of which is the deeds of the accused and not the suffering of the
42
victims.
Akhavan’s argument is based on the belief that collective blame will result in cycles of
violence between community, whereas, the individualization of guilt will show that
“specific individuals—not entire ethnic or religious or political groups—committed
atrocities.”43 Similarly, Moghalu argues that trials “establish individual responsibility for
the crimes adjudicated, thus negating collective guilt, which can be a significant obstacle
to genuine reconciliation.”44 These views suggest that legal prosecutions can do more
than simply express a new future; they can have a transformative effect on the trajectory
of this “new” society.
Some scholars, however, challenge the idea that the individualization of guilt will
strengthen inter-group relations. For example, Fletcher and Weinstein point out that “in
periods of collective violence, the focus on individual crimes has been used by many to
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claim collective innocence.”

45

Similarly, Meister notes that the “individuating project

[which] is a necessary component of criminal prosecutions… is also a serious limitation
of liberal political analysis. Politics, after all, is not merely about what people do, but
46

also about what they support, wish, and condone.”

These scholars suggest that placing

the blame squarely on the individual perpetrators fails to capture the wider social context
in which these conflict occurred. As Fletcher and Weinstein note, “the assumption that
47

individual agency is the primary determinant of behaviour is open to question.”

Criminal prosecutions grounded in the retributive justice paradigm are the
centrepiece of the international community’s response to conflict and authoritarianism.
Guided by the dictates of international law, at the heart of which are the civil and political
rights related to bodily integrity, criminal prosecutions are rooted in a liberal conception
of the world. The focus of the retributive justice paradigm is the prosecution and
subsequent incarceration of individual perpetrators of mass atrocities. In the transitional
justice community, many still argue that accountability through criminal proceedings
remains a vital component in a state’s transition from conflict. Weinstein and Stover
recognize this, suggesting that “individuals need some form of justice to acknowledge the
wrongs done to them, just as societies need it to establish boundaries within which
individuals can be held responsible for their behaviour toward their fellow citizens.”48
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However, Weinstein and Stover argue that “[j]ustice is most effective when it works in
consort with other processes of social reconstruction and reflects the needs and wishes of
those most affected by violence.”49 For these authors, “this is perhaps the greatest lesson
that has emerged since the international community began its experiment in international
criminal justice over ten years ago.”50 This recognition of the relative unimportance of
the victim in the justice process has been the central focus of the restorative justice
process. In response, the international community has adopted an array of mechanisms to
accompany legal prosecutions. These mechanisms will be discussed in the following
sections on truth commissions and the various reparative mechanisms.

4.2

Restorative Justice

Central to the field of transitional justice is a belief that the world must take action in
cases of gross human rights violations. Criminal prosecutions, rooted in retributive
justice, are only one approach that has been legitimated by the field; truth commissions
and their underlying philosophy of justice, restorative justice, are another. Whereas in
the retributive model, the victim is, for the most part, removed from the process and
replaced by the state,51 in the restorative paradigm, victims as well as the wider
community are viewed as integral actors in the justice process.52 While proponents of
restorative justice have identified a number of mechanisms, including healing circles, as
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an alternative to criminal prosecutions, truth commissions have become the mechanism
most closely associated with this paradigm.
As Hayner defines it, a truth commission is a body that “(1) focuses on the past;
(2) investigates a pattern of abuses over a period of time, rather than a specific event; (3)
exists temporarily, typically in operation for six months to two years, and completing its
work with the submission of a report; and (4) is officially sanctioned, authorized, or
empowered by the state.”53 Truth commissions were popularized following the wave of
military dictatorships in Latin America in the 1970s and 1980s, especially where previous
regimes had “insisted upon amnesties or pardons as a precondition for stepping aside.”54
Because of this, subsequent governments were forced to seek out alternative mechanisms
of justice, at least in the immediate period following the transition away from
authoritarian rule.55

In this respect, the truth commission was likely a political

compromise more than an imperative; however, the truth commission offered valuable
information for families of victims who had disappeared without a trace.56
For countries like Argentina, a truth commission was adopted not as an
alternative, but, rather, as a first step. After being elected President, Raúl Alfonsín
adopted the National Commission on the Disappearance of People (CONADEP).
However, eighteen months after this transition began, prosecutions were set up to
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investigate the crimes of the military junta.57 For Argentina, where criminal prosecutions
initially looked unfeasible, the truth commission offered an immediate mechanism to delegitimize the previous regime’s human rights violations but, in the end, did not close the
door on criminal prosecutions.58
The truth commission in Argentina was the first prominent commission of its
kind.59 Since then, approximately 40 such commissions have been appointed to date, but
the truth commission has largely become identified with the democratic transition in
South Africa. After the fall of the apartheid regime, the new government, under the
African National Congress, adopted the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) to
investigate the mass human rights violations under the previous regime.60 Since the
South African TRC, truth commissions have gained considerable legitimacy at the
international level,61 and there are a great number of advocates in the international
community, including international human rights non-governmental organizations
(NGOs), like the International Center for Transitional Justice; commissioners and staff of
previous truth commissions; academics from around the world; and proponents within the
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United Nations. All of these suggest that truth commissions are a necessary component
of the justice process in supporting peaceful transitions.62
The restorative justice paradigm has become the guiding moral force behind the
development of truth and reconciliation commissions following mass atrocities.
Restorative justice emerges from a unique view of wrongdoings in which crime breaks
down the very social fabric of a community.63 In response, restorative justice emphasizes
the “transformation of subjective factors that impair a community, such as anger,
resentment, and desire for vengeance.”64 Thus, crime, and the response to it, needs to
have a focus beyond the individual perpetrator to include the damaged relationships
within community.65

The retributive paradigm, as discussed above, eliminates this

relational aspect by removing all elements of the victim and inserting the state in his or
her place. In this sense, the retributive focus on a single criminal offense becomes a
contest between the state and the offender, to the exclusion of any outside actors. In one
of the early academic pieces that greatly influenced the restorative justice paradigm,
Christie described conflict as property and argued that the justice system robs victims of
this property. Christie argued that this is a misstep on the part of the modern state, to the
detriment of the victim and the wider society. He stated that “modern criminal control
systems represent one of the many cases of lost opportunity for involving citizens in tasks
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that are of immediate importance to them.”66 According to Christie, “the victim is a
particularly heavy loser in this situation. Not only has he suffered, lost materially or
become hurt, physically or otherwise… but above all he has lost participation in his own
case.”67
While the replacing of the victim with the state is justified by its goal of avoiding
cycles of vengeance, some scholars argue that this exchange actually signals the
prioritization of the state’s interest over the victim’s or the wider community’s. Sawin
and Zehr assert that
as the ostensible custodian of social order, the state’s duty is to denounce the
wrong, ensure that the offender receives the ‘hard treatment’ he or she deserves
and take steps to assure that no further harm will be committed. The state carries
out this duty by discovering the source of wrongdoing (the offender), condemning
the act and extracting assurances that the offenses will desist, either through
imprisonment, monitoring, treatment or reform. Much of this is done in the name
of the larger or macro-community, but rarely is the community actually consulted
or involved in any meaningful way.68
This suggests that ensuring social order is paramount to the interests of the victim or
those of the community. In many cases, where a retributive approach like the court
system is used, the actors most wronged by criminal actions, that is to say the victims, are
disconnected from the pursuit of justice.69 Their private pursuit of justice is not given any
assistance from the state, outside of knowing the offender is behind bars. Their needs and
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the needs of the community, if not satiated by the imprisonment of the offender, must be
met though other means.
In contrast, restorative justice argues that damaged relationships represent both the
effects of a crime, and the cause of that crime. That is, a criminal act further damages the
societal fabric of a community but it, perhaps more importantly, also signals an existing
brokenness within the community; a crime both implicates the community and
contributes to its deterioration.

Any response to such collective brokenness must

acknowledge the importance of bringing the community, including the victim into the
justice process in order to restore the basic fabric of society. Zehr highlights this,
suggesting that “restorative justice is a process to involve, to the extent possible, those
who have a stake in a specific offense and to collectively identify and address harms,
needs, and obligations, in order to heal and put things as right as possible.”70
In contrast to the criminal justice paradigm where “violations create guilt,” the
restorative justice paradigm suggests that “violations create obligations.”71 Whereas guilt
necessitates some form of punishment by the state, as evidenced in the criminal
paradigm, the restorative paradigm suggests that obligations are owed to both the victim
and the wider community “in an effort to put things right.”72 For example, this could
include dialogue between these stakeholders, in which all “share their stories and come to
a consensus about what should be done.”73 The approach of the restorative paradigm
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stands in marked contrast to the retributive paradigm for its emphasis on the victim.
However, Llewellyn urges us to use caution when viewing restorative justice as a strictly
victim-centered lens in which the objective is merely the rebuilding of the relationship
between victim and perpetrator. While restorative justice does not reject this view, it is
not the ultimate aim of the paradigm. Instead, she argues that the paradigm is
concerned with ensuring equality in social relationships between individuals.
Social relationships are those relationships that result from the fact that we all
exist in networks of relationships – some personal and intimate but the great
majority of which result from the fact that we share the same physical or political
space. The basic requirement for equality in these relationships is the satisfaction
of each party’s rights to equal concern, respect, and dignity.74
Llewellyn urges us to think about restorative justice as “relationship-centred,” rather than
“victim-centred” as the goals of restorative justice are broader than individuals.75 For
Llewellyn, the goal of any process of justice is restoring relationships.76

Ultimately,

these theorists remind us that “restorative justice seeks to recover certain neglected
dimensions that make for a more complete understanding of justice.”77 In doing so,
restorative justice looks to “prepare the way for victims and perpetrators, their respective
families, their communities and the nation as a whole to learn to live together after years
of enmity.”78
The convoking of the TRC by South Africa forced a reconsideration of the
accepted notions of justice. Apartheid was a system of racial oppression established by
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the white National Party in 1948 and sustained through brutal “manipulation, coercion,
and violence.”79 Its entrenchment in South Africa created a society “premised on lies,
secrecy and the abuse of basic human rights.”80 Chaired by Archbishop Desmond Tutu,
the TRC created a forum for victims to tell their stories and promised perpetrators
amnesty or leniency in exchange for confessions.81 The commission received 21,290
statements in which 19,050 individuals were identified as victims of human rights
violations. Another 2975 victims were identified through the amnesty process.82 The
3,500-page report was released on October 29, 1998. For Tutu, the truth commission
offered a “third way” between criminal prosecutions and blanket amnesties and was often
justified using alternative concepts derived from Christian or African ethics like
reconciliation, forgiveness, and Ubuntu.83
According to Archbishop Tutu, “retributive justice is largely Western. The
African understanding is far more restorative—not so much to punish as to redress or
restore a balance that has been knocked askew. The justice we hope for is restorative of
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the dignity of the people.”84 In addition to restoration, the TRC relied on concepts like
reconciliation to characterize its vision.

The prioritization of reconciliation over

retribution can be “traced both to South African architects of the commission and to the
history of truth commissions internationally.”85

As Kiss notes, the theme of

reconciliation was also “evident in the Argentinian truth commission’s report, which
disavowed “vindictiveness and vengeance.”

86

The Argentinian report relied on religious

language too to justify this approach. The report asserts that, “we are asking for truth and
justice, the same way that churches of different denominations have done, in the
understanding that there can be no true reconciliation until the guilty repent and we have
justice based on truth. If this does not happen, then the transcendent mission which the
judicial power fulfills in all civilized countries will prove completely valueless.”87 For
their part, South Africans invoked uniquely African qualities to justify their approach.88
According to Kiss, “The post amble of the interim constitution set the tone for the TRC’s
work when it proclaimed ‘a need for understanding but not for vengeance, a need for
reparation but not for retaliation, a need for Ubuntu but not for victimization’.”89 In this
light, Kiss argues that reconciliation should not be viewed as a “policy of forgive and
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forget,” rather, “what was required was a renunciation of vengeance and violence in favor
of a willingness to work together as South Africans.”90
Ultimately, however, the decision to adopt a truth commission was an important
political compromise as criminal prosecution would have been a significant barrier to the
peaceful transition from apartheid to democracy. According to Alex Boraine, a central
architect of the South African TRC, interviews with President Mandela revealed that
“senior generals of the security forces had personally warned him of the dire
consequences if members of those forces had to face compulsory trials and
prosecutions.”91 Despite this conscious political decision, there were certainly many
South Africans who opposed the TRC and, specifically, the granting of amnesty.
According to the then-Deputy President of South Africa, “within the ANC the cry was to
‘catch the bastards and hang them’ but we realised that you could not simultaneously
prepare for a peaceful transition. If we had not taken this route I don’t know where the
country would be today. Had there been a threat of Nuremberg-style trials over members
of the apartheid security establishment we would never have undergone the peaceful
change.”92
Similarly, Judge Richard Goldstone stated that “the decision to opt for a Truth and
Reconciliation Commission was an important compromise. If the ANC had insisted on
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Nuremberg-style trials for the leaders of the former apartheid government, there would
have been no peaceful transition to democracy, and if the former government had insisted
on blanket amnesty, then, similarly, the negotiations would have broken down.”93 And so
Goldstone believes that any other path would no doubt have resulted in incredible
violence in the country.94 Hayner, too, points to this balancing act, writing that “despite
the efforts of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, many South Africans still
demanded strict justice and punishment for their perpetrators. Where justice was not
possible, the minimal requirement for forgiveness, most insisted, was to be told the full,
honest, and unvarnished truth.”95 The turn towards truth, then, must be viewed, in part,
as a policy which recognized and accepted the limits of the particular situation in South
Africa. Indeed, Minow suggests that
many in South Africa proudly embrace the TRC’s search for nonviolent responses
to violence. From their vantage point, it is an act of restraint not to pursue criminal
sanctions, and an act of hope not to strip perpetrators of their political and
economic positions. Yet it is also an act of judgement that prosecutions would
impose too great a cost to stability, reconciliation, or nation building…when a
democratic process selects a truth commission, a people summon the strength and
vision to say to one another: Focus on victims and try to restore their dignity;
focus on truth and try to tell it whole.”96
Yet, this idea of a balance between peace and justice and the will to embrace truth,
forgiveness and reconciliation still somehow oversimplifies what was a complex mix of
emotions in South Africa. Indeed, as Nagy points out, South African political groups,
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like the Azanian People’s Organization rejected the amnesty as it “violated their
97

constitutional right to have ‘justiciable disputes settled by a court of law’.”

What this

suggests, then, is that, like the retributive paradigm, restorative justice must be
understood as subjective values instead of universal truths about justice.

Their

justification, including a mixture of Christian and African ethics as well as political
compromise, did not go unchallenged within South Africa.
Despite these challenges, truth commissions are increasingly viewed as a vital
component in a country’s transition from conflict to democracy. While, at its core, a
truth commission is a fact-finding body, to fully understand its value, transitional justice
scholars suggest that one must broaden their understanding of truth. In the adversarial
system of criminal prosecutions, there is a particular focus on the alleged perpetrator’s
account of the crime: Is his or her account of reality true or false? If the defense is
proven false or deemed insufficient, then the accused is found guilty. Here, truth is
confined to what may be relevant to the criminal guilt or innocence of the perpetrator. If
victims are included, their testimony, similarly, is “only admissible in accordance with
strict rules of evidence and may be subject to potentially hostile cross-questioning.”98
This is a very specific understanding of truth as based on evidence beyond a reasonable
doubt. According to Du Toit, “truth commissions represent an alternative way of linking
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truth and justice that puts victims first.”99 In truth commission hearings, it is not factual
truth alone that contributes to justice, but truth as acknowledgment—that is, viewing
victims as “equal sources of truth and bearers of rights.”100 Thus, in order to understand
the value of truth commissions, Du Toit argues that we must draw a distinction between
knowledge and acknowledgement.101
Some observers argue that truth commissions are needed to establish specific
knowledge about crime including its “extent, origin, and nature.”102 Hayner, however,
points out that it is not so much an issue of finding factual truth, but a process of lifting
the “veil of denial about widely known but unspoken truths.”103 For many victims, then,
a truth commission does not provide them with new truths, but gives formal
acknowledgement of the truths already known.104

In the case of South Africa, the

knowledge surrounding the Apartheid regime was certainly not in short supply, as,
unofficially, certain “individuals and sections in the security forces were widely known
as notorious torturers and killers.”105 Instead, it was often the official denial of these
occurrences that prompted the need for a truth commission.

99

Du Toit, “The Moral Foundations of the South African TRC,” 136.

100

Du Toit, “The Moral Foundations of the South African TRC,” 136.

101

This distinction was first made by the philosopher Thomas Nagel at the Aspen Institute Conference. See
Lawrence Weschler, “A Miracle, A Universe: Settling Accounts with Torturers,” in Transitional Justice:
How Emerging Democracies Reckon with Former Regimes, ed. Neil Kritz (Washington DC: United States
Institute of Peace Press, 1995), 492.
102

Naomi Roht-Arriaza, “The New Landscapes of Transitional Justice,” in Transitional Justice in the
Twenty-First Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006).
103

Hayner, Unspeakable Truths, 25.

104

Hayner, Unspeakable Truths, 26.

105

Du Toit, “The Moral Foundations of the South African TRC,” 133.

147

According to Du Toit, government denial produces a “redoubling of the basic
violations: the literal violation consists of the actual pain and suffering, and trauma
visited on them; the political violation consists in the refusal (publicly) to acknowledge
it.”106 For Du Toit, it is this second violation that “amounts to a denial of the human and
civic dignity of the victims.”107

Here, truth as acknowledgement stands as the

cornerstone for a different conception of justice as recognition. He writes, “what is at
stake when victims are enabled to tell their own stories is not just the specific factual
statements, but the right of framing them from their own perspectives and being
recognized as legitimate sources of truth with claims to rights and justice. The relevant
sense of truth is of a more holistic narrative truth—that involved in the overall framing
of the events and experiences that together make up the victim’s own ‘story’.”108 As
Asmal, Asmal, and Roberts claim, such memories are given meaning, where they were
once meaningless.109
This idea of justice as recognition stands at odds with the traditional
understanding of justice in established liberal democracies. There, if a crime like police
brutality occurs, justice is doled out through the regular institutional channels. However,
in transitional states the regular institutions of law and justice have been perverted by the
previous regime and, as a result, their functioning cannot be taken for granted as we do in
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more established democracies.110 Therefore, Du Toit argues that the establishment of a
“new culture of rights and equal citizenship”—a critical step in the consolidation of
democratic transitions—must be preceded by a special kind of justice, that is
recognition.111 As Gairdner claims, “truth commissions can legitimize the culture, beliefs
and values associated with human rights as the new framework for imagining social
relations.” Thus, by standing in opposition to arbitrary power the rights legitimized by
the truth commission can function to “guarantee the due process of law, the right to
participate in the political life of the country, to dissent without fear of physical
retribution and they broaden the concept of national security to include the well-being of
all persons in society.”112
In addition to recognizing the rights and dignity of victims, many advocates have
focused on the way truth commissions can contribute to a national dialogue and
consequently, national reconciliation through its production of a shared, historical
narrative.113 According to van Zyl, the truth commission can “generate a process of
national introspection that requires that everyone examine their role in the conflicts of the
past.”114 He writes that “far from handing down clear cut judgements about guilt or
innocence regarding complex conflicts, commissions force people to think critically
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about the past and in doing so, make it impossible fro them to glibly dismiss the suffering
of victims.”115
Similarly Gibson argues that the value of truth is derived from its ability to show
that blame is not a one-way street. He asserts that “the realization that one’s opponents
were unfairly victimized and that one’s own side bears some responsibility” is essential
for the effective functioning of a truth commission.116 In South Africa, the TRC’s evenhanded message that all sides did horrible things during the struggle” was necessary for
encouraging tolerance and, as ultimately, reconciliation.”117 Thus Gibson concludes that
“truth makes an independent contribution to democratic consolidation by changing
society, changing how people think about their own side and about their opponents.”118
Indeed, the truth and reconciliation commission has continued to grow in popularity with
commissions has been established in places like Guatemala (1997-1999), East Timor
(2002-2005), Sierra Leone (2002-2004), Morocco (2004-2005), Paraguay (2004-2008),
Canada (2008-2014), and Solomon Islands (2009-2012) among others.

4.3

Reparative Justice

In addition to retributive justice (often equated with prosecutions) and restorative justice
(often equated with truth-telling), the field of transitional justice has identified a third
paradigm: reparative justice. As Spelman appropriately points out, “we, the world we live
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in, and the objects and relationships we create are by their very nature things that can
break, unravel, fall to pieces.”119 Following episodes of mass violence, the social fabric
of a country is often left in tatters. In response to this, reparative justice attempts to
address this brokenness. This is the foundation of the restorative paradigm: that humans
and the relationships we build need to be repaired from time to time.

Reparative

mechanisms have largely been overshadowed by the attention given to retributive justice
and restorative justice. However, for some victims, they are the most concrete response
to human rights abuses.120 Indeed, de Greiff suggests that there is an emerging consensus
concerning the need for reparations in cases of mass human rights abuses.121
Reparative justice is rooted in the concept of reparation, which has historically
been understood as monetary compensation intended to counteract any losses as a result
of a crime committed.122 For Weitekamp, the generally accepted rationale behind the
concept of reparation is that it is an “act of restoring; restoring to its rightful owner; the
act of making good or giving equivalent for any loss, damage or injury; and
indemnification.”123 In post-conflict societies, the concept of reparation is broadened
from its historically narrow focus on monetary compensation. As such, in the transitional
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justice literature, the term refers to several legal and social measures, including material
reparations like cash payments or provisions for education, health and housing,
restitution, or broader symbolic measures like commemorations, memorials, and
apologies.124
For Minow, “the core idea behind reparations stems from the compensatory
theory of justice. Injuries can and must be compensated. Wrongdoers should pay victims
for losses. Afterward, the slate can be wiped clean.”125 According to Mani, reparations
can address “two principal kinds of injustices suffered by the victim: first, the legal
injustice, such as injury, loss of life, employment or property.”

126

Traditionally, at this

level, reparations should, “as far as possible, wipe out all the consequences of the illegal
act and re-establish the situation which would, in all probability, have existed if that act
had not been committed.”127

Second, “reparations should address the moral or

psychological injustice, that is, victimization, trauma, and loss of dignity.”128
Theoretically, at least, reparative programs have the potential to have a transformative
effect on post-conflict societies.
In terms of monetary reparation, there is a distinction between restitution and
reparations, wherein restitution is defined as the “return of the specific actual belongings
that were confiscated, seized, or stolen, such as land, art, ancestral remains, and the
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like.”129 Here, the most-cited example in the scholarly literature is compensation for the
theft of Jewish property by members of the Nazi party.130 For a number of reasons,
however, complete restitution may not be possible, for example, in the case of loss of life,
or a material item gone missing, and so on. In such cases, the term reparation, then,
refers to “some form of material recompense for that which cannot be returned, such as
human life, a flourishing culture and economy, and identity.”131

For example, the

Chilean Truth and Reconciliation Commission established programs to “provide
educational scholarships for children of victims. In addition, vicitms’ families were
granted access to free physical and psychological health services.”132 While falling short
of complete restitution, i.e. a return to a hypothetical state of being as before the abuse,
Philpott argues that such reparations programs can provide recognition for victims and
can go a long way towards “alleviating or compensating victims for the harm they have
suffered, both physical and mental.”133

Similarly Minow writes that “monetary

payments… symbolically substitute for the loss of time, freedom, dignity, privacy, and
equality.”134 Rather than understanding the payments as an attempt to replace what has
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been lost, such action taken by the government is, perhaps, lauded because it is a
symbolic gesture, which finally recognizes a group of victims.135
While monetary reparations fulfill a seemingly “straightforward obligation on the
part of the political community to compensate for property and goods that were lost due
to political injustices,” such actions are far more complex.136 Some critics suggest that
reparations “amount to ‘blood money,’ money that appears to pay off victims so that they
drop further demands; they equate the injustice victims’ suffered with financial goods; or
even that they buy victims’ silence.”137
In the case of South Africa, “large numbers of people asked the [Truth and
Reconiliation] Commission to compensate them financially for their losses.”138 Such
calls were initially heeded by the TRC, as “the commission felt that this was appropriate
and that, in accordance with the principles of national and international law and practice,
financial compensation should be granted to people that the commission found to be
victims of gross human rights violations.”139 In response, “the TRC Act identified the
problem of reparations and the rehabilitation of victims as one of its three major
concerns.”
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Of course, this is reflected in the composition of the Commission, which is
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comprised of three committees including the Reparations and Rehabilitation Committee,
the Human Rights Violations Committee, and the Amnesty Committee. Ultimately, the
TRC recommended “six annual payments of 17,000 to 23,000 [South African] Rand per
person.”

141

Yet, the South African government was relatively slow to act and, when it

finally did, the amount was much smaller than recommended.
In 2003, it finally provided a one-off payment of 30,000 Rand per person. For
Backer, this was an important step and can be “viewed as meaningful progress, building
on the TRC, insofar as the compensation acknowledged the harms victims suffered and
142

the hardships they continue to experience as a result.”

Yet, he argues that the

government’s initial resistance is curious. Of particular concern for this project has been
the government’s rhetoric regarding reparations.

According to Backer, despite the

“enrichment of political elites since the transition,” the “then President Thabo Mbeki,
among others” have opposed reparations arguing “that the liberation movement was not
fought for money and that reparations are tantamount to putting a price on losses that are
fundamentally irreparable.”
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Colvin, too, suggests that the government has actually

been rather “dismissive toward some victims labeling them ‘opportunists’ and
‘unrepresentative’.”

144

The contested issue of reparations in South Africa suggests that

caution is needed when approach this issue. While some victims viewed reparations as a
necessary component of the justice, it is clear that others in South Africa, including those
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in government, had differing opinions. Despite the initial view taken by the South
African TRC, the change in tone of the Mbeki regime suggests that reparations is not as
straightforward as compensation for losses.
In addition to monetary reparations, the field of transitional justice has also
identified symbolic reparations including apologies, memorials and commemorations.
Symbolic reparations provide a government with the opportunity to “acknowledge the
fact of harms, accept some degree of responsibility, avow sincere regret, and promise not
to repeat the offense.”145 Implicit in such symbolic reparations is a desire to move
forward; to build a new, rights-respecting state.
Nicholas Tavuchis provides insight into a meaningful apology: “To apologize is
to declare voluntarily that one has no excuse, defense, or justification… for an action.”146
A government apology is an “admission of wrongdoing, a recognition of its effects, and,
in some cases, an acceptance of responsibility for those effects and an obligation to its
victims. However, these are all different levels of acknowledgement that together create
a mosaic of recognition by perpetrators for the need to amend past injustices.”147 For
Eyal Brook and Sharon Warshwski-Brook, “at the heart of apology lies a genuine display
of appeal to sorrow, as opposed to an appeal to reason.”148 For Brook and Warshwski-
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Brook, the key components of an apology include an expression of remorse or regret,
acceptance of responsibility, compensation, and a promise to avoid such behaviour in the
future.”149

An apology, then, is an act of role reversal: “the person apologizing

relinquishes power and puts him- or herself at the mercy of the offended party, who may
or may not accept the apology.

This exchange, which is a dramatically powerful

encounter, providing the victim with a moral supremacy, is at the heart of the healing
process and contributes toward a change in the dynamics between the parties.”150 Such
an authentic act allows the “victim to heal and the offender to take responsibility for the
harmful act, be accepted back into society, and therefore have less reason to commit
future offenses.”151
There are, however, certain hesitations in the literature regarding apologies. For
example, Minow suggests some potential problems with apologies, including
“insincerity, no clear commitment to change, [or] an incomplete acknowledgement of
wrongdoing.”152

There are concerns regarding the use of apologies in the case of

genocide or mass human rights violations.

Specifically, an apology might be

meaningless for victims if it comes from people who have no actual ability “to accept or
assume responsibility, or who have only remote connections with either the wrongdoers
or the victims.”153 For Minow, a vital concern is a government that uses an apology as an
easy out; that is, an apology that is “purely symbolic, and carr[ies] no concrete shifts in
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resources or practices to alter the current and future lives of survivors of atrocities.”154
Such a use of apology will only further exacerbate an already difficult situation for
victims of mass human rights abuses.
In addition to apologies, governments have also set up memorials in response to
mass human rights violations. The process of memorialization “satisfies the desire to
honor those who suffered or died during conflict.”155 Such a process includes both
physical memorials, as well as public spaces, days of commemoration, and educational
programs. For example, such a process can range from the bodies of the deceased put on
display, as has been done in places like Rwanda and Cambodia, to educational programs
in South Africa that remind the youth of the pain and suffering that their parents and
grandparents had to endure under the apartheid regime.156 The functions of memorials
include, among others:
(1) Creating a specific place for the immediate family and/or the large society to
mourn victims;
(2) Honouring victims of violence and reinstating their reputation;
(3) Symbolizing a nation’s commitment to values such as democracy and human
rights;
(4) Encouraging civic engagement and education programs to engage the wider
community in a dialogue about the past and promote discussion of a peaceful
future based on coexistence; and
(5) Advancing educational purposes including the retelling of history for future
generations.157
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Memorials can provide longevity that other transitional justice mechanisms may lack.
For this reason, they can be an important symbol for a nation to remember the past.
Memorialization, then, can complement the work of tribunals and truth commissions.
According to Barsalou and Baxter, once “other transitional justice processes have
finished their work, the public is likely to better understand aspects of the conflict that
were previously hidden or repressed. For these reasons, memorialization at the national
level ideally follows truth-telling and legal accountability processes and is intimately
linked to educational efforts to engage the public and school-children in a dialogue about
the past.”

158

Memorialization, then, is an integral component in continuing the work of

traditional transitional justice mechanisms.
Reparative justice, like the other justice paradigms, attempts to confront some of
the injustices resulting from mass human rights violations.159

However, there are

considerable challenges for reparative mechanisms in post-conflict societies that are not
present in juridically developed and stable societies. As indicated by de Greiff,
a massive program of reparations cannot reproduce the results which could be
obtained in the legal system, because all legal systems work on the assumption
that norm-breaking behaviour is more or less exceptional. But this is not the case
when programs of reparation [in post-conflict societies] are being designed, for
such programs attempt to respond to violations that, far from being infrequent and
exceptional, are massive and systematic. The norms of the typical legal system are
not devised for this sort of situation.160
When crimes no longer are the exception to the rule, the state lacks the capacity to deal
with victim redress on a case-by-case basis, as is done in traditional juridical approaches.
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de Greiff takes a sober look at the realistic application of reparation in conditions
of mass human rights violations. His assessment is that any program of reparations will
fail if “the sole aim of the program [is] victims’ redress in accordance with a legal
formula.”161 This, however, does not take away from the importance of reparations in
such conditions. For de Greiff, this only prompts a rethinking of reparative justice in such
circumstances.

Instead of a case-by-case approach, he argues that a well-designed

reparations program can still distribute awards to victims, but can also be used as a way
to reinforce the wider political project of democracy building. He states that “although
reparations are well-established legal measures in different systems all over the world, in
transitional periods reparations seek, as most transitional measures do, to contribute to the
reconstitution or the constitution of a new political community. In this sense, also, they
are best thought of as part of a political project.”162
In other words, reparative mechanisms are not ultimately a mechanism for justice,
but can be employed in the construction of a new, democratic state. de Greiff notes that
“to assume a political perspective on reparations opens up the possibility of pursuing
ends through the reparations program that would be more difficult to pursue if the sole
aim of the program could be victims’ redress in accordance with a legal formula.”163 For
example, de Greiff recognizes that a viable democracy must be built on a foundation of
equal individuals. After periods of mass violence, this sense of equal moral worth is lost.
He asserts that “in a democracy, citizenship is a condition that rests upon the equality of
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rights of those who enjoy such states. And this equality of rights determines that those
whose rights have been violated deserve special treatment, treatment that tends towards
the reestablishment of the conditions of equality.”164
For de Greiff, then, transitional justice mechanisms can assist in this process. That
is, these mechanisms can work towards institutionalizing the “recognition of individuals
as citizens with equal rights.”165 Criminal justice “can be interpreted as an attempt to
reestablish equality between the criminal and his or her victim, after the criminal severed
that relationship with an act that suggested his superiority over the victim.”166 However,
without reparations, criminal justice is incomplete.

de Greiff notes that “from the

standpoint of victims, especially once a possible moment of satisfaction derived from the
punishment of perpetrators has passed, the punishment of a few perpetrators without any
effective effort to positively redress victims could be easily seen by victims as a form of
more or less inconsequential revanchism.”167 Likewise, de Greiff argues that “truthtelling provides recognition… in acknowledging facts. [This] acknowledgement is
important, precisely because it constitutes a form of recognizing the significance and
value of persons – again, as individuals, as citizens, and as victims.”168 Again, de Greiff
suggests that truth-telling without reparations could be interpreted as an “empty gesture,
as cheap talk.”169 Finally, de Greiff suggests that reparations are integral in institutional
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reform, as any transition to democracy must necessarily implement measures that help to
dignify citizens that were once victims of the previous regime’s abuse.170
There is nothing inherently wrong with what de Greiff is trying to achieve with
his justification for a program of reparations rather than them being doled out in a caseby-case basis. Recognition of victims as having equal moral worth is, of course, not a
negative goal to strive for in a post-conflict society. The problem arises, however, in the
interpretation of the political project. If these mechanisms are no longer rooted solely in
established legal traditions, they become much more vulnerable to interpretation and,
possibly, exploitation. Reparations are less about repairing the individual and more about
repairing the society, but using a pre-defined blueprint of liberal democracy. In other
words, whatever achievable results there are, they are harnessed for the constitution of a
new political community based on the tenets of Liberal Peacebuilding framework.
Indeed, the theorized impact of criminal justice is not limited to justice, but is put
into service to affirm the importance of liberal democracy.

Democracy promotion,

however, is not an inherent characteristic of trials, beyond the meaning we have given
them as a signpost to signal a new beginning. In other words, trials could be used to
pursue a variety of ends. Similarly, truth commissions have been adopted as a response
to mass human rights violations, but their inherent value is as a forum for victims and
perpetrators to speak their truths and not the truth (as if that exists). Yet, as we have
seen, any narrative produced by a truth commission is supposed to functions first and
foremost as a signifier of a new, liberal democratic order. Arthur argues that from early
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on, democracy was often assumed to be the ultimate goal of transition. This was, in large
part, at least according to Arthur, a result of the role transitology played in the
development of the field.

171

Yet, it was Teitel’s transitional jurisprudence that provided

the necessary theoretical foundation for this claim. Teitel’s theory is discussed in the
following section.

4.4

Justice as Liberal Democratic “Ritual”

The three paradigms of justice laid out above are now fully entrenched in the transitional
justice field. However, in the field’s infancy the question of whether or not to even
pursue justice following mass atrocities was still up for debate. For example, drawing on
realist theories from International Relations, Snyder and Vinjamuri argued that states
emerging from conflict needed to factor in questions of power in their decision to pursue
justice.172 They argued that if trials and other accountability mechanisms potentially
threatened the stability of a new government they should be avoided.

Synder and

Vinjamuri’s argument draws on the work of Samuel Huntington, who suggested that the
decision to pursue justice depends on the type of transition a country is undergoing. If
the transition is the result of a negotiated peace agreement, government officials will
continue to hold a great deal of power in society and be able to avoid prosecution. In
cases of regime collapse, punishment is more likely as long as the new democratic
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government is swift to act.173

He writes, “democratic justice cannot be summary

justice… but it also cannot be slow justice.

The popular support and indignation

necessary to make justice a political reality fade; the discredited groups associated with
the authoritarian regime reestablish their legitimacy and influence. In new democratic
regimes, justice comes quickly or it does not come at all.”174 Thus, even in cases of
regime collapse, the possibility of punishment is not a certainty. For realists, “justice in
transition is epiphenomenal, where transitional responses are the product of political or
institutional constraints.”175 However, this approach is increasingly being challenged by
liberal, legal-idealists who argue that justice does not depend on other factors, as the
realist would have it. For them, the establishment of the ICTY was proof that, with a
little help from an external actor, justice could be meted out even when political
strongholds exist.
While there is no right way to pursue justice, the international community has
coalesced around a series of “preferred options,” including criminal trials, truth and
reconciliation commissions, and certain forms of reparations. Whether transitioning from
conflict or from authoritarian rule, societies that adopt transitional justice mechanisms are
observably undergoing significant societal transformation. These societies become a
point of intersection for various forces, both international and national, each with their
own contending ideas of what we are transitioning to and the best way to get there. Thus,
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when we speak of transitional justice, we are always referring to a site of deep
contestation where the stakes are quite high (e.g. peace).
While each paradigm is rooted in a different principle of justice, in the hands of
transitional justice scholars, they have all been theorized in a way that contributes to the
goal of the transition to liberal democracy.

Indeed, democracy promotion figures

prominently in the theorization of the field of transitional justice. This is nowhere clearer
than in the writings of Teitel. In the final chapter of her book, Transitional Justice, Teitel
provides a theory of transitional justice based around the concept of transitional
jurisprudence. For Teitel, transitional jurisprudence is characterized by its functioning in
a dialectical relationship between law in its established form, where it is “forwardlooking and continuous in its directionality,” and in its radical transformative role where
it is “both backward-looking and forward-looking, retrospective and prospective,
continuous and discontinuous.”176 Ultimately, what emerges is a state based on liberal
identity and built around the notion of political unity across racial, ethnic and religious
divides.177
Central to Teitel’s theory is her contention that in periods of political change, we
cannot idealize a single site of “operative legal action.”178 While liberal legal theorists
assert that criminal prosecutions are necessary for any transformation, Teitel recognizes
that this role of radical reconceptualization can be taken up by any number of
mechanisms, including new constitutions or even public commissions like truth
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commissions. This challenges the realists’ argument that power alone dictates whether or
not justice will be meted out.179
In this process, while each mechanism (e.g. trials, truths, and reparations)
approaches the question of justice in a unique way, they are united in their capacity to
bridge this divide between the old and new regime.180 For example, by subjecting the
previous regime’s human rights violations to the rigors of criminal law, transitional
justice is able to disavow the old regime’s ideology, while performing “the signs and rites
of a functioning liberal order.”181

Ultimately, Teitel argues that we must think of

transitional justice mechanisms as “secular sanctification of the rituals and symbols of
political passage,”182 a passage that sees the society transform from an illiberal regime,
where violations took place, to a liberal regime built upon a juridical discourse of rights
and responsibilities and the delimiting of state power.183
Teitel’s theory was able to harmonize the arguments of both realists and liberal
idealists.

By arguing that transitional justice mechanisms are constitutive of the

transition, she recognizes the concerns of realists, while suggesting that incorporating
power into the calculus does not automatically equate amnesties, but, rather, impacts the
site of transformation. By suggesting that it also constructs the transition, she recognizes
the central role that transitional justice mechanisms play in signaling a new, liberal
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beginning. Teitel’s work on transitional jurisprudence is significant for providing the
necessary intellectual space for a consensus on both the possibility of its functioning in
transitions as well as the fundamental need for it. In doing so, Teitel’s work gives voice
to the ultimate consensus that transitional justice can and must construct a final solution
to the problem of conflict. Still, this assumes a certain level of closure in conflict. That
is, justice can help create a consensus in society. She writes, “[t]hese responses point to a
fragmentary but shared vision of justice that is, above all, corrective. What is paramount
is the visible pursuit of remedy, of reform, of wholeness, of political unity.”184
Second, this assumed consensus closes justice around a very particular
understanding of justice that is informed by the Liberal Peace Thesis. She writes that
“for there to be meaningful change in societies driven by racial, ethnic, and religious
conflict, identity politics should be exposed for what it is—political construction. Ethnic
politics has no place in the liberal state. What needs construction is the liberal response
to injustice.”185 As the previous sections point out, this notion that transitional justice
mechanisms can be (and should be) understood as ultimately servicing the transition to
liberal democracy is now found everywhere in the field. It is, indeed, taken as common
sense that the ultimate endpoint of transitional justice is the establishment of the liberal
democracy.
This is increasingly evident as the field starts to incorporate more positivist-styled
quantitative analyses. For some, the introduction of more quantitative research signals a
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maturing of the field of transitional justice. As Olsen, Payne, and Reiter suggest, the
central claims in the field have generally relied on “wishful thinking rather than
empirically grounded theory building.”

186

Thoms, Ron, and Paris similarly note that,

“reliable empirical knowledge on the state-level impacts of TJ is still limited.”

187

For

many scholars, then, this shift towards the employment of statistical techniques will
eventually fill the quantitative void in transitional justice and is, according to
188

Wiebelhaus-Brahm, the “natural progression in the development of the field.”

In its infancy, the field of transitional justice was dominated by legalphilosophical writings and small-N case studies. While the wedding of democracy and
transitional justice in the early, legal, philosophical and comparative politics literature
189

was largely implicit,

recent evaluative projects use democracy and liberal human

rights as indicators of success.

190

This, of course, is presented as mere common sense, as

“scholars and policymakers share an expectation that transitional justice should
191

strengthen democracy and improve human rights.”

In their book, Transitional Justice

in Balance: Comparing Processes, Weighing Efficacy, Olsen, Payne, and Reiter
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undertake one of the first large-N studies examining the ability of transitional justice to
achieve the goals of strengthening democracy and advancing human rights.

192

When

examining the impact of transitional justice on strengthening democracy, Olsen, Payne,
and Reiter use two indicators: (1) Polity IV which, according to the authors, scores
countries based on “the competitiveness of political participation, the regulation of
participation, the openness and competitiveness of executive recruitment, and the
constraints on the executive;”

193

and (2) Freedom House which scores countries based on

political rights including “the right to vote, compete for public office and elect
responsible representatives” and civil liberties including “freedom of expression and
belief, associational and organizational rights, rule of law, and personal autonomy.”

194

For human rights, Olsen, Payne, and Reiter use Cingranelli-Richards’ (CIRI) Physical
Integrity Rights Index (Physint), which measures government protection against torture,
extrajudicial killing, political imprisonment, and disappearance. The authors also use the
Political Terror Scale which measures human rights on a five-level “terror scale”
measuring citizens’ safety and protection from wrongful imprisonment and torture.

195

Similarly, in her book, The Justice Cascade, Sikkink evaluates the impact of human
rights prosecutions and truth commissions on a “core set of violations—torture, summary
executions, disappearances, and political imprisonment” using the Physint index
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developed by Cingranelli and Richards.

196

In his study on truth commissions,

Wiebelhaus-Brahm adopts similar indicators of success.

197

This type of theory is not simply about evaluating effectiveness, but is also geared
towards recommendations that make these institutions function more effectively. For
example, Olsen, Payne, and Reiter suggest that a balanced approach to justice best
maximizes the two important goals: strengthening democracy and reducing human rights
violations. For collapsed regimes, the balanced justice approach suggests a combination
198

of “trials and amnesties, with or without truth commissions.”

According to the

authors, these countries are generally in poor economic health and are, therefore, more
likely to expend resources on development needs rather than legal imperatives.

In

response, the authors believe that, through a balanced approach, poor countries can still
benefit from justice by trying only the “big fish” while saving on costs by offering
amnesty to the “small fry” perpetrators.

199

For negotiated transitions, the authors suggest that new democracies are often
fragile due to the existence of spoilers who might threaten the government if they are
vulnerable to prosecution.

In response, they recommend “combining trials and

amnesties, or trials, amnesties, and truth commissions,” but this must be carried out in a
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sequenced approach.

They write, “during the risky phase, governments can grant

amnesties. As democracy develops, countries may develop strong enough institutions
and sufficient security to begin trials.”

200

Overall then, “delayed justice offers new

democracies the chance to balance accountability with a practical need for amnesty:
security. Truth commissions, for restorative justice purposes, might be used at various
points in this scenario.”

201

While these studies provide an important step in clarifying the

impact of transitional justice mechanisms, it is important to recognize that their value is
dependent on first accepting liberal democracy as the ideal end-point of transitional
justice. In fact, these studies rely on two assumptions: first, that we can study transitional
justice mechanisms as if they are treatments that can be applied to society like medicine
to a sick body. Second, they assume that society is something that is temporarily ill, but,
with the right kind of treatment, can be brought to good health. Indeed, these studies are
unimaginable without the consensus that societies are transitioning from sickness to
health or “transitional” to “transitioned.”

4.5

Conclusion

In societies dealing with widespread conflict, the field of transitional justice has
identified three paradigms of justice: retributive, restorative, and reparative.

Each

paradigm is associated with specific mechanisms of justice: criminal prosecution
(retributive), truth commission (restorative), and reparations (reparative). While these
paradigms and their associated mechanisms are influenced by a mixture of legal,
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philosophical, religious, and cultural traditions, in the field of transitional justice they
have all been interpreted as working towards the establishment of a liberal democracy. In
this way, the field has approached conflict as a problem or puzzle that can be solved with
the right solution. Retributive restorative, and reparative mechanisms of justice are
merely instruments or calculations to be made in the establishment of liberal democracy.
Here, the purpose of justice is in its ability to solve the problem of conflict; the solution,
then, is the attainment of the liberal democracy. The remainder of this dissertation will
look to challenge this teleological understanding of justice as a ritual for liberal
democracy asking, first, what is the role of power in the development of this
understanding and, second, was is the impact on the pursuit of justice.
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Chapter 5

5

The Emergence of Transitional Justice

In the previous chapter I argued that the field of transitional justice coalesces around a
clear consensus regarding the ultimate goal of transitional justice: the establishment of a
liberal democracy.

This is apparent in the theorization of the field.

The question

remaining, then, is where this consensus came from. Teitel has given voice to the
consensus, but she did not construct it. Rather, she merely harmonized transitional
justice with its critics, the realists. While Sikkink focuses on the actions of human rights
activists in bringing about this consensus, Teitel focuses on the emergence of a new set of
laws at the international level that have given voice to these ideas, what she calls
Humanity’s Law, as discussed in chapter two. Both of these historical accounts suggest
that the causal factor in the emergence of transitional justice was the end of the Cold War
in the newly-opened political space as a result of the victory of liberalism. This chapter
challenges these historical accounts of transitional justice by positing that the field’s
emergence following the end of the Cold War is a myth that, in fact, supports the
consensus that societies are transitioning to a final end-point. In contrast, I argue that the
myth of the end of the Cold War as the starting point for Transitional Justice is a nice
story, which serves to conceal the fact that transitional justice only became useful as a
tool in democracy promotion at that time. This also helps explains why the consensus of
finality is so important to the field. Without the belief that transitional justice is working
towards a final end-point—liberal democracy—its usefulness withers away. Further,
what this suggests is that the emergence of the field was neither necessary nor
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predictable, but was, instead, the result of a re-interpretation of human rights in American
foreign policy, thus making transitional justice a politically useful tool.
In 2003, Teitel published what she called a genealogy of transitional justice in
which she organized transitional justice into three distinct phases: Phase I refers to early
international justice starting in 1945 and ending son thereafter; Phase II coincides with
Huntington’s notion of the “third wave” of democratization starting in the mid-1970s and
ending in the early 1990s; and Phase III refers to the normalization of justice, which
commenced with the establishment of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia in 1993 and is, according to Teitel, the current phase we find ourselves in
today. The impetus for Phase I, of course, was the Allied decision to prosecute Nazi
officials following the end of the Second World War. According to Teitel, “this phase
reflects the triumph [or origins] of transitional justice within the scheme of international
law.”1 And, while this phase is short-lived with the onset of the Cold War, Teitel argues
that “the legacy of the post- war trials that criminalized state wrongdoing as part of a
universal rights scheme far exceeds the actual force of historical precedent, and this
legacy forms the basis of modern human rights law.”2 According to Teitel’s genealogy
of transitional justice Phase II corresponds with the “third wave” of democratization, but
is particularly associated with the emergence of truth commissions following the military
dictatorships in Latin America.3

While Phase II relies on alternative forms of

accountability, Phase III, the current phase, according to the genealogy, is the
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normalization of transitional justice. This phase, which was preceded by the two ad hoc
tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, culminated with the establishment of
the International Criminal Court (ICC). Teitel writes, “half a century after World War II,
the ICC symbolizes the entrenchment of the Nuremberg Model: the creation of a
permanent international tribunal appointed to prosecute War Crimes, genocide, and
Crimes against Humanity as a routine matter under international law.”4
Teitel is one of the leading theorists on transitional justice and her book,
Transitional Justice, is regarded as one of the seminal works in the field. She has also
taken credit for giving the field its name.5

More importantly, this trajectory of

transitional justice seems to be widely accepted in the field. I argue that this genealogy
reads more like a straightforward historical account rather than a Foucauldian genealogy
as she sets out to do. This is important as it shows the failure to account for the way in
which power has functioned in the emergence of transitional justice more than the field is
willing to accept. By revisiting this genealogy, I hope to graft on important aspects of
history that were whiped away in order for transitional justice to have the appearance of a
tool against power, a belief that is central to its legitimacy. By showing that we must
take into account the way power has functioned in the field, I hope to destabilize the
founding assumptions of transitional justice.

This is not meant as an exercise in

destruction. Rather, I hope to open the field up, as Derrida might say, to that which may
come.

4
5
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There is a general consensus in the field of transitional justice that the Nuremberg
Trials following the Second World War represent the genesis of the practice of
transitional justice.6 In her own genealogy of transitional justice, Teitel suggests that the
pursuit of individual accountability for Nazi atrocities was actually a critical response to
the failed measures taken against Germany following the end of the First World War.
Under Article 227 of the Treaty of Versailles, Kaiser Wilhelm II was singled out for his
role in starting the war. According to the Treaty, the Kaiser was deemed responsible for
“a supreme offense against international morality and the sanctity of treaties.”7 The
Article stated that such an undertaking was to be “guided by the highest motives of
international policy, with a view to vindicating the solemn obligations of international
undertakings and the validity of international morality.”8
In addition to Article 227, the Treaty of Versailles outlined further steps to be
taken in order to uphold international law and morality: Article 228 asserted that “the
German Government recognizes the right of the Allied and Associated Powers to bring
before military tribunals persons accused of having committed acts in violation of the
laws and customs of war;” and Article 229 stated that “Persons guilty of criminal acts
against the nationals of one of the Allied and Associated Powers will be brought before
the military tribunals of that Power.”9 These proceedings were generally rejected by
Germany and, in the end, the German people were unwilling to extradite their own

6
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nationals. In response, Germany was allowed to hold domestic trials before the German
Supreme Court in Leipzig.

Of the 800 individuals accused, only 12 were ever

prosecuted.10 Kaiser Wilhelm II himself managed to flee to The Netherlands to avoid
prosecution.11 More well-known are the monetary reparations Germany was forced to
pay, as well as the acceptance of full responsibility for causing the war. Such measures,
however, proved disastrous, as Adolf Hitler subsequently exploited them as a rallying
point for Germans under the Third Reich. For Teitel, these “onerous sanctions and their
crude undifferentiated impact raised profound normative questions.”12 And, in response,
“this approach gave way to the… liberal focus on individual judgment and responsibility”
through the Nuremberg trials.13
The establishment of the Nuremberg trials following the end of the Second World
War, for many, marks the advent of transitional justice. However, initially, the notion of
prosecuting the top Nazi officials was rather contested. In the United States, there was a
split between officials over the best strategy to pursue. On the one side, Secretary of the
Treasury Henry Morgenthau Jr. advocated for summary execution and, for some time,
had the ear of President Roosevelt. The British and Soviets favoured a purge and punish
route, which, in all likelihood, would have meant execution without due process.14 On
the other side, Secretary of War, Henry Stimson, argued for more elaborate legal
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proceedings in which the Nazi officials would be prosecuted in a courtroom.15 Stimson
succeeded in convincing the U.S. president of the utility of judicial proceedings.16 In the
end, the U.S. was able to pressure the other victors to adopt a strategy of international
criminal justice over summary execution.17
The Allies met in London to draft the London Charter of the International
Military Tribunal, which established the parameters for the subsequent Nuremberg trials.
Issued on August 8, 1945, the Charter outlined the crimes over which the tribunal would
have jurisdiction. According to Article 6, this included:
(a) Crimes against Peace: namely, planning, preparation, initiation or waging of a
war of aggression, or a war in violation of international treaties, agreements or
assurances, or participation in a common plan or conspiracy for the
accomplishment of any of the foregoing;
(b) War Crimes: namely, violations of the laws or customs of war. Such
violations shall include, but not be limited to, murder, ill-treatment or deportation
to slave labor or for any other purpose of civilian population of or in occupied
territory, murder or ill-treatment of prisoners of war or persons on the seas, killing
of hostages, plunder of public or private property, wanton destruction of cities,
towns or villages, or devastation not justified by military necessity;
(c) Crimes against Humanity: namely, murder, extermination, enslavement,
deportation, and other inhumane acts committed against any civilian population,
before or during the war; or persecutions of political, racial, or religious grounds
in execution of or in connection with any crime within the jurisdiction of the
Tribunal, whether or not in violation of the domestic law of the country where
perpetrated. Leaders, organizers, instigators and accomplices participating in the
formulation or execution of a common plan or conspiracy to commit any of the
foregoing crimes are responsible for all acts performed by any persons in
execution of such plans.18
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Other important sections of the Charter included Article 7, which stipulated that “the
official position of defendants, whether as Heads of State or responsible officials in
Government Departments, shall not be considered as freeing them from responsibility or
mitigating punishment.” 19 Further, Article 8 asserted that “the fact that the Defendant
acted pursuant to order of his Government or of a superior shall not free him from
responsibility, but may be considered in mitigation of punishment if the Tribunal
determines that justice so requires.”20
The trials of the major German war criminals before the International Military
Tribunal at Nuremberg (hereafter known as the Nuremberg Tribunal) commenced on
November 20, 1945. Less than one year later, sentencing was pronounced on October 1,
1946.21

In comparison to the trials at Leipzig following the First World War, the

Nuremberg Tribunal proved much more effective at holding the leaders of the Nazi party
accountable with twelve death sentences (one defendant, Hermann Göring—the highest
ranking official—consumed cyanide before his execution), three receiving life
imprisonment and another four handed fixed terms which ranged from ten to twenty
years. Two defendants were unable to be prosecuted, as one committed suicide prior to
his trial and another was deemed too ill to stand trial. Finally, one individual, Martin
Bormann—an official close to Hitler during the war—was tried in absentia.22 Following
this, under Allied Control Council Law No. 10 and Military Government Ordinance No.
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7, almost 200 prominent German supporters of the war were tried, including members of
the SS (including the Einsatzgruppen), Gestapo, industrialists, doctors, and jurists.23
Following the trials at Nuremberg, the International Law Commission of the
United Nations drafted the Nuremberg Principles to provide a clear understanding of the
legal consequences of the trials. For example, Principle 1 established that an individual
can be held responsible for atrocities under international law: “Any person who commits
an act which constitutes a crime under international law is responsible therefor and liable
to punishment.”24 Principle III established that public officials could no longer protect
themselves from prosecution under the ‘head of state’ defense and Principle IV rejected
the defense of following orders from a superior “provided a moral choice was in fact
possible to him.”25
These principles speak to one of the main achievements of Nuremberg: the ability
to ascribe individual accountability, as opposed to the collective blame that was leveled
against all of Germany following the First World War. The ability to hold the Nazi
regime accountable was significant, but as Teitel suggests, the central achievement of
Nuremberg was that it gave states the legal responsibility to try individuals for Crimes
against Humanity, despite their position within the state apparatus. This marked a critical
shift in state sovereignty and, specifically, immunity for state leaders.26 Teitel writes that
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While the asserted aim of the transitional justice norm in this first phase was
accountability, a striking innovation at the time was the turn to international
criminal law and the extension of its applicability beyond the state to the
individual. Moreover, through changes in the law of war and its principles of
criminal responsibility, the international legal regime enabled holding accountable
the Reich’s higher echelons for the offenses of aggression and persecutory
policy.27
Despite this (or, in some cases, because of it), the legacy of Nuremberg remains
problematic. Plaguing it, of course, is the criticism of retroactivity in which crimes
against the Nazi officials were applied ex post facto, thereby violating the legal principle
nullum crimen sine lege, nulla poena sine lege (no crime without a law; no punishment
without a law).28 While there was a firm legal basis for prosecuting War Crimes to be
found in the Geneva Conventions, it is generally accepted that the charges of Crimes
against Peace and Crimes against Humanity stood on rather shaky legal ground.29
The Charge of Crimes against peace comprised two counts, conspiracy and
waging aggressive war.30 To support the first count of conspiracy, the Tribunal relied on
the Hossbach Memorandum, a record of a 1937 meeting in the Reich Chancellery, which
exposed Hitler’s plan to expand the German people’s Lebensraum (living space).31 The
legal foundation for the second count, waging aggressive war, was based on the 1928
Kellogg-Briand Pact and the Covenant of the League of Nations. Beyond the charge of
Crimes against Peace, the charge of Crimes against Humanity also stood on rather shaky
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foundation. In order to prosecute the Nazi officials, the Allies argued that the charge of
Crimes against Humanity ought to be punishable in an international court, “because the
conduct, by its nature, offended humanity itself.”32 And, because such conduct was a
product of humanity itself, “its legal status and consequence transcended the province of
municipal law.”33 Therefore, a person who committed a Crime against Humanity was not
merely accountable to his fellow state citizens, but should be accountable to all human
kind. He was, in other words, “an enemy of all mankind.”34 According to this, “the
notion that international judicial enforcement was the only means of genuinely
establishing the rule of international law was a central premise of the Allied Powers’
program of prosecution.”35
Further, the Allied powers justified the rather novel charge of Crimes against
Humanity by linking it to aggression. To achieve this, the Allied powers argued that
Crimes against Humanity were hazardous to world peace and, as a result, perpetrators
should face punishment. In doing so, however, the Allies restricted the jurisdiction of the
Tribunal when it came to Crimes against Humanity, stating that they could only be
prosecuted “when committed ‘in execution of or in connection with’ one of the other two
crimes subject to International Military Tribunal’s jurisdiction: crimes against peace and
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War Crimes.”36

This created what Drumbl calls a nexus between Crimes against

Humanity and armed conflict.37

While it allowed for the prosecution of some

perpetrators, it was, perhaps, a trade-off. As Bishai points out, “the most shocking
aspect of Nazi activities, the ‘final solution’, was deemed a matter of internal sovereign
exemption except for the fact that it occurred as an integral part of an aggressive war
effort.” 38 Consequently, such actions actually protected state sovereignty. For Luban,
this was not an accident, but was a calculated decision on the part of the U.S. According
to Luban, when a French representative at the drafting of the London Charter of the
International Military Tribunal expressed concern that Article 6 (c) would contravene the
traditional legal principle protecting state sovereignty, chief US prosecutor at the
Nuremberg Tribunal, Robert H. Jackson, responded that, the principle of nonintervention
was vital to Americans. 39 This, of course, was in defense of the American’s own policies
of racial discrimination. For Luban, connecting Crimes against Humanity to Crimes
against Peace effectively was critical as it meant that the charge of Crimes against
Humanity could not be used against the US government as a way to address their
treatment of African Americans, thus “enclos[ing] American human rights violations
within a wall of state sovereignty.”40
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The conflicted legacy of Nuremberg suggests that the consensus on the logic
driving the trials was never absolute. For some, Nuremberg was merely victor’s justice, a
view that continues to this day.41 This realist viewpoint suggests that the decision to
focus primarily on aggression is rather telling as it kept the focus on state sovereignty.42
Despite this, there are still those that argue that with all its apparent flaws, Nuremberg did
serve to put human rights on an international stage. This, of course, is an outflow of the
idealist element at Nuremberg that, according to Bishai, “insisted on raising the issue of
Crimes against Humanity so that the true nature of the Nazi violations would be made a
matter of public record and the perpetrators be held accountable even if those charges
remained secondary to the larger question of aggressive warfare.”43
The idealist camp points to the other hallmarks of the international human rights
movement following the Second World War, including the adoption of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR)44 and the Genocide Convention in 1948. Yet,
despite these developments, as tensions began to grow between the United States and the
Soviet Union, criminal accountability and the international protection of human rights
faded into history. In the years following Nuremberg, the international community failed
to “craft a legal response to the mass murders in Cambodia, South Africa, and Kurdistan,
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just to name a few.”45 According to Falk, the legacy of Nuremberg is further tarnished by
the fact that the victorious powers did not just stand idly by as atrocities occurred in the
years following the Second World War, but that the once-dispensers of international
justice “were each subsequently associated with wars that included a recourse to
belligerent tactics of the sort condemned at Nuremberg and Tokyo.”46 For the United
States, the tactics employed in Vietnam caused tremendous uproar in their own country.
As Falk points out, Telford Taylor, a member of the team that prosecuted the Nazi
officials at Nuremberg as well as a former military officer, suggested that the American
policies during the Vietnam War were, in fact, comparable with the crimes prosecuted at
Nuremberg.47 In the end, those who view Nuremberg as the genesis of the international
human rights movement emphasize the precedent it set for the prosecution of Crimes
against Humanity, while those who are less enthusiastic will maintain its hypocrisy.
Phase II of Teitel’s genealogy picks up with the establishment of truth
commissions following the military dictatorships in the Southern Cone of Latin America,
particularly in Argentina. The dictatorships established in the 1960s and early 1970s
worked towards the common aim of eliminating left-wing opposition groups. Those
opposed to the military junta in Argentina, and those elsewhere in the region, were
viewed as “enemies of the state, to be physically eliminated or politically and socially
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isolated or silenced by imprisonment, torture, enforced disappearances, or exile.”48
According to Teitel, these conflicts cannot be separated from wider Cold War politics, as
many of these regimes were “supported by United States/Soviet bipolarism.”49
Following the decline and eventual collapse of the Soviet Union, there was an intense
growth in new democracies across Latin America and, of course, Eastern Europe, in what
has come to be known as the “third wave” of democratization.50

In the wake of these

transitions, the new democratic governments struggled with a series of challenges
including how to respond to the violence experienced under the preceding military juntas.
In Argentina, after gaining office in Argentina in 1983, President Raúl Alfonsín
opted to establish a commission to investigate the truth about the military actions, known
as the National Commission on the Disappearance of People (CONADEP).

51

With

50,000 pages of testimony, the report, entitled “Nunca Más” (Never Again) confirmed
the disappearance of 8,963 people. 52 It also identified 340 torture centres and provided a
list of individuals who had assisted in the repression. The list included doctors, judges,
journalists and priests, among other professions.53 According to Neier, the commission
was established, in part, in response to a report written by the Junta itself, called the ‘final
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report’. In it, the Junta denied all responsibility for the disappearances in the country. 54
The Nunca Más report paved the way for criminal prosecutions. Following its release,
and only 18 months after the military junta left power, nine members of the Proceso de
Reorganización Nacional were put on trial. Of the nine charged, three were former
presidents of Argentina: Eduardo Viola, Jorge Videla, and Leopoldo Galtieri.55 Viola
and Videla as well as Admirals Emilio Eduardo Masera and Armando Lambruschini, and
Brigadier General Orlando Ramón Agosti were convicted and sentenced to prison.

56

When the new government turned its attention to prosecuting middle-level officers for
these crimes, rebellions broke out, with officers claiming that they were merely following
orders. While the rebellions were put down, President Alfonsín eventually abandoned the
prosecutions.57 In 1990, Alfonsín’s successor, Carlos Menem, pardoned the previously
convicted individuals, a decision that was eventually reversed by a federal court in
Argentina in 2007.58
In the end, the rebellions in Argentina suggested that criminal prosecutions were
perhaps, too risky to pursue in some transitions to democracy and, partly as a result of
this, there was a rapid diffusion of the truth commission model throughout Latin America
including in Chile, Uruguay, Bolivia, Paraguay, Suriname, Peru, Colombia, El Salvador
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and so on.59

Beyond Latin America, truth commissions have been established in

countries around the world including, among other places, Colombia, Liberia, Morocco,
Peru, Solomon Islands, and South Korea.60 By far the most prominent of these was the
South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission established by the African National
Congress (ANC) following the end of Apartheid.61
Truth commissions have remained a viable option for countries transitioning from
conflict and/or authoritarian rule. Yet, in the wake of the worst violence in Europe since
the Second World War, the UN Security Council opted to return to the Nuremberg model
of international justice when it established the ICTY, thus marking the start of Teitel’s
third phase of transitional justice. Prior to the establishment of the court, the Security
Council had expressed concerns regarding the “widespread violations of international
humanitarian law and in particular reports of the imprisonment and abuse of civilians in
these camps.”62 As the evidence mounted, the Security Council passed Resolution 771
which “demanded the immediate cessation of all breaches of international humanitarian
law, including those involved in the practice of ‘ethnic cleansing’, and unimpeded access
for relevant international humanitarian organizations to camps, prisons and detention
centres.”63 This was followed by Resolution 780, which established a Commission of
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Experts to investigate “grave breaches of the Geneva Convention and other violations of
international humanitarian law.”64 This eventually culminated in the establishment of
Resolution 808 on 22 February 1993, to create the ICTY. The Statute for the court
(Resolution 827) was later adopted on 25 May 1993.65 The Security Council invoked
Chapter VII of the UN Charter to establish the Court, thereby justifying the court as a
measure for international peace and security.

The Court’s jurisdiction included

individuals who committed Crimes against Humanity, War Crimes and Genocide during
the Yugoslav wars (Serb-Croat War, Serb-Bosnia War and the Kosovo War). The court’s
statute was relatively conservative, as its definition of Crimes against Humanity required
a connection between the act and armed conflict, though not international armed
conflict.66 The ICTY began its work in The Hague, Netherlands, in 1995, and by 2002,
over 90 persons had been indicted for War Crimes and several had already been tried.67
In terms of its goals, accountability for human rights violations was the most
obvious, but many believed that that the Court would contribute to the promotion of
reconciliation through the creation of an irrefutable historical record of the war in order to
prevent a hijacking of history by revisionists.68 These expectations were inflated by
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diplomats, media, and other supporters who “sought to expand its legal mandate beyond
the goal of prosecuting alleged perpetrators of War Crimes,” to a “larger, more illdefined, and unrealistic objective of promoting reconciliation among warring groups.”69
However, these goals were not completely unwarranted.

Security Council records

suggest that the goals of the Court included the punishment of those guilty of War Crimes
in order to bring justice for victims, to provide a truth about the atrocities of the war, and
to deter future war criminals.70 Further, it was hoped the mere creation of the Court
would deter future atrocities in the Yugoslav wars, which, ultimately proved unsuccessful
as the largest massacre of the war, the killing of 7,000 Bosniak men and boys at
Srebrenica, occurred after it had been established.71
Despite this apparent success, the record of the first international judicial body
since Nuremberg has been mixed.72 According to Neier, the ICTY marked the first time
in the United Nation’s forty-eight year history that it had put muscle behind its moral
authority by “bring[ing] anyone to justice for committing human rights abuses.”73
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According to Sikkink, the ICTY was a major development for the Justice Cascade and, in
addition to the end of the Cold War, points to Bill Clinton’s appointment of Madeleine
Albright as the U.S. ambassador to the United Nations. Albright, a committed human
rights supporter, became a staunch supporter of the court.

74

Others, like David Forsythe,

saw Clinton’s decision to pursue the ICTY as merely a tactic to appear to be doing
something about the human rights violations the Balkans. Such an approach views the
ICTY as a mere “fig leaf” to conceal the fact that little was actually being done to put an
end to the atrocities being committed.75 According to Forsythe, the U.S. wanted to
“appear to be concerned about atrocities in the Balkans and Rwanda, while seeking to
avoid decisive military intervention—by putting Western military personnel in harm’s
way to protect the rights of others.”

76

In response, Forsythe suggests that, “in the greater

political space for international criminal justice opened up by the end of the Cold War at
the UN Security Council, renewed interest in international criminal courts in the 1990s
occurred partially for the wrong reasons.”

77

One the fact, these explanations seem to contradict one another, but, they in fact,
share the same primary explanatory variable. In terms of the first argument, the U.S. and,
especially Albright, was influenced by human rights discourse especially after the end of
the Cold War. Here, the ICTY served as a tool to reinforce these principles at the
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international level. As for the second argument, the U.S. were looking to avoid military
action in the Balkans and, instead, opted for a human rights-centred policy given the
increased political capital that this discourse had acquired at the international level. In
other words, both explanations rely on the growing importance of the human rights
movement.

The difference then was in whether or not the Americans were acting

genuine. However, what both of these explanations suggest is the passive nature in
which the Americans supported the court. It was either them being influenced by the
Human Rights discourse or it was them relying on the discourse as a way to avoid
military intervention.
Either way, the ICTY paved the way for the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda (ICTR) to be established in response to the 1994 genocide. The ICTR was
established in response to a request by the Rwandan government. According to Kerr and
Mobekk, the hope of the Rwandan government was that the tribunal would give the
appearance of legitimate justice, as opposed to merely vengeful justice, as well as
“promote national reconciliation and [the] construction of a new society through
equitable justice.”78 Despite this, it too suffered from several challenges, not least of
which was the sheer volume of perpetrators. Further, despite the Rwandan government’s
request for the Court, once it became clear that they would not have the type of control
they had anticipated, they withdrew their support.

For example, the Rwandan

government felt that, temporally, the jurisdiction being restricted to only 1994 did not
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adequately reflect the history of crimes in Rwanda.79 Further, questions arose over the
selection of judges from countries who had supposedly been involved in the war, as well
the fact that the trials and imprisonment of convicted criminals took place outside of
Rwanda meant that there would be a “disparity in sentencing between the ICTR and
national courts, [which] would lead to inequality of justice.”80
The turn back to criminal prosecutions marks the beginning of the third and
current phase of transitional justice—its normalization in the international system—but
this turn posed several challenges to the international community. Ultimately, this latest
phase has been marked by considerable confusion over the objective of transitional
justice. While the first phase of transitional justice sought accountability in the face of
overwhelming violence, the second phase looked to alternative measures that highlighted
reconciliation and peace. As the experiences of the ICTY and ICTR suggest, the third
phase is marked by a desire to see justice, but with the additional goal of helping to build
a new society. In part, this reflects a greater role that the international community, led by
the United Nations Security Council, has taken in helping to rebuild societies after
conflict.81 Increasingly, then, we are seeing transitional justice as a component of wider
peacebuilding efforts in societies emerging from conflict.
These challenges aside, for transitional justice scholars, the most significant
development in the third phase has been the formation of the ICC. Established by the
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Rome Statute in 1998, the court came into existence in 2002. For legal advocates, “the
ICC symbolizes the entrenchment of the Nuremberg Model.”82 The Court can prosecute
individual perpetrators for crimes of genocide, Crimes against Humanity, War Crimes,
and Crimes of Aggression.83 At the time of writing, the court had presided over 18 cases
from 8 situations including Democratic Republic of the Congo, Central African Republic,
Uganda, Sudan, Kenya, Libya, Côte d’Ivoire, and Mali.84 In addition to the ICC and the
ad hoc tribunals, several hybrid courts, which straddle the domestic and international
realm, have been set up in Cambodia (the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of
Cambodia), East Timor (Special Panels of the Dili District Court), Kosovo (“Regulation
64” Panels in the Courts of Kosovo), and Sierra Leone (Special Court for Sierra Leone).85
Composed of both national and international elements, the hybrid model is believed to fill
the gap between principles of international justice and local priorities. In doing so, it is
argued that hybrid courts are able to deal with problems that arise from purely
international courts, such as, for example, lack of ownership, while resolving some of the
challenges posed by domestic courts, for example, lack of infrastructure or procedures for
fair trials.86 By the time the Report of the Secretary-General on the Rule of Law and
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Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies was released in 2004,
recognition of the importance of transitional justice was firmly entrenched at the
international level.87

5.1
Cold War Thesis in the Transitional Justice
Narrative
The opening of the third and current period of transitional justice, what Teitel calls the
normalization of transitional justice, coincided with the end of the Cold War.

This

period has been marked by a new phase in international politics following the end of the
Cold War.

The ideological victory of democracy over communism has renewed a faith

in

democracies.

liberal

According

to

liberal

scholars,

taken

together,

Liberal/Democratic Peace serves as a compass for post-Cold War relations.

the
The

normative argument inferred from these liberal theorists is rather straightforward,
whether stated or not: to promote democracy abroad is to pursue peace within and
between nations. According to these scholars, this shift towards liberalism resulted in a
significant expansion of the realm of possibilities envisioned by agents of democratic
promotion. During the Cold War, the gridlock created by the veto power of the United
States and the Soviet Union meant that the UN was severely handicapped in its ability to
intervene in the domestic affairs of many conflict-ridden countries. As Paris points out,
Both the Soviets and Americans were concerned with maintaining the integrity of
their own spheres of influence and did so partly by insulating these spheres from
outside meddling. Achieving Security Council agreement for the deployment of a
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new peacekeeping mission was therefore possible only when both veto-wielding
superpowers believed that their strategic interests were not threatened.88
After the Cold War, liberalism’s victory was consequently accompanied by supposed
opening in the international community for the exportation of democracy and liberal
values. No longer under threat of nuclear war, Western powers could go out and spread
the ideals of democracy.
This ideal was soon embedded in the rhetoric of Western powers. For example,
the 2003 European Security Strategy, drafted under Javier Solana and adopted by the
heads of state of the European Union asserted that: “The quality of international society
depends on the quality of the governments that are its foundations, the best protection for
our society is a world of well-governed democratic states. Spreading good governance,
supporting social and political reform, dealing with corruption and abuse of power,
establishing the rule of law, and protecting human rights are the best means of
strengthening the international order.”89 According to Magen and McFaul,
European governments have—since the end of the Cold War, but particularly
after 9/11—gradually elevated the promotion of good governance and democracy
abroad on their lists of foreign policy priorities… From practically no organized
government spending in the 1980s, the countries of the European Union now
dedicate some $1.3 billion per year directly to programs promoting good
governance and democracy around the globe.90
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For the United States, similar trends have been observed in their support for democracy
abroad: “resources for democracy programs… increased 538 percent between 1990 and
2003, as opposed to total USAID assistance, which increased only 19 percent.”91
This Cold War Thesis has had a tremendous impact on the transitional justice
narrative.

Barahona de Brito gives voice to this argument writing that “modern

international and national human rights law and practice stem from 1945, but the
development of international human rights regime was stalemated by the onset of the
92

Cold War.”

For Barahona de Brito, while the 1970s saw a rise in human rights

activities, “the continued hegemony of Cold War thinking counteracted the universalizing
pretensions of the human rights revolution.”

93

However, “by the late 1980s and early

1990s, when the majority of transitions examined in this book took place, the scenario
had changed significantly. Human rights had become a universal language, even if not a
universally cherished concept.”

94

The growing acceptance of human rights standards

was “empowered by the progressive ratification by nation states of the various human
rights conventions, and was complemented in aid and trade relations. At the same time,
powerful transnational networks focusing on normative issues created in the 1970s were
by then well developed regional, and international institutions, as well as boosting the
95

influence of national HRO.”

Accordingly, “these networks” writes de Brito, “have
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contributed to a lowering of sovereign barriers and to legitimating the intervention of
external actors in national processes of democratization and in the promotion of respect
for human rights. Concomitantly, the spread of the values of democratic governance
96

boosted the notion of rights and made universality seem possible for the first time.”

For many transitional justice scholars, the end of the Cold War signaled the ideological
victory of liberalism in the international community. Certainly, such a view legitimizes
the work done by both transitional justice practitioners as well as many of its scholars
who have taken a very supportive stance on the importance of these mechanisms.

I

contend, however, that the universalization of the human rights language in the space
opened up by the end of the Cold War should not be understood as merely the result of a
groundswell of support for liberal democracy by human rights advocates, as Sikkink, de
Brito and others propose. Instead, we must understand it as a contingent outcome of the
growth of American power in the international system.
To understand this point, we must rewind back to the internationalist turn taken by
the US at the start of the 20th century.97 The presidency of Woodrow Wilson is often
pointed to as a significant shift in the foreign policy of the United States, as Wilson took
a decisively internationalist stance.98 In his Fourteen Point Plan speech delivered to

96

Barahona de Brito, The Politics of Memory, 23.

97

Adam Quinn and Michael Cox, “For Better, for Worse: How America’s Foreign Policy became Wedded
to Liberal Universalism,” Global Society 21. 4 (2007): 500.
98

The debate over what drives American foreign policy is a lively debate in American academia. For a
good introduction, see Donald Abelson, American Think-Tanks and Their Role in US Foreign Policy
(London: Macmillan Press, 1996). However, American foreign policy has exhibited behaviour, which
suggests its desire to see democracy grow outside of its borders. Whether strategic interests, cultural
values, or both drove this behaviour, this will likely remain a topic of intense debate for the foreseeable
future. The belief that values such as liberty and democracy could be exported is nothing new to American
policymakers. Such sentiments were already central to the United States efforts in the Philippines

198

Congress on 8 January 1918, Wilson outlined his vision of an interdependent
international community with a League of Nations at its centre point. For Wilson, the
democratic nation-state lay at the foundation of this vision.

Above this sat an

international order in which states were held together through economic, military, and
moral interdependence.99

Such a vision saw “nationalism wed to democracy;

democracies wed in peace, prosperity, and mutual respect embodied in international law
and institutions.”100 According to Wilson, this type of international superstructure based
on a core commitment to liberalism best guaranteed American security.101
In her book, Paris 1919, historian Margaret Macmillan summarized Wilson’s
position at the Paris Peace Conference:
When governments were chosen by their people, they would not, indeed they could
not, fight each other. ‘These are American principles,’ he [Woodrow Wilson] told
the Senate in 1917. ‘We could stand for no others. And they are also the principles
and policies of forward looking men and women everywhere, of every modern
nation, of every enlightened community. They are the principles of mankind and
they must prevail.’ He was speaking, he thought for humanity. Americans tended
to see their values as universal ones, and their government and society as a model
for all others…American democracy, the American constitution, even America
ways of doing business, were examples that others should follow for their own
good.102
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Such a view was not entirely novel, even in Wilson’s time, and was fueled by the notion
of American exceptionalism: a theory which states that the United States is different from
other nations.

They are the “apostles of openness, moral precepts, and honor.”103

Despite the apparent failure of the U.S. Congress to deliver on such a vision for the
international community following the First World War, this position gained tremendous
value again with the onslaught of the Second World War.

Such views manifested

themselves in U.S. foreign policy under Franklin Delano Roosevelt with the creation of
the United Nations and the promotion of the Bretton Woods system.104

Truman

continued in the Wilsonian tradition with the democratization of Japan and Germany, as
well as supporting European economies through the Marshall plan.105
The desire to see liberal democracies grow around the world became a common
theme in American foreign policy during the second half of the twentieth century. It was
generally believed that the growth of liberal values in non-democratic countries was best
secured through economic development. As tensions rose between the United States and
the Soviet Union, the spread of American values through development was not simply
seen as valuable for the recipient societies, as an exercise in humanitarianism, but became
a strategy for containing the spread of communism.106 The identification of the so called
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“Third World” countries, especially following the wave of decolonization in the 1960s,
was generally viewed through this Cold War lens; each country that adopted the liberal
democratic model expanded the sphere of influence of the United States, and vice versa
for the Soviet model. As a result, the real battleground for their Cold War was not the
sky, sea or land between the two superpowers, but the developing countries that were
looking for models of development.
Accordingly, both sides in the Cold War had a set of prescriptions for how to
organize the political, social, cultural, and economic life of a country. Of course, the
United States was committed to a model of governance based on liberal democracy and
free market economics, and the Soviet Union was committed to a “people’s democracy
which embraced public ownership of the means of production and a state led by a
communist vanguard on behalf of the working class.”107

The desire to prove the

superiority of their “respective ideologies was a necessity and drove each side to
intervene across the globe… both sides sought transformation in the new states as a way
to demonstrate that their ideologies were best suited to deliver the benefits of modern
life.”108
The American brand of development was premised on the belief that economic
growth was the primary engine of modernization. Economists like Walt Rostow were
generally relied upon to form the United States’ development strategy. His 1960 book,
The Stages of Economic Growth, played an integral role in the founding of modernization
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theory. This early scholarship, however, generally ignored the social, political, and
cultural aspects of development. In response to these gaps in knowledge, development
studies eventually developed into a burgeoning field for all social scientists.
In sociological terms, development was understood using Modernization Theory,
an approach that drew heavily on the notion of evolutionism applied to human societies.
Relying on the experience of the Western world, or some simplified version of it,
theorists suggested that the pattern of development was a linear movement towards
modernization. Societies, it was believed, passed through various stages when moving
from a traditional to a modern society.109 The end-point of this path, of course, was a
society that resembled those in the West. Modernization became synonymous with
Westernization.
When a country moved from traditional to modern ways of life, scholars like
Karl Deutsch suggested that a substantial part of the population would undergo social
mobilization.110 This was a “process in which major clusters of old social, economic, and
psychological commitments are eroded or broken and people become available for new
patterns of socialization and behaviour.”111 Often, this process can have a significant
impact on the political behaviour of a population as it is often accompanied by a growth
of the “politically relevant strata of the population.”112 According to Seymour Martin
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Lipset, “increased wealth and education also serve[d] democracy by increasing the extent
to which the lower strata [were] exposed to cross-pressures which will reduce the
intensity of the commitment to given ideologies (i.e. class struggles) and make them less
receptive to supporting extremists ones.”113 In this respect, as Wiarda argues, “economic
growth… would eventually produce social modernization and differentiation that would
lead to democracy. All the United States needed to do, the argument ran, was to provide
economic aid, aid to education, new communications media, aid to new social groups,
and so on; democracy [instead of communism] would presumably inevitably follow.”114
While the primary subject was often the developed nations of the Western world,
“economic development outside of Europe and the United States was lent urgency by the
political context of decolonization, the Cold War, and competition for the adherence of
Third World countries to either capitalism or communism.”115 Modernization theory,
then, was not merely a technical strategy for countries to follow, but was politically
charged. With much of Europe demobilized following the Second World War, the
United States was in a position to lead the construction of a new worldwide order.
Ekbladh argues that
[t]he creation of liberal hegemony that relied upon the permeation of values and
understanding throughout the global system also rested on development aid and
the institutions that could provide it. Modernization was a preexisting means to
assist this permeation and to establish the stability required for a functioning
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international system on liberal lines. It also served to contain communism with its
own enticing brand of modernization.116
Such a struggle over the proper vision of development shaped the United States’
engagement with the developing world throughout the Cold War and “modernization
[was] deeply implicated in what has more aptly been described as the establishment of
American global hegemony. The project that modernization served in the twentieth
century was not always humanitarian, but strategic.”117 According to Latham,
[a]s an American ideology, modernization fit squarely within the larger history of
liberal, internationalist visions of an open, integrated world in which ideals and
values as well as capital and commerce would flow across borders and markets.
Its assumptions about the universal validity of U.S. institutions and the
malleability of foreign societies were also tempered by long-standing reservations
about the nature of foreign peoples and the need for their transformation to be
carefully channeled and controlled.118
By the end of the 1960s and the start of the 1970s, the failure of modernization was
evident. Modernization came to be seen as too paternalistic, relying on Western notions
of development, and had become the handmaiden of the Cold War. A host of forces
factored into the demise of modernization:
The imperative of promulgating a liberal version of development against
‘totalitarian’ opponents had dissipated when the rigidities of the Cold War
buckled as questions of the legitimacy of the superpowers and the systems they
advocated became common. Assumptions about the importance of the central
state came to be doubted in many quarters, as had faith in large-scale programs
guided by the concept of planning. These were tied to profound questions about
the nature of modern, high-tech, industrialized society.119
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In development circles, modernization was being replaced by sustainability, the idea that
development should be directed towards poverty and focusing on basic needs like food
and health.120

Though the idea of promoting democracy never ceased to exist in

American policy circles, the justification for use of modernization theory as the
intellectual base of this policy had collapsed.

After entering office in 1969, U.S.

President Richard Nixon officially altered the course of American foreign aid with the
introduction of the Nixon Doctrine, which reflected the general discontent with
modernization and the faith in economic assistance to counter the communist threat.121
Central to this was a fading willingness on the part of the U.S. to shoulder the large-scale
projects that had come to be associated with development à la modernization. This
change in course reflected the disillusionment surrounding the ability of the current
course of U.S. foreign aid to effectively influence the developing world.122 Accordingly,
the Nixon administration looked to alternative avenues for development assistance:
The president turned to old standards, as technical assistance was again deputized
as a way to reassert the primacy of the Untied States. There were also bows to the
cultivation of private enterprise in developing nations. The real departure was a
call for greater emphasis on multilateral aid through the United Nations,
particularly the World Bank.123
The larger goal of strengthening American hegemony within the international community
via the promotion of liberalism was not abandoned for long. Reagan’s administration,
with the support of neoconservatives, once again adopted a crusade for democracy as a
means to check the power of the Soviet Union and strengthen American influence. Such
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a strategy was “essentially picked up from where it had been set down in the mid1960s.”124

This time, however, American foreign policy was aided by the newly

emerging concept of human rights. But to properly situate these developments, it is
important to examine how human rights became a central concept in rallying support
around America’s promotion of liberal democracy.
Immediately following the defeat of the Nazi regime in 1945, the Allied forces
established the Nuremberg trials to prosecute the top echelon of the defeated German
state. For observers like Norbert Ehrenfreund, a correspondent for The Stars and Stripes
during the trials, Nuremberg represented a turning point for human kind. He asserts that,
Before Nuremberg, people living in totalitarian states had no protection against
torture, murder and enslavement by their governments… Repressive heads of
state could breach human rights on a massive scale and get away with it because
they were shielded by the tradition of sovereign immunity. There was no
international recognition of human rights. Within a nation’s borders, human
rights could be extensively violated and there was no recourse. No worldwide
collective effort with teeth, no international court with powers of enforcement was
in place to respond to the injustices inflicted by a sovereign government upon its
own citizens… whether Robert Jackson realized it or not, what he did by winning
his fight for such a trial was for the first time to give authority and force to the
concept of international human rights.”125
Ehrenfreund’s observations regarding the significance of Nuremberg represent a common
understanding in the human rights community. The newly established United Nations
General Assembly (UNGA) followed up the trials with the adoption of the Convention on
the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide and the Universal Declaration
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of Human Rights in 1948. However, Chandler, among others, warns that we should not
interpret the UDHR and Genocide Convention or any other major human rights
covenants (i.e. International Covenant of Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, and the
International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights, adopted in 1966) as expressing a
desire to build an enforceable framework for the protection of human rights in the
international sphere.126 Indeed, soon after the end of the Second War, the U.S. found
itself in a new struggle with the Soviet Union. The Cold War would structure the
relations between these two superpowers for much of the remainder of the twentieth
century.
Similarly, historian Samuel Moyn suggests that we have falsely interpreted the
Nuremberg Trials and the subsequent legal innovations as a real framework for the
protection of human rights. In drafting the blueprint for the postwar era, the Allied
powers were interested more in balancing powers than protecting universal rights. Such a
reality was all too evident when preparatory documents regarding this postwar order were
leaked in the lead-up to the establishment of the United Nations. The documents spelled
out the actual intentions of the Allied powers and “those with eyes to see understood
immediately that the true goal of the prospective UN was to balance great powers, not to
moralize (let along legalize) the world.”127 The concept of human rights was recognized
in the newly-established UN, but it was a “negligible line [in the final blueprint], buried
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in the proposal for an Economic and Social Council and without any serious meaning.”128
Moyn proposes that the inclusion of human rights “reflected a need for public acceptance
and legitimacy, as part of the rhetorical drive to distinguish the organization from prior
instances of great power balance.”129 Such offerings by the Allied powers were a “far cry
from a utopian multilateralism based on human rights.”130 Despite their introduction into
the language of the international community, the accepted understanding of human rights
never deviated from the “older tradition of the domestic rights of man.”131 As relations
between the U.S. and the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics (USSR) soured, the West
“captured the language of human rights” to use as a tool in the emerging Cold War.132
According to Moyn’s analysis, human rights discourse actually gained real
momentum in the 1970s, especially under U.S. president Jimmy Carter. A pivotal year
was 1977 particularly due to Carter’s inaugural speech, which “put ‘human rights’ in
front of the viewing public for the first time in American history.”133 Under Carter,
human rights were introduced as a guiding principle of U.S. foreign policy. However, the
importance of Carter’s use of the term is, perhaps, best understood symbolically, as “he
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embedded it for the first time in popular consciousness and ordinary language.”134 By
acknowledging the concept of human rights on the global stage, Moyn argues that Carter
transformed the concept into a “publicly acknowledged buzzword.”

135

In terms of actual U.S. foreign policy, Carothers proposes that the surfacing of
human rights as a goal manifested itself in some “diplomatic initiatives that could be
interpreted as pro-democratic – although they were not generally put in those terms – but
little change on the assistance front.”136 The authorization of funds for human rights
projects was promoted in 1978 when Congress enacted Section 116(e) of the Foreign
Assistance Act; however, according to Carothers, this only led to the funding of minor
projects like legal aid centres in Latin America.

Overall, these were relatively

insignificant “footnote[s] to the overall portfolio of U.S. aid.”137 Johansen’s analysis
similarly finds that Carter’s adoption of human rights did little to lift them beyond
anything more than empty rhetoric:
The Carter administration has used human rights advocacy to recapture the spirit
of a highly moral foreign policy—a spirit lost during the long years of the
Vietnamese war and Watergate… on the other hand, Carter has not moved far
enough to make substantial or comprehensive policy changes. Consistent with the
posture of his predecessors, Carter has frequently subordinated the promotion of
human rights to economic and strategic advantages for the United States. The
public support for human rights, especially as evidenced in congressional action
to compel the president to curtain aid to brutal regimes, is a sign of a more
enlightened world order struggling to be born. Resisting this new potential is a
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deep governmental reluctance to apply its lofty rhetoric in cases where U.S.
security benefits are jeopardized.138
Johansen does note, however, that the use of human rights under the Carter
administration was not intended as an empty promise, but “powerful vested interests and
the apparent requirement for functioning effectively within the international system force
human rights into a subordinate position.”139 Carter’s recognition of the importance of
human rights gave the concept significant clout and it has found a home in American
foreign policy, at least rhetorically, ever since.
However, his successor, Ronald Reagan, altered the meaning of this concept, once
again, to fit his agenda.140 Under the conservative presidency of Reagan, the human
rights concept was fully integrated as a tool in American Foreign policy, but the
concept’s adoption came at the expense of any substantive interpretation that challenged
the sanctity of the state. Its use actually served as a legitimating force for Reagan’s anticommunist platform.
Reagan came to power backed by an anti-communist platform built on a concern
for the ever-growing Soviet influence around the world, especially during the period of
Détente.141 This perspective was based on three observations: (1) In the post-World War
II period, the United States was engaged in a battle between forces of good (liberal
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democracy) and evil (Marxist-Leninist state socialism); (2) This struggle between good
and evil took place on every continent and in almost every country; and (3) The U.S. has
a critical interest in aiding and assisting governments and anti-government forces that
subscribe to the ideals of democratic capitalism and undermining any governments and
anti-government forces that are committed to Marxist-Leninist doctrines.142 Once in
power, Reagan set out to undermine Soviet power anywhere possible. According to
Brown, “it was time to leave behind the Vietnam-era squeamishness about the decisive
application of U.S. military force.

Economic power and the attractiveness of the

American way of life would also be exploited with confidence and pride, not with the
equivocation and apologetics of the Carter years, in a worldwide assault on the false
prophets of socialism.”143 In reflecting on the decisions made during this period, former
British Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher, wrote that, “the west… would regard no area
of the world as destined to forego its liberty simply because the Soviets claimed it to be
within their sphere of influence. We would fight a battle of ideas against communism
and we would give material support to those who fought to recover their nations from
tyranny.”144
Reagan’s administration had “correctly reasoned that the Achilles heel of the
USSR was its economic base. After decades of stagnation, the Soviet economy could not
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stand the strain of increased military competition at home and abroad.”145 Economically,
the U.S. sought to “restrict Soviet cash flow and revenues by depriving the USSR of vital
trade and technology.”146 As well, “there was an attempt to spend the USSR into a
corner—if not into oblivion—by challenging it to a costly arms race and technological
competition that Reagan felt it could not match and would die trying.”147
In addition to the economic warfare, the Reagan administration resorted to old
tactics of promoting American ideals across the world. This time, however, the U.S. used
the rhetorical force of human rights to legitimate its actions. As one observer worded it,
this was “a program designed to place freedom on the offensive.”148 The
neoconservatives, influential in Reagan’s administration, had been rather critical of
Carter’s human rights policy. They suggested that an interpretation of human rights that
bound the United States to international law “placed severe constraints and selflimitations on American power, while facilitating attacks on U.S. foreign policy in the
name of human rights.”149 In response to this attack, the neoconservatives set out to reinterpret the meaning behind human rights. Centrally, they saw human rights, not as
international standards which they considered “ineffective and deprived of enforcement
mechanisms,” but as “values embedded in existing national political institutions and legal
structures, of which the United States were at once the best historical example and
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model.”150 Accordingly, human rights did not exist in any sense in the international
realm, but needed to be rooted in “democratic political regimes and legal systems.”151
Substantively, such an interpretation of rights was best protected through the
establishment of democracy, the foremost protector of individual rights. In contradiction
to earlier understandings dominant under Carter, the neoconservative position on rights
eschewed any desire to limit state power through a supranational structure for the
protection of rights. Instead, they viewed human rights as existing only in the “principled
foundation and the moral substance of a state.”152

Thus, promoting and protecting

national institutions committed to the ideals of democracy would be the best way to
promote human rights internationally. Despite the administration’s initial reluctance to
take up the cause of human rights, this specific interpretation of the concept was soon
embedded in Reagan’s foreign policy to the detriment of any real protection of universal
human rights. This co-option of human rights effectively eliminated the use of human
rights as a language to challenge state sovereignty.
In support of these policies, the U.S. once again employed its military might to
assert its dominance. This translated into the provision of equipment and training for
American allies, backed up by a threat to use force where necessary.153 There was,
however, a unique twist to Reagan’s foreign policy. The chief intellect behind Reagan’s
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plan was UN Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick,154 a vigorous anti-Marxist, who believed
that American foreign policy needed to make a distinction between ‘traditional
autocracies’ and ‘revolutionary autocracies’. To Kirkpatrick, in contrast to revolutionary
autocracies, traditional autocracies were generally less repressive and, perhaps, more
inclined to liberalize their states.155 Thus, Reagan adopted a double standard for his
human rights policies, as “unrelenting opposition to communist regimes that would never
reform[…]had to be balanced with a friendly attitude towards rightist dictators
supposedly on a path to liberalism.”156

Forsythe notes that “the president was not

inclined to pressure friendly tyrants and the Reagan team knew it.”157 Reagan, as well as
others in his administration, believed that “in places such as El Salvador nothing could be
worse than a leftist rebel victory, and therefore gross violations of human rights in
association with the government should be played down—even if that meant lying to
Congress.”158 As a consequence, Reagan’s crusade for democracy focused on places like
Cuba and other communist states, while trying to “block diplomatic pressure on friendly
authoritarians in El Salvador and Guatemala.”159
Aside from the apparent double standard, Guilhot points out two major
implications of the neoconservative discourse on human rights, used to pursue Reagan’s
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agenda: (1) If human rights were entrenched in the legal foundations of a “national
political system,” then the “pursuit of the national interest of ‘democratic’ countries was
entirely consistent, if not equivalent, with the international promotion of human
rights.”

160

Such an interpretation of the relationship between democracy promotion as

U.S. foreign policy and the protection of international human rights “provided a strong
moral legitimation for a policy of foreign intervention and confrontation with the Soviet
161

Union.”

Human rights were swiftly domesticated under the Reagan administration

and put to use as a tool to challenge Soviet influence and, by extension, proliferate
American hegemony; and (2) An interpretation that saw human rights as existing only
within national government institutions meant that regime change was effectively within
the realm of a human rights policy. In other words, to pursue democracy promotion was
to have a human rights-centred foreign policy.

162

In this light, Guilhot notes that the

“‘nation-building’ programs, which would subsequently proliferate in the wake of postconflict situations in the course of the 1990s, should also be viewed in this perspective, as
an instrumentalization of human rights for the direct imperial control of foreign
regimes.”
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The absorption of human rights within the policy of democracy promotion

under Reagan effectively nullified any robust understanding of the concept by situating it
within national governing institutions.

Furthermore, it placed American values and

specifically civil and political rights, at the forefront of human rights, a concept that is
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supposedly universal in nature. Such an interpretation was to be carried forward into the
1990s in the form of the liberal peacebuilding framework.
The end of the Cold War signaled a new period in international relations. The
policy of containing communism was replaced by a focus on democratization. Between
1990 and 1996, the number of electoral democracies around the world—at least in
name—grew from 76 to 118.164

Larry Diamond argues that this trend established

democracy as the typical form of government. With the official failure of planned
economies through communist vanguards, the international discourse was no longer
centred on the need for democracy to counter the perils of communism. Rather, the
elimination of the Iron Curtain and the disintegration of the Soviet Union meant that the
international community led, of course, by the United States could set a new agenda to
promote democracy.

The normative perspective underlying this agenda was that

Western-style democracy was generally good, and that peace in the world would be
secured through democratization.165 While there was a great deal of optimism during this
period, this was certainly overshadowed by the surge of internal conflicts around the
world. Of particular concern for the United States and Europe was the intense fighting in
the Balkans—Europe’s backyard. Yet, this conflict provided an opportunity to advance
the democratization trend that started with the fall of the Soviet Union.
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The expansion of democracy around the world was not simply driven by an
idealistic agenda, but also served more strategic ends. In response to significant changes
in the international system, President Clinton, along with his Secretary of State, Warren
Christopher, National Security Advisor, Anthony Lake, and Ambassador to the UN,
Madeleine Albright, set out a broad vision for U.S. foreign policy through a series of
speeches in September 1993. The speeches by Clinton,166 Christopher,167 Lake,168 and
Albright169 outlined the administration’s “strategy of enlargement of the world's free
community of market democracies.”170

First, Clinton and his advisors heralded the

importance of promoting democracy and free market capitalism, which they believed
were universal values. This sentiment is evident in Lake’s speech:
We see individuals as equally created, with a God-given right to life, liberty, and
the pursuit of happiness. So we trust in the equal wisdom of free individuals to
protect those rights: through democracy--as the process for best meeting shared
needs in the face of competing desires--and through markets--as the process for
best meeting private needs in a way that expands opportunity. Both processes
strengthen each other: Democracy alone can produce justice but not the material
goods necessary for individuals to thrive; markets alone can expand wealth but
not that sense of justice without which civilized societies perish.171
Second, given its military might, economic strength and multi-ethnic society, Clinton
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envisioned the U.S. taking a leadership role in this new, post-Cold War world. Of course,
this role is made possible by the absence of the Soviet Union as a global superpower.
Strategically, this foreign policy accepts the security logic of the Democratic Peace
Theory. According to Lake,
To the extent democracy and market economics hold sway in other nations, our
own nation will be more secure, prosperous, and influential, while the broader
world will be more humane and peaceful. The expansion of market-based
economics abroad helps expand our exports and create American jobs, while it
also improves living conditions and fuels demands for political liberalization
abroad. The addition of new democracies makes us more secure, because
democracies tend not to wage war on each other or sponsor terrorism. They are
more trustworthy in diplomacy and do a better job of respecting the human rights
of their people.172
Similarly, in his speech, Clinton argued that
Democracies rarely wage war on one another. They make more reliable partners
in trade, in diplomacy, and in the stewardship of our global environment. In
democracies with the rule of law and respect for political, religious, and cultural
minorities are more responsive to their own people and to the protection of human
rights.”173
While the political landscape of the post-Cold War was new, this idea of connecting
security with democracy was not. As Lake goes on to say:
These dynamics lay at the heart of Woodrow Wilson's most profound insights;
although his moralism sometimes weakened his argument, he understood that our
own security is shaped by the character of foreign regimes. Indeed, most
Presidents who followed, Republicans and Democrats alike, understood we must
promote democracy and market economics in the world--because it protects our
interests and security and because it reflects values that are both American and
universal.
In response to this, Clinton and his advisors outlined four components of their strategy of
enlargement:
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(1) Strengthen the community of major market democracies which constitutes the
core from which enlargement was proceeding;
(2) Foster and consolidate new democracies and market economies, where possible,
especially in states of special significance and opportunity;
(3) Counter the aggression—and support the liberalization—of states hostile to
democracy and markets; and
(4) Pursue a humanitarian agenda not only by providing aid but also by working to
help democracy and market economics take root in regions of greatest
humanitarian concern.174
This strategy was important for shaping America’s response to the violence in the
Balkans, particularly in Bosnia.175 There, the international community took a top-down
and heavy-handed approach to democratization and marketization.176 As Guzina notes,
[t]he Western principles of liberalism have certainly served as a template that
guided the actions of the international community in Bosnia. In the political
realm, this meant the international imposition of democratization (promotion of
regular elections, imposition of constitutional limits on governmental powers, and
respect for basic civil and political rights). In the economic realm, liberalisation
was equated with marketization (stabilisation and economic restructuring
according to free market principles).177
Of particular importance in this process was the establishment of the International
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Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY).

5.2

Situating Transitional Justice

It is in this light, that we must situate the emergence of the normalization phase of
transitional justice. The international community responded to the outbreak of ethnic
conflict in the Balkans with the creation of the ICTY. As examined above, in the field of
transitional justice, there are two dominant explanations for the ICTY’s establishment:
First, that it was a fig-leaf for inaction; or second, that it was the result of a concerted
effort on the part of human rights activists which forced the international community to
finally respond to international human rights abuses. These views, however, fail to
account for the importance Clinton and his foreign policy advisors placed on the first ad
hoc tribunal, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. In the
debates leading up to the establishment of the ICTY, Albright provided two possible
reasons why the U.S. supported the tribunal. First, Albright claimed that
we cannot ignore the human toll. Serbian ethnic cleansing has been pursued
through mass murder; systematic beatings and the rapes of Muslims and others;
prolonged shellings of innocents in Sarajevo and elsewhere; forced displacement
of entire villages; inhumane treatment of prisoners in the detention camps’ and the
blockading of relief to the sick and starving civilians… our conscience revolts at
178
the idea of passively accepting such brutality.
While this was a passionate plea, it resembled a standard response to human rights
abuses. However, she followed this up with a second reason:
[t]here is a broader imperative here. The world’s response to the violence in the
former Yugoslavia is an early and concrete test of how we will address the
concerns of the ethnic and religious minorities in the post-cold-war period [sic]…
the events in the former Yugoslavia raise the question of whether a State may
address the rights of its minorities by eradicating those minorities to achieve
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ethnic purity. Bold tyrants and fearful minorities are watching to see whether
ethnic cleansing is a policy the world will tolerate. If we hope to promote the
spread of freedom, or if we hope to encourage the emergence of peaceful, multi179
ethnic democracies, our answer must be a resounding ‘no’.”
Here, Albright focused on the use of justice to promote western ideals. This suggests that
Clinton and his advisors were already well aware of the strategic importance that these
prosecutions had for their goals of democratization and marketization. Of course, this
justification is more in line with the eventual policy of enlargement articulated by Clinton
and his advisors in the months following the establishment of the tribunal. Indeed,
democratization was already a prominent theme in Clinton’s 1993 inaugural speech in
which he stated that “our greatest strength is the power of our ideas, which are still new
in many lands. Across the world we see them embraced, and we rejoice. Our hopes, our
hearts, our hands are with those on every continent who are building democracy and
freedom. Their cause is America's cause.”

180

In response, I suggest that we cannot fully

understand the creation of the ICTY and, by extension, the commencement of Teitel’s
third phase of transitional justice—the normalization of justice—without addressing
Clinton’s strategy of democracy enlagement. Certainly, Clinton’s belief in the security
logic of the democratic peace must be understood as shaping his response to the events in
the Balkans and, subsequently, his support for the criminal tribunal.

5.3

Neoliberalism

To fully understand the impact of Clinton’s strategy of enlargement which included the
promotion of democracy and free market capitalism, it is critical to explore the dominant
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ideology at the time: neoliberalism. Neoliberalism first became dominant in the United
States and Great Britain during the governments of Reagan and Thatcher, respectively.181
In time, these ideas gained a foothold in the major international development agencies,
including the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. Embedded in
neoliberal discourse is the belief that the political ideals of human dignity and individual
freedom are universally central to human civilization.182

Such ideals, according to

Harvey, are both compelling and seductive. For neoliberals, these ideals lead to the
normative theory that human well-being is best advanced by “liberating individual
entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional framework characterized by
strong private property rights, free markets, and free trade.”183 In this ideological view of
dignity and freedom, the state exists to guarantee the integrity of money and private
property through the establishment of a military, police force, and legal structures.184
The development of neoliberalism is based on a specific premise regarding the
nature of society: “the notion that, however complex social relations might be, there
exists an immanent market-like essence to each individual, regardless of a society’s
culture or history.”185 Neoliberals believe that the economic sphere functions according
to a basic rationality whereas the political sphere is assumed to be inherently irrational.
A basic assumption of neoliberalism, then, is the institutional separation of society into
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an economic and political sphere, as neoliberals claim that all problems of the economy
can be resolved by socially-neutral experts using technical rationality. Derived from this
belief, neoliberal policy prescriptions emphasize market solutions to relieve the problems
of (re)distribution. At the core of this is that “long-term harmony of interest is implicit in
economic activity within the framework of a free market.”186
With this, the rolling back of the state is identified as an integral process in order
to unleash market forces. The state’s role, in this light, is to provide a “conducive
environment for the private accumulation of capital by the bourgeoisies—both
international and local... the redesigned pro-capitalist state is expected to protect the
capitalists and their physical assets from destruction by the possible actions of the
exploited and marginalized subaltern classes.”187 Such a neoliberal view, is, according to
Harvey, “threatened not only by fascism, dictatorship, and communism [the old political
battles], but by all forms of state intervention that substituted collective judgments for
those of individuals free to choose.”188
As a result of this “rolling back” of the state, there is often a retrenchment of the
social safety net forcing states that adopt these policies to end various programs in areas
such as public education, public housing, and public transportation. In many African
states, the World Bank and IMF have pressured governments to stop investing in public
higher education and, instead, allow private ownership to assume control over these vital
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services.

In response, Kieh argues that “ultimately, the overarching contour is the

facilitation of the rapacious process of capital accumulation by metropolitan-based
multinational corporations and other businesses. That is, the capitalist doctrine dictates
that all ‘barriers’ to profit-making are to be removed, and the possibilities for the
unbridled and unfettered accumulation of wealth be expanded and protected.”189 What
we see is that the principle of profit-making trumps the condition of basic human needs.
Vulnerable groups including women and children are, no doubt disproportionately
affected. According to Joseph Stiglitz, former vice president and chief economists of the
World Bank, the economic solutions subscribed by the IMF and the World Bank have
“the feel of the colonial rulers... they help to create a dual economy in which there are
pockets of wealth... But a dual economy is not a developed economy.”190 The roles of the
IMF and World Bank have steadily increased throughout the world.

Today, these

institutions are not merely loan providers. As seen in by the Structural Adjustment
Programs required and promoted by the World Bank and IMF, they have become heavily
involved in institutional reforms and governance in developing countries.191

While

neoliberalism emerged to enact a specific new economic doctrine, it, no doubt, entails to
a “broader ideological norm—neoliberalism—concerning the nature of society.”192 A
richer understanding of neoliberalism is as a “project to expand and universalize free-
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market social relations.”193

The incorporation of the phrase, “free market social

relations” alludes to the fact that, much of the work being done by the IMF and World
Bank goes beyond a “rolling back of the state.” To Harrison, neoliberalism is an attempt
to shape the economy, the state, and society.194
Indeed, the faith in the removing of the state, ever present in the 1980s, has given
way to a realization that “reducing the state’s unproductive involvement in society was
not a sufficient condition to ensure the development of properly functioning markets.”195
The provision of social infrastructure was needed to ensure the conditions for individuals
to act socially in a market-conforming fashion; “education provides the cognitive ability
to balance utilities; roads create mobility, and bring markets to more remote areas. A
stronger state ability to establish a regime of property in rural areas is seen as a key part
of agricultural development, allowing land to be used more efficiently, productively and
as collateral for loans.”196 The states expansion into society did not fit nicely into the
neoliberal framework; however, according Harrison, it “represents the fuller ambition of
neoliberalism and its champions—social engineering to create a market society that
involves the state (under the auspices of external agencies) as the principal engineer.”197
Such social engineering sought to bring the wisdom of the free market into both public
institutions as well as into broader society, more generally.198
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It is in this context that transitional justice can contribute to the construction of the
liberal state. Increasingly, institutionalization has been argued as necessary prior to the
liberalization of a state.

The building of a strong and effective political and legal

institutions, including a written constitution, a functioning judiciary, and a police force
able to enforce the new rules, are all critical for a functioning state.

199

In response,

international community has sought to promote the development of “functioning (and
indeed democratic) political institutions, public administrations that can deliver basic
goods and services, and a legal framework which is sufficiently robust to encourage
200

investment, trade and industry as well as more general public confidence in the state.”

According to McEvoy “developing the state’s institutional capacity to deliver justice is
thus viewed as a core element in the process of re-building structures of governance more
generally. It is both a practical and symbolic necessity as well as a way of seeing
reconstruction.”

201

Indeed, the power of transitional justice was not fully realized until

the international community came to the consensus that significant investment into liberal
institutions was necessary for societies emerging from conflict. McEvoy writes,
[i]n such a context, law becomes an important practical and symbolic break with
the past; an effort to publicly demonstrate a new found legitimacy and
accountability. In some such circumstances, the signing up to and implementing
of international human rights agreements are integral to seeking international
respectability. A professed respect for the rule of law demonstrates a ‘fitness of
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purpose’ for countries to take a proper place amongst the community of nations,
202
or even the recovery of a sense of national self-confidence and pride.
The value placed on transitional justice mechanisms as tools for establishing liberal
democracy forces a re-thinking of the role of power in transitional justice. Indeed, in this
light, they are more than just mechanisms of justice but are “meticulous rituals of power”
which reaffirm the importance of a liberal democratic state and the accompanying
capitalist relations.

5.4

Conclusion

Understanding the normalization of transitional justice at the international level requires
an examination of the value placed on these mechanisms as tools in the establishment of
liberal democracy around the world. The ascendency of transitional justice is not the
result of a blossoming of international human rights or even humanity’s law, but is the
result of its political usefulness for democracy promotion. In other words, it has become
a “meticulous ritual of power” confirming the importance of liberal democracy. Further,
we can see that the consensus that has emerged in the field is fundamental. Without the
belief that these mechanisms would assist in the transition to a final, end-point, their
value and, therefore, the viability of the field itself, would be in jeopardy. What this
suggests is that transitional justice not only accepts these liberal values without question,
but also receives considerable legitimacy as a field because of these ideas. It is only by
viewing rights as a form of governmentality that we can begin to pry open this consensus
and interrogate it for what it really is—a necessary myth. The Liberal Peacebuilding
project initiated in large part by Clinton provided the context for the re-emergence of
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transitional justice. This argument can also shed light on the prioritization of civil and
political rights over economic and social rights given the dictates of neoliberal economics
which calls for a more limited role for the state in the economic realm.
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Chapter 6

6

Theorizing Transitional Justice

The dominant theories in transitional justice view justice as working towards the
achievement of liberal democracy and human rights, specifically civil and political rights.
Establishing democracy and respect for human rights could be viewed as a way to
challenge the traditional sovereignty of the state—as the dominant reading in the field of
transitional justice suggests—but they could also be viewed as disciplinary discourse,
which produce the liberal subject and justify actions of the west. Scholars in the field of
transitional justice, however, have failed to interrogate these concepts choosing instead to
treat them as universal ideals.

The failure to adopt a critical perspective has been

supported by the Cold War Thesis, which asserts that the “victory” of liberalism
following the dissolution of the Soviet Union provided the necessary space for activists to
impose human rights at the international level. Yet, as I argue in the previous chapter,
what this fails to account for is, first, the importance placed on transitional justice by the
United States in affirming liberal democracy and, second, the way merchandising
democracy and human rights as the United States has done supports their strategic goals
according to the security logic of the Democratic Peace Theory. Viewed in this light, the
end of the Cold War symbolizes the closing of the international system around a single
model: liberal democracy.
Drawing first on the work of Wittgenstein and Rorty, I argue that we must resist
viewing these paradigms as expressing a universal truth about justice. They are, instead,
vocabularies which express particular beliefs about the world. In response to this, I draw
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on the work of Derrida, Hampshire, and Agamben, in order to transgress these boundaries
in transitional justice theory. Central to this transgressive reading is the argument that
transitional justice theory relies on a Platonic understanding of justice and conflict in
which justice is the attainment of some ideal endpoint: liberal democracy.

This

teleological thinking treats conflict like a mathematical problem that can be solved with a
single solution. Yet, according to Derrida and Agamben, by presupposing a single
purpose or vocation for justice—the attainment of liberal democracy—our theories
actually eliminate the possibility of justice, which fundamentally requires choice. Rather
than creating the space for justice to emerge, the paradigms of justice are little more than
rules to be followed in the construction of a liberal democracy.
In contrast to this Platonic view, if we see the world in Heracleitean terms, we
must understand that conflict is never-ending and cannot be resolved like a mathematical
problem.

Justice, therefore, is not the attainment of some ideal endpoint—like a

mathematical proof—but must also be understood as interminable process.

Such a

reading is meant to open transitional justice theory to allow in those voices that do not
conform to the dominant vocabulary of justice in the field.

6.1

Vocabularies of Justice

The work of Wittgenstein and Rorty is critical for deconstructing the theories of
transitional justice. As these philosophers remind us, language is bound up in human life
and practices, and is not a means to discover eternal truths about the world. Instead, we
carry around with us a set of words—a vocabulary—that we use to make sense of our
actions and beliefs. While we view these vocabularies as final, there are merely one set
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of words among many. We must treat alternative vocabularies not as pieces of a large
jigsaw puzzle that somehow fits together but instead, as “alternative tools.”

1

In response to this, theorists in the field of transitional justice must resist a “truth
as correspondence” epistemology that assumes the possibility of a search for eternal
truths about justice. Rather, as Rorty argues, truth is a “property of sentences, since
sentences are dependent for their existence upon vocabularies, since vocabularies are
made by human beings, so are truths.”2 In this way, the paradigms of justice are not bits
and pieces of a puzzle called “justice” but are, instead, vocabularies which express
particular ethical beliefs about the world. While Rorty is not a common theorists used in
transitional justice, this idea is not novel in the field. For example, scholars like Nagy
have been critical of retributive justice for being an individual-centric approach “steeped
3

in Western liberalism.”

Indeed, views like Nagy’s sparked a great deal of debate

between advocates of retributive and restorative justice in what was known as the truth v.
justice debate.

4

According to advocates of restorative justice, retributive justice

privileges the liberal individual, which, to them, is an artifact of western philosophy. Yet,
restorative justice itself privileges certain discourse over others including Christian ideals
which emphasize forgiveness and reconciliation and African concepts like Ubuntu.
Indeed, a cursory examination of any conflict will reveal fragmented views on justice.
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For example, in the case of South Africa, instead of focusing on punishment, the African
National Congress adopted a Truth and Reconciliation Commission inspired by
restorative justice principles. However, as I suggest in chapter four, this was not a
welcomed decision by all South Africans.

5

The South African case also sheds light on

the highly contested nature of reparative justice as well. While some victims of the
Apartheid regime view reparations as integral to their concept of justice, this has
increasingly been attacked as opportunistic or greedy.

6

These examples only confirm

what is known in the field: that justice is a contested concept.

Yet, despite this

awareness, the field has continued to hold onto the possibility of a universal language on
justice.
Central to Rorty’s argument is the contingency of these vocabularies. As he
wrote, “if doubt is cast on the worth of these words, their user has no noncircular
argumentative recourse. Those words are as far as he can go with language; beyond them
there is only helpless passivity or a resort to force.”7 Indeed, there is no meta-theory to
determine the right form of justice.

A liberal, for example, cannot appeal to any

universal measure that exists outside human action to verify the Truthfulness of their
claims. As John Gray suggests,
For the liberal, a liberal society is not merely one of the options open to human
beings, but a moral necessity. All non-liberal societies stand condemned, together
with the excellence and virtues which they harboured. Because of its
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universalizing doctrinal zeal, liberal thought has always sough to elevate liberal
practices into a set of principles and then to demonstrate the unique claim on
8
reason of those principles.
Yet, while the contested nature of justice is recognized in the field, the theories of
transitional justice continue to privilege certain vocabularies over others. Even the call
for a more holistic approach is merely a buzzword for adopting a range of mechanisms
9

that are still derived from the dominant theories. Thus, while the content of the field has
been broadened to include alternative paradigms of justice, the field’s theory remains
bounded by a consensus regarding the importance of liberal democracy. As I argued in
chapter three, transitional justice scholars have provided theories that support the
usefulness of transitional justice mechanisms in the establishment of a liberal democratic
state.
Understood in this light, transitional justice theory is better thought of as rules to
be followed in order to establish a liberal democracy. One of the preeminent theorists in
the field, Ruti Teitel, illustrates this treatment of transitional justice when she writes that
“the justice-seeking phenomena discussed here are intimately tied to the fashioning of a
liberal political identity.”
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In fact, Teitel’s understanding of transitional justice has played a central role in
forming the theoretical foundation of the field. In her book, Transitional Justice, Teitel
offers a theory of transitional justice built on a synthesis of two competing arguments that
dominated early debates in the field. On the one hand, realists argued that the question of
whether to pursue justice after conflict was decided by the political and institutional
constraints of any given regime. The pursuit of justice as criminal accountability was
possible only when the outgoing regime was weak. In contrast, idealists argued that
regime strength should not be factored into the calculus of whether or not to pursue
justice. The pursuit of justice should be universal, regardless of the prior regime’s
existing power. In response, Teitel argued that the question of whether or not to pursue
justice failed to capture the actual process of justice in the face of authoritarianism or
conflict. She argued, instead, that the question was not whether to pursue justice, but
through what mechanism would justice be pursued. In other words, realists were correct
that the old regime’s continued strength changed the calculus but it did not necessarily
have to mean no justice at all. Instead, where the old regime was still strong, the pursuit
of justice could take alternative forms like truth commissions. Thus, the site of justice
shifted from criminal prosecutions to non-criminal mechanisms.
Teitel’s work is critical for several reasons. First, Teitel’s synthesis of these
diverging opinions gave transitional justice scholars the theoretical space in which to
operate insulated from this realist/idealist debate otherwise known as the “peace versus
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justice” debate.

11

Second, Teitel’s argument provided support for non-criminal

mechanisms like truth commission, thus paving the way for this eventual shift towards
holism as embodied in such documents like the UN Secretary-General’s Report of 2004,
The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies.12
Most importantly for this project, Teitel articulated what has become the
dominant expression of justice in transitional justice. In the wake of this synthesis
between realists and idealists, justice (retributive, restorative or reparative) was not only
possible regardless of regime strength, but according to Teitel, justice plays a critical role
in the transition from authoritarianism and/or conflict to liberal democracy. In this way,
she viewed transitional justice as a bridge connecting the two sides. While the notion that
transitional justice could be important for democratization was certainly not novel, 13 she
made explicit what was largely implicit in the field: justice in transitional justice acts as a
ritual symbolizing the achievement of a liberal democracy. Teitel certainly recognized
that the process of transforming an authoritarian and/or conflict-ridden regime into a
liberal democracy was not an overnight matter. However, she argued that, at the very
least, transitional justice mechanisms can emulate the same characteristics of a liberal
democracy thereby embedding these practices like a seed that grows over time. In this
way, transitional justice can act as a drama depicting a functioning liberal democracy.

11
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This notion of embedding liberal democracy in post-conflict societies has become the
dominant goal of transitional justice theory. In response, this project attempts to cast
doubt on the linkage of transition to liberal democracy and justice. The transition to
democracy cannot be treated as a neutral or benign thing, but is fundamentally entangled
in the play of power. Indeed, it is clear that the field operates with a certain degree of
moral certainty about the inherent goodness of the liberal democratic state. However, as
the previous chapter suggests, the field must recognize the ambiguous character of human
rights and, by extension, liberal democracy. While they could be used to challenge state
sovereignty, as traditional liberals would argue, human rights can also be understood as a
disciplinary discourse that sets specific standards of behaviour.

14

Therefore, by

attempting to embed liberal democratic values in post-conflict societies, transitional
justice mechanisms operate as a meticulous ritual of power, which produces a liberal
democratic subject.
To be clear, I do not outright reject the potential benefits of human rights and
liberal democracy. Yet, to see value in it is not the same as suggesting that our theories
of justice should be defined by its realization. What is at issue here is how we theorize
about justice as necessarily working towards the ideal endpoint of liberal democracy.
This is especially important given that the mechanisms, of which our theory speaks,
operate at a site of deep contestation. Before examining the impact this has on our
theories, we first need to ask: why is the field defined by this teleological thinking about
justice? And is this a necessary feature of the field? As is by now clear, theorizing in the
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field is carried out in a top-down manner in which the goal of justice has already been
assumed. However, transitional justice scholars argue that this is not merely the result of
over-zealous liberals in the field, but is, instead, a necessary condition of the field.
The term “transitional justice” did not exist twenty-five years ago. While scholars
in the field generally point to the Nuremberg trials as the genesis of the field, what we
identify today as transitional justice emerged in the 1990s.15 As a new field, transitional
justice needed to distinguish itself from ordinary justice. One way scholars in the field
have achieved this is by focusing on the periodization of conflict in society. Here,
societies are understood as moving from states in conflict to states at peace. Transitional
justice has traditionally been defined as operating somewhere in this liminal state
between conflict and peace.

Here, Teitel’s theory of transitional justice envisioned a

unique justice that bridges the old, authoritarian and conflict-ridden regime to the new,
liberal democratic one.

16

There are, however, scholars who call into question this

distinction between transitional justice and ordinary justice is overblown. For example,
Posner and Vermeule argue that scholars in the field of transitional justice have overemphasized the distinctiveness of a “transitional” justice. They argue that many of the
abnormalities when pursuing justice following mass atrocities (e.g. retroactivity), used by
transitional justice scholars to justify their unique approach, are present in ordinary times
as well. Instead, they argue that we must see legal and political transitions as existing on
a continuum where regime transitions, the subject of transitional justice, are simply one
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endpoint.

17

For transitional justice scholars, then, emphasizing the uniqueness of

transitional justice is central to the field’s identity. Transitional justice must be
understood as something separate from ordinary justice or else it loses its purpose.
Viewing the goal of transitional justice as the achievement of a liberal democracy is
important as it provides this distinction. As Boraine argues, in contrast to ordinary
justice, “transitional justice offers a deeper, richer, and broader vision of justice which
seeks to confront perpetrators, address the needs of victims and assist in the start of a
process of reconciliation and transformation.”18
This treatment of transitional justice as a unique justice operating in the space
between two regimes, however, depends on a particular understanding of conflict and
justice. Stuart Hampshire’s work in Justice is Conflict clarifies this point. Hampshire’s
work is significantly influenced by the work of the pre-Socratic philosopher, Heraclitus.
In Heraclitus’ Fragment 80, he wrote: “One should know that war is common, and that
justice is conflict, and that everything comes about in accordance with conflict and
necessity.”19 The Heracleitean world, then, is “always the scene of conflicting tendencies
and of divided aims and ambivalences [and] … our political enmities in the city or state
will never come to an end while we have diverse life stories and diverse imaginations.”20
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To see the significance of this, Hampshire contrasts the Heracleitean world with the
Platonic one.
In Plato’s Republic, Socrates explains to Glaucon that the components of the mind
(i.e. our desires or wants; the passionate, assertive, brave side; and the rational or
intellect) are analogous to the three classes of society (the Producers, the Auxiliaries, and
the Guardians). 21 For Plato, in the city as in the soul, justice is achieved through reason’s
imposition of a harmony subsuming these conflicting elements. Here, reason operates as
mathematical proof by imposing an indisputable conclusion.
In contrast, for Heraclitus, the soul and the state is “always the scene of
conflicting tendencies and of divided aims and ambivalences.” 22 In such a world, “our
political enmities in the city or state will never come to an end while we have diverse life
stories and diverse imaginations.”23 Instead of moving towards harmony, the world we
live in is best characterized by its flux. This is captured in Heraclitus’ most famous claim
that, “all things are in process and nothing stays still, and [comparing all things to
flowing waters, he says] we cannot step twice in the same river.”24
Here, we can see that there is an essential tension in Being for Heraclitus. In his
Fragment 10, he wrote, “Everything taken together is whole but also not whole, what is
being brought together and taken apart, what is in tune and out of tune; out of diversity
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there comes unity, and out of unity diversity.”25 The tension is that existence is never
static, but is in a constant flux. According to Geldard, this Heracleitean tension is a “fact
of existence,” and Heraclitus “derides those who naively wish for peace in the world in
the sense of a release of tensions as not understanding the necessity of conflict in the
creation.”26 Anyone who plays a guitar can understand the basic necessity of tension:
strings that are too loose cannot properly vibrate and, therefore barely make a noise;
strings that are too tight will either be off in pitch or, with enough turns of the machine
head will break under the increased tension. Thus, it is through the proper tuning of this
tension that the guitar strings produce perfect harmony. Yet, as any guitar player knows,
the tuning of a guitar is an ongoing process (it is never final), as it always requires readjustments from time to time. To a non-musician, the melody played on a guitar
perhaps masks the fundamental tension that must exist for it to be produced. Thus,
Heraclitus tells us that our Being should not blind us to this same kind of flux that exists
in the world. Instead, we must live with it and the tension it produces, as it can never be
overcome.
According to Hampshire, the tension in our current society is a product of the
differences that arise over activities of the imagination. He writes, “it is difficult to
envision all of humanity agreeing on activities like storytelling, poetry, music, drama,
visual art, public celebration, the description of ideal societies and ideal persons and ideal
ways of life, and moral imagination.”27 For our purposes, an emphasis must be put on
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the moral conflict that arises in society. As Hampshire suggests, there is no “universal
criterion of evaluation” when it comes to moral and ethical ideals; “rather, they help to
distinguish different ways of life.”28
This inevitability of moral conflict suggests the impossibility of a harmony in
matters of substantive justice. Hampshire writes, “the imaginative and radical critics of
established conceptions of substantial justice repeatedly widen the debate and open up
cases of injustice that had hitherto been beyond the range of discussion.”29 Indeed, this
opening and re-opening of substantial justice is clearly visible in our own past “with
criticism of unregulated factory labor, labor of inequality between the sexes, of limited
voting rights, of unequal access to health care, of unequal access to education, unequal
access to legal aid.”30

The “moral imagination engenders new conflicts with new

conceptions of the good, when it coincides with some social unrest.”31
In contrast to Plato’s understanding of reason as mathematical proof, Hampshire
proposes an alternative understanding of rationality based on how states actually resolve
conflict: through an adversary model. In most societies, when conflicts arise they are
often dealt with through “procedures and institutions that all involve the fair weighing
and balancing of contrary arguments bearing on an unavoidable and disputable issue.”32
Continuing with Plato’s analogy of the city and the soul, Hampshire argues that this

28

Hampshire, Justice is Conflict, 21.

29

Hampshire, Justice is Conflict, 31.

30

Hampshire, Justice is Conflict, 31.

31

Hampshire, Justice is Conflict, 31.

32

Hampshire, Justice is Conflict, 8.

241

process better captures the way our inner deliberation functions as well. He writes, “the
adversary principle of hearing both sides is imposed by the individual on himself as the
principle of rationality ‘Hearing’ here becomes a metaphor.”33 Hampshire’s approach
sees reason as “deliberating,” “judging,” “adjudicating,” and “examining.” These are all
ways to weigh the evidence to determine an outcome, putting the focus on the procedures
to achieve an outcome rather than the outcome itself.34 Such a process is subject to one
basic prescription: hear the other side.35 This approach, for Hampshire, is necessary if we
recognize that we live in a Heracleitean world where conflict is eternal.
Whereas Plato and his student, Aristotle, believed that conflict was resolved when
each class (i.e. Guardian, Auxiliary, and the Producers) “performs its proper (i.e. natural)
function and does its own job in the community,”

36

Hampshire argues that all we can

expect is compromise. A “smart compromise” however, “is one where the tension
between contrary forces and impulses, pulling against each other, is perceptible and
vivid, and both forces and impulses have been kept at full strength.”

37

Harmony merely

conceals tension and it is only achieved through domination and the use of force.
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The field of transitional justice operates with the assumption that harmony can
subsume the conflicting elements in a post-conflict society. The rational solution offered
by transitional justice scholars (as well as the wider liberal peacebuilding framework) is
the introduction of liberal democratic institutions and free-market capitalism known as
the Liberal Peace Thesis. Based on a belief that humans are essentially rational utilitymaximizers, the Liberal Peace Thesis states that if the basic institutions of a liberal
democracy can become embedded in a society, then “the sources of its internal conflict
will be ameliorated, or at least suppressed until ultimately forgotten amid other
priorities,” allowing peace to take root.

38

Yet, such a view is fundamentally premised on

a Platonic worldview.
To sum up the argument so far: there is a consensus in transitional justice that the
ultimate goal of justice is the establishment of the liberal democracy. Such thinking, it is
argued, is critical for it distinguishes transitional justice from ordinary justice. However,
this perspective is based on a Platonic reading of justice and conflict. While I doubt
transitional justice scholars believe that conflict will be eradicated once and for all, they
must theorize as if this is a possibility. Indeed, the field’s very existence depends on a
view that conflict in society can be ameliorated otherwise it loses its purpose. While the
solution could conceivably be any one of a number of possibilities, the field draws on the
Liberal Peace Thesis for its answer; transitional justice theorists, therefore, must “live” in
a Platonic world for the field to have meaning. Yet, what all this suggests is that the
current boundaries of the field are not necessary: the teleological thinking is based on a
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need to distinguish the field from ordinary justice yet, this distinction is based on a
particular Platonic understanding of justice and conflict. By adopting a Heracleitean
understanding of the world, we can conceivably pull the rug out from under the feet of
the dominant theorizing in transitional justice. Such actions, however, require some
further theoretical justification before being carried out. Here, Derrida’s work on justice
is critical for understanding the consequences of this teleological thinking.
In his essay, “Forces of Law,” Derrida draws an important distinction between the
law and justice in order to show that, despite their common association, their relationship
is quite unstable.39 For Derrida, the law—as in the legal system—is constructed. Laws
do not exist outside of humanity, waiting to be discovered. Instead, their origins lie in
human actions; their authority is what we have given to them in the originating act, which
established them. And so law must presuppose the legitimacy of its origin. Derrida
writes, “[s]ince the origin of authority, the founding or grounding, the positing of the law
cannot by definition rest on anything but themselves, they are themselves a violence
without ground.”40 Derrida is clear that this violence does not mean that laws are unjust
as in illegitimate or illegal. Rather, because the act of establishing law necessarily occurs
prior to law, those laws “are neither legal nor illegal in their founding moment.”41 For
Derrida, the importance of this is the recognition that, as a product of human action, laws
are fundamentally deconstructable. Such an orientation to the law recognizes that what is
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constructed must necessarily be susceptible to deconstruction.42 On the other hand,
justice, as it exists outside law, is not deconstructable. For Derrida, “justice is what the
deconstruction of law means to bring about… it gives deconstruction meaning and
momentum.”43 Thus, deconstruction exists between the deconstructability of law and the
undeconstructability of justice “watching out for the flowers of justice that grow up in the
cracks of law.”44
If justice is distinguished from law, then following law is not justice. Instead, for
Derrida, the opportunity for justice exists only when the way is blocked—an aporia. But
he complicates this in two ways: First, when one comes up against an aporia but
navigates it in a way that helps him to find passage, then one has not fully experienced an
aporia.45 Yet, Derrida writes that “there is no justice without the experience, however
impossible it may be, of aporia.”46

In this way, “justice is an experience of the

impossible.”47 Therefore, “a will, a desire, a demand for justice the structure of which
would not be an experience of aporia, would have no chance to be what it is—namely, a
just call for justice.”48 For Derrida, if we successfully navigate a passage then we have
not experienced justice. He writes that “[e]very time that something comes to pass or
turns out well, every time that we placidly apply a good rule to a particular case, to a
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correctly subsumed example, according to a determinant judgment, law perhaps and
sometimes finds itself account for, but one can be sure that justice does not.”49 It is clear
that, for Derrida, “law isn’t justice. Law is the element of calculation, and it is right that
there be law, but justice is incalculable, it requires one to calculate with the incalculable,
and aporetic experiences are the experiences, as improbable as they are necessary, of
justice, that is to say of the moments when the decision between the just and the unjust
isn’t assured by a rule.”50
So, for Derrida, law is distinguished from justice in the sense that the following of
law does not produce a just result. Law is the application of a rule; it is the “foreseeable”
result of this rule’s application. On the other hand, justice is the opening of law to the
other. Justice is about addressing the singular demands of each situation, a task for which
a general law is unsuitable.

Yet, Derrida argues that justice must continue to operate

within the law. That is, it can't operate outside of the law and so must operate in its
name. He writes, “this decision of the just, if it is to be and to be said such, to be
recognized as such, must follow a law.”51 But, in doing so, the judge must approach the
law in a “fresh” way. He writes, “[t]o be just, the decision of a judge must not only
follow a rule of law or a general law but must also assume it, approve it, confirm its
value, by a reinstituting act of interpretation, as if, at the limit, the law did not exist
previously—as if the judge himself invented it in each case.”52 So, for a decision to be
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just, it must be responsible and follow the law, but, at the same time, it must suspend the
law in order to rule in a novel way “improvis[ing] outside of all rules, all principles.”53 A
just decision must function within the universal law while maintaining an eye on the
singularity of the situation. That is, justice demands “each decision is different and
requires an absolutely unique interpretation, which no existing, coded rule can or ought to
guarantee absolutely.”54
A just decision, then, is one that freely passes through the “ordeal of the
undecidable.”55 That is, “[n]o justice is exercised, no justice is rendered, no justice
becomes effective nor does it determine itself in the form of law, without a decision that
cuts and divides.”56 Undecidable, here, is not the opposite of decisiveness, but that,
which is programmable and calculable.57 Derrida writes, “the undecidable is not merely
the oscillation or the tension between two decisions. Undecidable—this is the experience
of that which foreign and heterogeneous to the order of the calculable and the rule, must
nonetheless—it is of duty that one must speak—deliver itself over to the impossible
decision while taking account of law and rules.”58 Yet, justice is not something we can
freeze in place: “once the test and ordeal of the undecidable has passed, the decision has
again followed a rule, a given, invented or reinvented, and reaffirmed rule: it is no longer
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presently just, fully just.”59 Finally, Derrida argues that the just decision must be made
without delay. It is not a decision that has taken in all possible information and evaluated
from all perspectives as is expected with the cost/benefit analysis of modern rationality.
But, “even if it did give itself the time, all the time and all the necessary knowledge about
the matter, well then, the moment of decision as such, what must be just, must always
remain a finite moment of urgency and precipitation; it must not be the consequence or
the effect of this theoretical or historical knowledge, of this reflection or this deliberation,
since the decision always marks the interruption of the juridico-, ethico-, or politicocognitive deliberation that precedes it, that must precede it.”60 Indeed, it was the urgency
of Rosa Parks’ decision to remain seated on her bus which released “justice upon
Montgomery Alabama…[where] it was legal, legitimate, and authorized to force AfricanAmericans to the back of the bus.”61
What this suggests is the difference between the possible and impossible. The
possible is that which is foreseeable, and, with sufficient planning, effort and resources, is
attainable. For justice, the possible is located in procedural law: the regular application
of due process. This possible future is “already present as an ideal before it rolls around
in actuality, which it can do—it is possible—at least in principle.”62 In contrast, the
impossible exists outside of this future: it is more than what we foresee and plan for.
Yet, as Caputo writes, “the impossible is not a simple logical contradiction, like x and
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not-x, but the tension, the paralysis, the aporia, of having to push against and beyond the
limits of the horizon… to desire the impossible is to strain against the constraints of the
foreseeable and possible, to open the horizon of possibility to what it cannot foresee or
foretell.”63 If the possible is a slamming of a door, then deconstruction is the prying of
such doors open so that that which remains outside the horizon of possibility might come
speeding in.64 To deconstruct, then, is not about destroying, but is meant to “loosen up,
to open something up so that it is flexible, internally amenable, and revisable, which is
what the law should be.”65

Thus, deconstruction “exposes the contingency and

deconstructability of the present,” and, in doing so, illustrates the changeability of the
present “powers that be.”66
The impossible is best illustrated in Derrida’s notion of a gift. For Derrida, a pure
gift cannot exist, because as soon as we give a gift, we impose an obligation on the
recipient to return the gesture in kind. A gift, therefore, is an example of an aporia. The
activity of giving and receiving a gift forms a circle of exchange, a circular economy, that
cancels the act of giving. Even if it is given unconditionally, the recognition of it as a gift
draws it into the circle, thus transforming a gift into an obligation.67 Derrida notes, “[a]s
soon as I say ‘thank you’ for a gift, I start canceling the gift, I start destroying the gift, by
proposing an equivalence, that is, a circle which encircles the gift in a movement of
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reappropriation.”68

Thus, Derrida draws a distinction between a gift and economy.

Economy refers to the “the circle of exchange, of reciprocation and reappropriation, a
ring of generosity and gratitude, which links or binds the donee to the donor by means of
the donatum.”69 It is what is familiar to us in our daily lives: it “denotes the domain of
presences, of presents, of the commercial transactions, the reasonable rules, the lawful
and customary exchanges, the plans and projects, the rites and rituals, of ordinary life and
time.”70 A gift is the impossible. It is what is most desired but will never appear, will
never be present as long as it is drawn into the circle of exchange. Paradoxically, a
genuine gift must be completely disassociated from this cycle of giving and taking. It
must exist outside of this circle. According to Derrida, a gift cannot be recognized as
such. It cannot appear as a gift to the one who gives or to the one who receives. This
paradoxical condition is the only way for a gift to be given without it getting caught up in
the circular movement of economy.71
Yet, the decision to be made is not one between a gift and the circle of economy.
Instead, we must realize that “each depends upon, invades, and interweaves with the
other.”72 We must continue to desire the gift however impossible it is, but this does not
mean that we give up on economy; in the end, economies of various types are all that
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exist and we can never remove ourselves from them in toto.73 So we continue to give, to
go around this circle, but we do so knowing the limits and recognizing that a gift is
impossible. That is, we “give economy a chance” but we continue to strive for a gift—
for what we most desire—so that we may at the very least interrupt the circle and loosen
it up.
For Derrida, a gift and justice share the same movement.

Justice that is

calculated, that follows the rules and regulations of procedural law, is not justice.74
Justice, like a gift, must go beyond calculation. We must continue to calculate, but know
that there is always a limit beyond which “calculation must fail.”75 Deconstruction, as a
gift or justice, is about transgressing these limits, even if only for a moment.76 The desire
of the impossible, whether it is justice or a gift, is what impels us; it sets us in motion by
soliciting us from afar. That which remains within the realm of foreseeable possibilities,
that is “all the determinate presences,” fails to disturb us in the same way. 77
As it is currently theorized, transitional justice mechanisms are merely rules to be
followed in the construction of a liberal democracy.

As Simon Robins’ fieldwork

suggests, in the eyes of the international community, transitional justice has become a
box needing to be checked. The work of Giorgio Agamben clarifies this concern. In his
book, The Coming Community, Agamben argues that any discussion on the topic of
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ethics must start with recognizing that there is “no biological destiny that human must
enact or realize.”78 To believe otherwise would be to fail to see that what is necessary for
a discussion on ethics is the possibility of choice, something that a biological destiny
based on some master plan would eliminate. He writes, “this is the only reason why
something like an ethics can exist, because it is clear that if humans were or had to be this
or that substance this or that destiny, no ethical experience would be possible—there
would only be tasks to be done.”79 He continues, “this does not mean, however, that
humans are not, and do not have to be, something, that they are simply consigned to
nothingness and therefore can freely decide whether to be or not to be, to adopt or not to
adopt this or that destiny.”80

Agamben is not taking a nihilistic stance here.

He

recognizes that humans “have to be, but this something is not an essence nor properly a
thing: it is the simple fact of one’s own existence as possibility or potentiality.81 Central
to Agamben’s understanding of potentiality, then, is the potentiality to not-be. For ethics
to exist, humans must be confronted with a choice—what Derrida might call the ordeal of
the undecidable. If their destiny is already set, then no choice can be made, thereby
eliminating the possibility of ethics.
This lesson can most certainly be applied to justice in transitional justice. By
theorizing the establishment of a liberal democracy as a messianic task to be completed
by transitional justice, the field eliminates the ordeal of the undecidable. For one to
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experience justice, they must run up against a wall—an aporia. If the pathway is already
cleared, as it is when transitional justice theory connects the transition to liberal
democracy to justice itself, then we have already assigned to a society its destiny.
Conventional transitional justice theory, though, leaves no room for choice; all that exists
are rules to be followed.

82

Derrida and Agamben provide persuasive arguments for a reconceptualization of
transitional justice that transgresses the current boundaries of the field.

Following

conventional logic, to view transitional justice as distinct from ordinary justice requires
the theorization of definite end-point, after which ordinary justice takes over. A definite
end-point requires a belief that conflict can be ameliorated once and for all with the right
kind of justice.

However, by imposing a definite end-point and eliminating the

experience of undecidability (i.e. choice), the possibility of justice is destroyed and
replaced by a set of rules to be followed. These rules will always have a silencing effect
on those whose ideals do not conform. In a site of such deep contestation as exists in all
post-conflict societies, to impose such a destiny is to silence all voices that do not
conform to such an ideal. Hampshire aptly captures this violence when he writes that “all
determination is negation.”83

If transitional justice scholars want to embrace justice,

they must abandon the teleological thinking that has served as the defining characteristic
of the field. In fact, it is Hampshire who provides an alternative to the type of thinking
dominant in transitional justice theory. For Hampshire, the only alternative is a set of
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practices that ensure that “contrary claims are heard.”84 An institutionalized argument is
the “universally acceptable restraint and the only alternative to tyranny.”85 Here, we see
a re-imaging of justice, one that is focused not on the ideal-end-point of liberalism, but,
rather, on the procedures for hearing all sides. It is clear that this must start with how
scholars theorize about transitional justice. To theorize according to Hampshire’s dictum
would be to eschew the identification of liberal democracy as destiny. This argument is
not about destroying transitional justice as some might view it.

Rather, given that

conflict is ongoing, transitional justice must maintain fluid concepts so that it can be open
to that which it cannot “foresee or foretell.”
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Chapter 7

7

Conclusion

This chapter provides a concluding analysis by way of an examination of Lars Waldorf’s
article, “Transitional Justice and Socio-Economic Wrongs.” This chapter should not be
read as a summary of his work, but, rather, as a road map for the overall argument of this
project. I chose Waldorf’s article for two reasons: first, because it points to the emerging
criticism in the field—the prioritization of civil and political rights over economic and
social rights—which was an impetus for this research; and, second, despite recognizing
this the field’s tendency to favour of certain definitions of justice, Waldorf continues to
perpetuate the assumptions in the field that have led to this criticism in the first place.

7.1

Preamble

At the heart of most debates in the field of transitional justice is the basic, though
impossible question: after mass atrocity, what does justice look like? This question was
at the centre of the early debates between advocates of retributive justice and advocates
of restorative justice. Practitioners in the field, for the most part, came to a consensus
that justice does not have to be the result of criminal prosecutions and can, in fact, take
many forms. This led to the legitimization of alternative justice mechanisms including
truth commissions. The debate over justice continues today with increasing attention
paid to traditional or customary mechanisms of justice.1 Rather than thinking about these
as different debates, it is more useful to think of them as a series of battles in the war over
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justice. The justice question, as I call it, has resulted in a great deal of literature in the
field of transitional justice, but is, fundamentally, a discourse with no end. The concept
of justice is fundamentally a contested concept. To reiterate Stover and Weinstein’s
argument, “justice, like beauty, is in the eye of the beholder and can be interpreted in a
variety of ways.”2 We are reminded of this every time a survivor expresses discontent
over a process of justice. Even in a county like South Africa, where the Truth and
Reconciliation Commission garnered considerable international attention for the tone of
reconciliation and forgiveness set by both moral and political leaders, survivors expressed
dissatisfaction when it ignored their calls for greater accountability through courts. Yet,
we continue to theorize in transitional justice in a way that fails to fully takes this into
account.

7.2

Waldorf’s Fundamental Question

Over the last few years, there has been a surge of reports, articles and, more recently,
books, that outline the various ways justice in the transitional justice discourse is “out of
touch” with survivors.3 In particular, scholars in the field are starting to criticize the way
transitional justice mechanisms have neglected economic and social injustice and,
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instead, have focused on addressing “civil and political rights linked to bodily integrity.”4
In his article, “Transitional Justice and Socio-Economic Wrongs,” Waldorf suggests four
possible reasons for this: (1) transitional justice is heavily influenced by human rights
discourse, which has traditionally prioritized civil and political rights over economic and
social rights; (2) transitional justice was “profoundly shaped by criminal justice,
particularly the concomitant development of international criminal law,” which, of
course, has focused on the criminal responsibility of individuals rather than structures;5
(3) transitional justice has “often played the handmaiden to Liberal Peacebuilding” which
has been heavily influenced by neo-liberal economics and, specifically, the structural
adjustment programs of the IMF and the World Bank;6 and (4) the intellectual history of
the field: Waldorf argues that transitional justice theory has been heavily influenced by
the wave of states transitioning from authoritarianism to democracy at the end of the of
the 20th century often referred to as the third wave of democracy, in which “transitions
were conceptualized as relatively short-term affairs.”7

These transitions viewed

economic change, including the quest for more equitable conditions, as “something for
successor regimes to tackle after the transition period had produced new constituting
laws, and institutions.”8

Furthermore, this period in history viewed re-distributive

politics, which seek to address economic and social rights, as reflecting more communist-
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like approaches and was, therefore, largely discredited.9
For Waldorf, along with Robins, Laplante, Miller, and others, the strategic choice
not to address socio-economic injustices has meant that transitional justice has failed to
meet the needs of survivors in post-conflict societies.

However, while Waldorf

recognizes this, he suggests that there are some practical difficulties in expanding
transitional justice to meet these needs: (1) transitional justice mechanisms are usually
already over-stretched and under-funded; (2) expanding transitional justice mechanisms
to meet the demands of social and economic injustices will risk “raising already inflated
expectations;”10 (3) “transitional scholars and practitioners have no expertise in designing
and implementing programs to reduce socio-economic inequalities;”11 and (4) transitional
justice refers to a “relatively short time-span during periods of political transition.”12 In
contrast, Waldorf argues that “remedying socio-economic injustices is a long-term
political project.”13 Therefore, he suggests that countries need to address the concerns of
long-standing inequality in the “post-transitional” period.14

For Waldorf, these are

“essentially political questions [which] merit deliberation, sensitivity to local political
factors, and democratic accountability.”15
Waldorf aptly points to one of the critical issues in transitional justice today. As
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I suggested in the literature review in chapter one above, the criticism that transitional
justice fails to recognize socio-economic justice is starting to dominate discussions
around the justice question. Further, Waldorf points to some of the accepted reasons that
transitional justice has, in general, failed to formulate an adequate response to these
concerns, not least of which is the way transitional justice has uncritically accepted the
dominant perspectives of human rights discourse, as well as the connection between
transitional justice and the Liberal Peace. It is evident that Waldorf is sympathetic to the
demands for social and economic rights, but is resistant to fundamentally altering
transitional justice in any way. Instead, he recommends a plan in which governments
issue reparations in the form of shares in micro-finance institutions (MFIs). He cites
Seibel and Armstrong who propose that,
governments could issue smaller collective grants to villages or sub-districts as
the start-up capital for local MFIs, but also individual cash payments, with which
beneficiaries may choose to buy shares or open accounts in the newly created
microfinance institution… This option does recognize individual suffering, but
also provides a neutral space where, finances permitting, other members of the
community may also participate. Low-level perpetrators would indeed be
allowed to participate, but their cash contribution to an organization that at least
initially would be owned by victims could contribute to restoring the inequalities
of power within the community. Particularly for victims that have suffered abuse
which led to their subsequent ostracism… these types of institutions can promote
16
social inclusion and participation by facilitating interpersonal contact.
For Waldorf, this allows governments to address questions of social and economic
injustice and puts reparations to use in a way that “increases the likelihood … [they] will
contribute to sustainable income-generating activities.”17 Further, he suggests that this
approach will provide “safe savings for the poor, enhancement of agency, expansion of
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services, and civic repair through the building of financial institutions.”18 And, finally,
this approach provides a more attractive reparations project in which international donors
can invest.19
In terms of this project, Waldorf’s analysis and conclusions are important for
three reasons. First, Waldorf highlights the debate regarding socio-economic injustice
within the field of transitional justice and some of the accepted explanations for this gap
between the goals of transitional justice and the needs of survivors on the ground,
including the impact of human rights discourse, criminal law, the Liberal Peace Thesis,
and the intellectual history of the field. The recognition that the field of transitional
justice has largely prioritized civil and political rights over economic and social rights
actually served as the impetus for this project.
Second, even as a critic of transitional justice, Waldorf continues to expound a
basic consensus in the field, that transitional justice is about reaching the final endpoint—liberal democracy. As an example of problem-solving theory, then, the question
Waldorf seeks to answer is not why are we doing this, but, rather, how can we do it
better? Waldorf, of course, is in good company. As chapter four of this thesis examines,
the field has coalesced around a consensus regarding the role and goals of transitional
justice mechanisms. Being both backward- and forward-looking, transitional justice
mechanisms address conflict in the past but always with an eye to a future in which
conflict has been resolved through the establishment of a liberal democracy. This, of
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course, assumes two things: normatively, that all states should transition to a liberal
democracy and, ontologically, that there is a state of being in which conflict is resolved.
These two assumptions are important as they have effectively close down discussion of
justice in transitional justice. This poses a problem if we are to maintain justice as a
contested concept. Fortunately, this understanding is not a Truth about conflict, but
merely a perspective that has gained dominance as if it was the Truth. Therefore, in order
to deconstruct transitional justice, we must break down the assumptions that we hold
when analyzing the site of transitional justice.
Hampshire’s discussion is critical for understanding the importance of this
project. In order to recognize the fundamental flux that exists in this world, we need to
avoid closure around any particular conception of justice. However, this requires that we,
first, call into question the array of basic assumptions, or, to recall Rorty, the final
vocabulary that has embedded itself in the field of transitional justice. This project
initially set out to further interrogate and problematize the justice question. However,
that lasted only until I discovered that the debates surrounding the question of justice are
interminable. They are, in other words, irresolvable. This is not a result of a lack of
trying but rather, because of the multitude of perspectives that make up, in this case, a
conflict. The challenge for this project was not to replace the dominant conception of
justice—which prioritizes civil and political rights—with a conception that incorporated
social and economic rights as well, for, as Hampshire suggests, there can be no consensus
on the substantive meaning of justice. Such an act will merely be met with another
alternative conception of justice, based on alternative principles. For Hampshire, the
most we can do is to help create the conditions for all sides to be heard. Hampshire’s

261

argument is evocative of Derrida’s discussion of justice. For Derrida, the im-possibility
of justice is to recognize that we must strive for justice, but know that justice will never
be in our hands. It will never be something we can touch and hold onto. Instead, justice
is something that we cannot foresee because to do so is to reduce it to a finite object.
Central to Derrida’s argument is that justice requires one to pass through an “ordeal of
the undecidable.” Agamben, too, captures this in his discussion of ethics. Ethics requires
one to make a choice.

Transitional justice theory as it is currently formulated has

removed this choice: Justice implies the transition to liberal democracy. To desire the
im-possible then is, to repeat Caputo, to “strain against the constraints of the foreseeable
and possible, to open horizons of possibility to what it cannot foresee or foretell.”20 We
must eschew the moral certainty that has settled into the field of transitional justice. We
must, instead, live with the tension that conflict is interminable. But, just as the guitar
can produce the melodies of a song so can the melodies of justice be heard from time to
time. And, that is all we can ask for: there is no Messiah at the end of the tunnel.

7.3

Concluding Thoughts

Given that the site of transition at which the language of transitional justice is used is a
place of continued deep contestation, it seems necessary for the field to be centred on
more fluid and flexible concepts in order for theorization to avoid closure around any
single vision of society. To open up transitional justice, then, is call into question the
ontological certainty around the transition. The transition exists as a line demarcating a
condition of conflict from one of no conflict. It is premised on a belief that conflict can
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be overcome and justice can be can be achieved. This, of course, relies on a belief that
there is a fundamental truth that can be stated about justice: justice is X (however
defined). To see justice as transitional in this sense suggests that the form of justice that
is being presented in transitional justice is a justice that is terminal or final. Transitions
are generally marked by end-points, which bring a particular phase to a close. It can be
reasoned that, if transitions were not characterized by this finality, they would cease to be
transitions and, instead, be understood as ongoing or perpetual. This leads to two critical
questions: why is conflict understood as final; and how, if this closes justice, has this
been sustained in the field.

The answers to these two questions, I believe, are

fundamentally connected.
To view conflict as final, we have to understand transitional justice as preparing
for something new; in this way, justice is preparatory. Transitional justice is viewed as a
fleeting moment in time; as a chapter or, perhaps, as a preamble to a new book. The
justice envisioned in transitional justice is not justice for its own sake, but a justice that
leads to new things. Justice, here, is instrumental in that it helps to initiate a new phase
for society, as well as individuals. Thus, while prominent scholars have argued that
justice is fundamentally a contested concept, we must recognize that the consensus has
continued to shape justice as definite, final, beyond contestation.

Justice is the

achievement of liberal democracy and human rights. If scholars were to view conflict as
ongoing it would force them to accept that either the Liberal Peace is false, or that the
justice offered by this emerging field is not suitable to the needs of liberal democracy
promotion. This, of course, has not been the case. Instead, transitional justice scholars
continue to represent the field as contributing to the establishment of liberal democracy.
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By serving the needs of Liberal Peacebuilding the field’s theories have sacrificed an open
justice to the needs of the transition.
The follow-up question, of course, is how this conception has been sustained in
the field. Indeed, the field of transitional justice has remained largely insulated from the
criticism leveled against Liberal Peacebuilding for its imperial-like tendencies of
imposing liberal democracy.21 Waldorf’s analysis and conclusion provides a clue to this
question. Waldorf’s analysis exemplifies a fundamental problem in the theorizing of the
field: the rather narrow understanding of power. As he suggests that transitional justice
has been influenced by a number of factors, including human rights discourse and the
Liberal Peace. His understanding is that transitional justice discourse stands outside of
power, and is only externally impacted by it. This is a common sentiment in the field.
As chapter five examines, power is conceived in its most reductive form. The field has
largely coalesced around the belief that the emergence of transitional justice is the result
the activities of human rights activists in the open political space created by the end of the
Cold War. Indeed, Sikkink is unapologetic about the liberal bias in the field, in part
because she views its existence not as a product of an external imposition, for example,
by the dominant forces behind Liberal Peacebuilding, but, rather, as the result of a
groundswell of support for such values by individuals in countries emerging from
conflict.22 Therefore, when transitional justice does seem to falter, as it has with the
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prioritization of civil and political rights over economic and social rights, the common
explanation seems to be the negative impact of external factors and not an internal
contradiction.
In response, chapter five of this project looks to challenge the myth that human
rights activists are entirely responsible for the emergence of the field’s normalization
phase. Why is this myth central to the field? Because it allows us to believe that
transitional justice is above politics; to believe that transitional justice speaks truth
(embodied in universal human rights) to power. Instead, I argue that the end of the Cold
War did not create a space for liberalization, but allowed for the universalization of a
particular model of the state, the liberal democracy. In doing so, it actually closed the
international system. As Zizek writes, “it is easy to make fun of Fukuyama’s notion of
the End of History, but the dominant ethos today is ‘Fukuyamaian’: liberal-democratic
capitalism is accepted as the finally found formula of the best possible society, all that
one can do is render it more just, tolerant, and so forth. The only true question today is:
do we endorse this ‘naturalization’ of capitalism, or does contemporary global capitalism
contain antagonisms which are sufficiently strong to prevent its indefinite
reproduction.”23 While I am not denying the value of the work of human rights activists,
we cannot ignore that it was within these conditions that the usefulness of transitional
justice became apparent for the merchandising of liberal democracy. To understand this
argument, this project suggests that transitional justice theory requires a fuller
understanding of power as offered by Foucault.
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In the field of transitional justice scholars have largely failed to consider the
operation of power as anything but a repressive force. Of course, the idea of challenging
power is at the centre of the transitional justice discourse: the field is built on the notion
that certain mechanisms, including legal prosecutions and truth commissions, can curtail
the power of state leaders (as well as rebel leaders) when they act against international
norms of behaviour. As Bassiouni writes, there is a “growing discontent with the practice
of granting impunity, particularly for the leaders who have ordered the commission of
atrocities and the senior commanders who executed these unlawful orders… the
realpolitik of reaching political settlements without regard to a post-conflict justice
component is no longer acceptable.”24 Here, the literature is clear on the relations of
power. Transitional justice can provide once powerless victims with the necessary tools
(human rights) to challenge the seemingly untouchable power of state leaders.
In response to this, then, this project draws on the work of Ivison, Golder, and
Douzinas to suggest that human rights may be better understood as a conduit for power
rather than a challenge to power. Central to Foucault’s later work is moving us beyond
this reductionist understanding of power. Power, for Foucault, must be understood as
something that is diffuse and never in the possession of a single agent.25 In other words,
individuals do not wield power like a stick; rather, they mediate power by regulating
behaviour. Such an understanding, therefore, recognizes that power is not simply an

24

M. Cherif Bassiouni, “Accountability for violations of Internaitonal Humanitarian Law and other Serious
Violations of Human Rights,” in Post-Conflict Justice ed. by M. Cherif Bassiouni (Ardsley, NY:
Transnational Publishers, Inc., 2002), 3.
25

Michel Foucault, “Two Lectures,” in Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews & Other Writings 19721977, ed. Colin Gordon (New York: Pantheon Books, 1980), 98.

266

aspect of the political arena but is “produced from one moment to the next, at every point,
or rather in every relation from one point to another.”26 Thus, power is indeterminate and
omnipresent because it is “exercised from innumerable points.”27 Accordingly, power is
diffused and embodied in the dominant discursive structure “that sets the standards of
accepted or expected behaviour.”28 As the rite of passage for the transformation of
societies from conflict to peace and authoritarianism to liberal democracy as elucidated
by Teitel, transitional justice is fully enmeshed in this manifold of power. Further, it is
not simply the practice of transitional justice that needs to be challenged, but the
academic field itself. Per Foucault, we cannot fully grasp his understanding of power in
isolation from his understanding of discourse and knowledge generation:29 “there can be
no possible exercise of power without a certain economy of discourses of truth which
operates through and on the power and we cannot exercise power except through the
production of truth.”30 This is what Foucault means by power/knowledge. Power is
fixed (at least temporarily) in the accepted forms of knowledge, scientific understandings,
and ‘truth’. Therefore, Foucault writes,
we should abandon the belief that… the renunciation of power is one of the
conditions of knowledge. We should admit… that power and knowledge directly
imply one another; that there is no power relation without the correlative
constitution of a field of knowledge, nor any knowledge that does not presuppose
and constitute at the same time power relations. These power/knowledge
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relations are to be analyzed, therefore, not on the basis of a subject of knowledge
who is or is not free in relation to the power system, but, on the contrary, the
subject who knows, the object to be known and the modalities of knowledge must
be regarded as so many effects of these fundamental implications of
power/knowledge and their historical transformations. In short, it is not the
activity of the subject of knowledge that produces a corpus of knowledge, useful
or resistant to power, but power/knowledge, the processes and struggles that
traverse it and of which it is made up, that determines the forms and possible
domains of knowledge.31
Indeed, the knowledge that transitional justice produces further entrenches these
practices.

It is important to draw attention to this relationship between power and

knowledge, especially with the surge of large-N quantitative studies that seek to evaluate
the success of transitional justice.

These studies rely on the established theory to

formulate and test hypothesis in hopes of generating new knowledge about transitional
justice mechanisms. Here, success and failure is determined by how well transitional
justice impacts the achievement of liberal democracy and levels of repression (the
commonly used variable used for measuring human rights),32 thus further closing our
understanding of justice.
However, it must be clear that I am not drawing on Foucault and Foucauldian
scholars as a justification for rejecting transitional justice altogether.

Central to

Foucault’s analysis is that “power is exercised over those who are in a position to choose,
and it aims to influence what their choices will be.”33 Accordingly, where the subject has
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no freedom or capacity to resist “there can be no relations of power.”34 Thus, Foucault
makes a distinction between power and domination where domination refers to “those
asymmetrical relationships of power in which the subordinated person has little room for
maneuver because their margin of liberty is extremely limited by the effects of power.”35
In Foucault’s conception of power, as in much of critical theory, domination is
“something that must be avoided whenever possible.”36 According to Ivison, “relations
of domination could, and certainly do, exist that could be masked by the discourse of
rights and sovereignty. But not all modern institutions are dominating in the specific
sense of the term.”37
So, this distinction between power and domination must be made if we are to see
that power is not entirely problematic (or avoidable, for that matter). The work of
Foucault challenges the sanctity of liberalism and reminds us that no single vocabulary
will best express “human essence” as such a thing does not exist. Yet, the recognition
that power is everywhere should not lead to nihilism. Instead, we must recognize that the
problem we face is not one of avoiding “relationships of power, but, rather, one of
establishing conditions which would allow these games of power to be played with a
minimum of domination.”38 In terms of transitional justice, the task at hand is not about
putting forward another expression of justice. Rather, it calls attention to the way justice
has had to conform or mold itself to fit the transition narrative in order to caution against
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the closure of justice around any single vocabulary. For, as soon as we identify the
Messiah of justice, things like democracy and liberal human rights, we enclose it in walls
and define what is and what is not worthy of its saving grace thereby perpetuating
domination through definition. In order to maintain openness, I argue that we must have
the intellectual space to challenge the canonization of any single theory.

Postmodern

theory offers a way of understanding the world that resists such certainty.
In conclusion, to ensure that there is a minimum of domination in our theories, we
must guard against the closing of justice around any particular conception. The work of
Derrida, Hampshire and Agamben are central for challenging liberalism—the dominant
vocabulary in the theory of field. Indeed, this is important especially given the way
marginal voices have traditionally been silenced by transitional justice theory.

As

Lyotard suggests, such theory “refines our sensitivity to differences and reinforces our
ability to tolerate the incommensurable.”39 As a deconstructive project, the goal is not
about destroying, but, rather, is an exercise in opening up justice to that which may come.
As a rite of passage, transitional justice understands conflict as something that can be
overcome.

Why?

Because, it holds the answer to how we can achieve this state.

Currently, this answer is tied to the Liberal Peace. In other words, the transitional justice
discourse is not a passive actor that has been manipulated by the Liberal Peace. Instead,
it has benefited tremendously from this relationship; transitional justice not only accepts
these liberal values without question, but also receives considerable legitimacy as a field
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because of these ideas.40 To deconstruct transitional justice theory, then, is to think of the
relationship between conflict and justice not as something that is final, but ongoing. At
the very least, we must heed the words of Rorty and be cognizant of what we are saying
and, perhaps more importantly, what we are not saying, when we speak of justice.

40
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